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This book is dedicated to our unsung heroes. 
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Introduction 
War. It is the darkest, most violent and archaic instrument used by mankind to gain 
power over humans and their territory. Generally, it conjures images of bullets, tanks, 
rockets, missiles, smoke and death. However, war may not be limited to hard military 
operations. In fact, a less obvious, softer, form of warfare appears to exist in which 
states use the power of attraction to strategically target hearts and minds in order to 
gain geopolitical power.  
 The term psychological warfare implies the use of soft power, to manipulate 
perceptions held within a population. The United States Department of Defense 
defines it as ―planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and 
ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.‖1 Thus, the objectives 
of powerful states play a determining role in who will be persuaded how to think, what 
to do and why. Markedly, the term psychological warfare suggests it is not limited to 
peaceful means or ends.  
 In recent years the use of soft power - the power of attraction - has been 
propagated as something positive in international relations. Yet, one must not 
overlook the fact that it belongs to the realm of power politics and power politics 
belong to the field of international security.2 If states were moral and ethical actors, 
their use of soft power would aim at influencing human behavior towards trust, the 
common good, and the realization of peace. However, when we extrapolate Lord 
Ashton‘s famous conclusion that ―great men are almost always bad men‖ because 
―power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely‖ to the realm of international 
relations, it implies that powerful states, the great actors in international relations, are 
also likely to be corrupt and not restrict themselves to legitimate means or ends while 
competing for power. Thus, in exercising soft power states may also target self-
perceptions and identity ideas in such a way as to make their citizens support or 
even participate in wars rather than coexist in peace.   
 The idea that an informal element of state power exists which influences 
perceptions to promote insurgency and war may seem implausible to some. It 
presupposes that soft power can be used to deteriorate national security to the extent 
                                               
1 U.S. Joint Forces Command (2009). Commander‘s Handbook for Strategic Communication and  Communication Strategy, Joint Warfighting 
Center posted 27 October. Available at: 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Strategic%20Communication%20Handbook%20JFC%2009.pdf 
2 In this study the terms ―soft power‖ and ―the power of attraction‖ are used interchangeably. 
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of causing conflict. Moreover, since the overt promotion of conflict, separatism, and 
war falls beyond the realms of legitimacy, such foreign policies are likely to be covert 
and rely on informal structures for logistics and financing. Markedly, the relationship 
between the state-makers and organized criminals may be more intimate than 
generally accepted.  
 History shows that sovereigns have relied on fear and their political-criminal 
relations to gain geopolitical power. The Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors 
used their ―God-given right‖ endowed upon them by Papal decree to help wipe out 
entire, highly cultured, ―Godless‖ civilizations whilst looting treasures and gold for 
their sovereigns. The Lettres du Marque converted wild, murderous and pillaging 
pirates on the high seas into sovereign-serving privateers. These letters serve as 
prime historical examples of how sovereigns converted belligerent, organized 
criminals into instruments of foreign policy. History is known to repeat itself. 
Disturbingly little reason exists to suggest the use of fear and political-criminal 
relations in international affairs belong to bygone days and history books.  
 The human condition is fragile and the tendency to be weary and distrustful of 
one‘s self and others continues to be promoted within our societies. In fact, the 
current human civilization has been molded by the manipulation of fear. Today, 
commercial marketing is a prime example of how fears of not being handsome 
enough, healthy enough, smart enough, safe enough, good enough, or rich enough 
are used to drive the economy. Not unlike corporations, states may use fear to 
realize their own geopolitical objectives. It is with reason that in 2010 the annual 
base-budget of the USA Defense was over $700 billion, and this figure does not 
include emergency or supplemental funding! It is with reason Machiavelli remains 
revered in universities all over the world for his iron-first advisory manuscript based 
on an approach to humanity that propagates rule guided by greed for power, material 
wealth, and the projection of fear over love. 
 Hearts and minds are targeted by soft power. Remarkably, despite its recent 
prevalence in international relations jargon, very little is known about how soft power 
is used, let alone the components of national security it affects. Moreover, whether or 
not states use political-criminal relations to fund and operationalise warfare remains 
unclear. It is therefore necessary to determine whether soft power is linked to 
national security in such as way as to promote conflict or insurgency, and, to 
establish whether a political-criminal nexus exists as an instrument of foreign policy 
which impacts the way states perceive and treat one another. It could be that the 
citizens of this world are informally being seduced into distrust, fear and justifying 
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war. It is therefore interesting to consider these matters within the international 
security dynamics of the first decade of the 21st Century.  
 The geopolitical interests and dynamics in the Black Sea Region make it a 
fine candidate for such an analysis. It is a region where, because of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the first decade of the 21st Century saw the political interests of 
great powers clash to such an extent that one of them appears to have used smart 
power3 to instrumentalise separatist conflict as a geopolitical tool.  
 The fall of the Soviet Union triggered a competition for power between the 
Russian Federation and the Western Allies i.e. US, NATO, EU. The game is rather 
simple: the great powers want more power. The West wanted new, reliable partners 
in the region: states willing and able to cooperate effectively and integrate into its 
economic and security structures. To this end, the transatlantic community forged 
new relationships by introducing Western democracy, the market system and 
collective security into hitherto uncharted Black Sea lands and waters. Contrarily, the 
interests of the Russian Federation were in regaining power over ―its‖ former Soviet 
republics. To do so, it needed to prevent the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea 
Region from having the national strategy, will and authority to effectively transform, 
cooperate and integrate with occidental institutions. The rationale is clear: Russia will 
lose power over the Black Sea Region only if these states successfully move away 
from the Russian-centered post-Soviet regional security complex.  
 Russia‘s foreign policy has been identified as exporting its model of 
governance characterized by a symbiosis of neo-KGB structures, organized crime, 
state bureaucracy, and government connected big business. And, that the Russian 
Federation uses its secret services, NGOs and media to promote its interests and 
objectives.4 The use of these institutions is indicative of a soft power component of 
Russia‘s foreign policy. Moreover, the fact that the Russian Federation is often 
referred to as a state whose ―system relies on a secret army of informants and 
provocateurs, on coordination between organized crime and the police, on controlled 
opposition and double agents, on false fronts and Potemkin villages‖ suggests 
organized political-criminal elements may also be at play.5  
                                               
3 The term ―smart power‖ refers to a policy which combined the use of hard military force combined with soft power operations. Since being 
developed by Joseph Nye, the term has been frequently used particularly by the Obama Administration. 
4 (Socor 2005; Jackson 2006). 
5 Nyquist J. R., (2007). Putin‘s Munich Speech, Geopolitical Global Analysis.  Available at 
<http://www.financialsensearchive.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2007/0216.html> 
see also Shelly L. (1999). Organized Crime in the Former Soviet Union: The Distinctiveness of Georgia. Transnational Crime and Corruption 
Center. Available at: < http://www.traccc.cdn.ge/publications/index_subject.html#crime>  Also, Jackson, B. P. (2006). The ―Soft War‖ For 
Europe‘s East, in Policy Review June & July: 3-14.  
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 Let us be reminded that the Soviet Union was an amalgamation of 15 
republics with the Russian one at its center. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the 
Russian Federation became its formal successor. It inherited the Kremlin-centered 
Soviet machine. The rest inherited the remnants of those hierarchical political and 
security networks. Thus, the Russian Federation‘s policy toward separatism and self-
determination in the post-Soviet space calls for attention in this regard. It is also 
important to recall that the promotion of separatism inside third states violates the 
principle of non-intervention. It is prohibited by national and international laws. And, 
by their very nature, separatists and insurgent groups depend on informal networks 
for funding and organization.6  
 Moscow defends the federation‘s territorial integrity with a strict no-tolerance 
policy to self-determination within its federal subjects (i.e. Chechnya, Dagestan, 
Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachey-Cherkessia and North Ossetia-Alania). 
Yet, it openly supports the separatists in the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea 
Region (Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan/Armenia; Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 
Georgia; Transdniestria in Moldova and The Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 
Ukraine).7 Markedly, separatism in these territories wreaks havoc in the Black Sea 
Region. It deters democratization and, ultimately, the increased engagement of 
Western powers, particularly NATO.8  
 After the coloured revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the two states 
intensified their foreign policies of Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time, the 
threat of pro-Russian separatism in their territories grew.9 In Ukraine, the separatist 
sentiment gradually intensified particularly in its Autonomous Republic of Crimea, 
where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) is stationed. Then, in 2006, for the first 
time in the history of Ukrainian-NATO relations, pro-Russian NGOs and separatists in 
Crimea thwarted the annual US-led, NATO ―Sea Breeze‖ exercise. Less than two 
years later, at the 2008 NATO Summit in Budapest, Ukraine and Georgia were 
assured eventual NATO membership. This notwithstanding, their ascension to the 
Membership Action Plan (MAP) was blocked by France and Germany. Russian-
backed separatism and high diplomacy appear to have played a major role in this 
regard.   
                                               
6 Kemp, W. A. 2004. The Business of Ethnic Conflict. Security Dialogue vol. 35, no. 1, March,  43-59. 
7 This support is most vividly exemplified by the stationing of Russian Military forces there and by the Friendship Treaties signed between 
Moscow and the break away territories.  
8 For instance, NATO has never accepted a state with a foreign military presence or conflict within its sovereign territory. Such a move would be 
too risky for the collective security organization which is, at least legalistically, based on the principle of solidarity encapsulated by Article 5 of the 
NATO Treaty.  
9 (Georgia: 2003, Ukraine: 2004-2005) 
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 After the ascension to MAP was blocked, Vladimir Putin, the then President of 
the Russian Federation, addressed the Euro-Atlantic Community. He formalized 
Russia‘s negative stance toward NATO enlargement and drew a direct correlation 
between Euro-Atlantic integration, separatism within the post-Soviet states and the 
recognition of Kosovo. He warned NATO members to be careful: ―We have been 
very responsible, very weighted, and call on you to be careful as well‖.10 Then, 
Vladimir Putin cast doubt on the legitimacy of the 1954 Soviet transfer of Crimea to 
Ukraine and asserted: ―We have been calm and responsible about these problems. 
We are not trying to provoke anything, we have been acting very carefully, but we 
ask our partners to act reasonably as well‖.11 Subsequently the Russian president 
incorrectly stated that the entire southern part of Ukraine is inhabited completely by 
Russians and continued: ―If we introduce into it to NATO problems …it may put the 
state on the verge of its existence.‖12  
 Another set of dynamics was also linked to the reason Georgia and Ukraine 
had been blocked from the MAP: the Western Allies‘ need for Russian support in 
their war in Afghanistan. Vladimir Putin clearly stated: ―If the discussion on your 
expansion issues developed differently yesterday, today‘s transit agreement would 
not likely be signed. But, considering that, nevertheless, as we understand, our 
concerns were heard, somehow at last, we made the decision for ourselves to not 
stop the collaboration on Afghanistan, but, to put it honestly, there was such a 
desire…‖13  
 Not all of Putin‘s warnings were heeded; the NATO allies continued to 
recognize Kosovo as an independent state. And, a few months later, the Russian 
Federation entered a war with Georgia. Remarkably, the Russian Federation 
launched successful naval operations against Georgia, Ukraine‘s democratizing ally, 
from Ukraine‘s Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The operations destroyed virtually 
all of Georgia‘s naval capacity. These facts call for attention and exemplify one set of 
reasons Ukraine‘s pro-Western Orange Coalition maintained its policy not to extend 
the treaty governing the stationing of Russia‘s Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. Markedly, 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet also appears to have played a rolein supporting pro-
Russian separatism in Crimea and countering Ukraine‘s democratic processes and 
Euro-Atlantic integration.   
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After the war, Russia succeeded in taking effective control of Georgia‘s break-away 
territory South Ossetia. On 26 August 2008, the new Russian President, Dmitri 
Medvedev, signed decrees recognizing Georgia‘s breakaway territories, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, as independent, sovereign states. Pro-Russian forces in 
Crimea moved, illegitimately, to do the same. Some of them also called upon the 
Russian Federation to ―liberate them‖ by annexing Crimea as well.14  
The timing of the Russo-Georgian war was also important to Ukraine. It 
preceded the country‘s Presidential elections where the pro-Russian candidate Viktor 
Yanukovich, whose severe election falsifications in 2004 led to the Orange 
Revolution was, once again, a main candidate. Curiously, within a few short months 
of his inauguration, in 2010, an extremely controversial treaty prolonging the 
stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea to the year 2042 was signed. It 
was passed by the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine‘s Parliament, amidst great controversy 
and violent uproar. Then, virtually all of the separatist sentiment in Crimea silenced.  
 It therefore appears that a significant pro-Russian contingent in Crimea 
supported Russia‘s foreign policy toward Ukraine. Yet, the Western press reported 
that experts believed the separatist sentiment in Crimea was forged similarly to 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia (Georgia), Transdniestria (Moldova), and even Nagorno-
Karabakh (Azerbaijan/Armenia).15 Did Russia indeed provoke separatism in Crimea 
to fend off Ukraine‘s democratic development and Euro-Atlantic integration? Could it 
be that Russia targeted the hearts and minds of the Crimean population to make 
them want to break the peninsula away from Ukraine? Did a post-Soviet network 
combine the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with soft power operations that 
shaped the interests and perceptions in Crimea to make separatist conflict appear 
justified? And, if so, which elements of Ukraine‘s national security had to be 
strategically targeted to forge separatism as an unlit match in front of a gas tank, to 
be lit, or not to be lit, in accordance with developments in global affairs? Would the 
activities of such an international separatist network be legitimate, or would they fall 
outside the realm of legitimacy and rely on a covert, political-criminal nexus for 
logistical and financial support? 
 These questions arise out of a lack of knowledge regarding the connection 
between soft power, national security, separatism and the role of the political-criminal 
nexus in international relations. It is hoped that this lack of knowledge will be 
resolved here by answering the following question; the centerpiece of this study:  
                                               
14 Danilova M. (2008). After Georgia War, eyes turn to Crimea. Chron. Available at: <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/world/6039350.html> 
15 Krushelnycky A.  (2008 b). Crimean Peninsula Could Be The Next South Ossetia, in The Independent,  posted 28 August. Available at: 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/crimean-peninsula-could-be-the-next-south-ossetia-910769.html> 
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What are the linkages between national security, soft power and the political-
criminal nexus, and, to what extent are they part of the Russian Federation’s 
foreign policy towards Ukraine, particularly, its Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea? 
  
To answer the main research question, a number of key understandings must first be 
developed. To this end, the following four sub-questions have been formulated and 
shall also be answered:  
 
1) What is the relationship between soft power, national security, and 
separatism? 
 
2) Are political-criminal relations used by states as an instrument of foreign 
policy and does their use as such affect the way states perceive each other in 
international relations; if so, what is the profile of the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus?  
 
3) What is Russia’s soft power policy toward the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea via the Russian Black Sea Fleet; and what is the extent to which Russia 
utilizes a political-criminal nexus in this particular case? 
 
Just like a surgeon requires precision instruments to perform delicate surgery, the 
international relations analyst requires theoretical instruments to answer her 
questions.16 Yet, unlike medical science, the science of international relations is an 
integrative one and ―cannot be studied and taken seriously if not conceived within the 
broader framework of the social sciences in general‖.17 Thus, depending on the 
research interests, the international relations scholar must rely on the findings of 
other social sciences where they pertain to transnational, international and foreign 
policy, or, domestic, socio- and economic-political phenomena.18  
 When we consider the research question at hand, it becomes clear that this 
study depends on the findings of four disciplines, namely, International Relations, 
Security Studies, Criminology and International Law. It is divided into three parts:  
                                               
16 Volten, P.M.E., Professor Emeritus, Director of the Center of European Security Studies, personal communications, Groningen. 
17 Schulte-Bockholt A. (2006). The Politics of Organized Crime and the Organized Crime of Politics: Critical Perspectives on Crime and 
Inequality. Oxford: Lexington Books, p 19. 
18 Ibid. 
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The objective of Part One is to determine how soft power interlinks with national 
security and to identify which components would need to be targeted to promote 
separatism. To this end, it is first necessary to identify the elements of state power, 
particularly intangible power, and how they relate to one another. Already in 1977, 
former top CIA analyst, Ray Cline, identified a multilayered approach to state power 
as ―the ability of the government of one state to cause the government of another 
state to do something the latter otherwise would not choose to do - whether by 
persuasion, coercion, or outright military force‖.19 He developed a calculus for 
measuring state power potential which will be used here. It identifies the tangible and 
intangible components of state power and how they interrelate.  
 Second, an interesting commonality appears to exist between Cline‘s 
approach to power and Buzan‘s et al. sectoral approach to national security. The 
sectoral approach extends the concept of security to non-traditional security sectors. 
A complimentary relationship appears to exist between the intangible components of 
state power and the political and societal security sectors. Thus, the Buzan et al. 
approach to security analysis is presented and compared with Cline‘s perceived 
power. Nye‘s notion of soft power is used to clarify the rather elusive notion of 
intangible state power.  
 Cline, Buzan et al, and Nye all have separate, but complimentary approaches 
to security analysis. Their approaches to state power and national security are used 
to identify the components of national security which would need to be targeted by 
soft power to promote separatism. In so doing it is expected that a framework for the 
analysis of soft power security will be created. 
 
The objective of Part Two is to establish the nature of the political-criminal nexus, 
whether it is used as a foreign policy instrument, and if it affects the way states 
perceive one another in international relations. Although increasing attention is paid 
to transnational organized crime in international relations, analyses remain rather 
restricted to the apolitical character of organized crime. Here transnational organized 
crime is considered from a political context. 
 First, it is necessary to know what transnational organized crime is and 
whether the international legal community has linked it to foreign policies. The 
phenomenon is considered from the perspective of the international community. 
Then, the highest level treaty which provides the legal threshold which must be 
                                               
19 Cline R. S. (1977). World Power Assessment 1977: a  calculus of strategic drift. Boulder: Westview Press. pg. 7. 
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crossed for unlawful acts to constitute transnational organized crime, the 2000 UN 
Palermo Treaty against Transnational Organized Crime is examined. Particular 
attention is paid to those articles and annotations which indicate that states recognize 
the existence and use of transnational political-criminal relationships.  
Second, it has been noted that the current view of the state‘s monopoly of the 
use of force may be too limited or one dimensional.20 To determine if political-criminal 
relations belong to the instruments of foreign policy, it is necessary to establish if the 
monopoly over the use of force includes transnational organized crime. It is also 
necessary to determine the historical linkages existing between the state and 
organized crime. To this end, Max Weber‘s theory on the state‘s monopoly over the 
use of force is revisited. Max Horkheimer‘s Racket Theory, Charles Tilly‘s and 
William Chambliss‘ research into the history of state-building are among the materials 
used to establish the philosophical and historical relationship between the state and 
organized crime.  
Third, because the main objective of this part is to determine if a political-
criminal nexus is used by states to gain power abroad, political-criminal relations 
need to be dynamic. They must affect territorial spheres of influence in international 
relations. The stage evolutionary model of organized crime is used to ascertain if 
formal and informal structures affect others‘ spheres of influence, particularly 
territory. To date, the model has only been applied on a state-level of analysis. Here, 
it is extrapolated it from the national or sub-system level to the realm of international 
relations.   
Fourth, to determine if the political-criminal nexus affects the way states 
perceive one another (i.e. their identities) it is necessary to ascertain whether it 
constitutes a social structure within the state. Social structures influence state identity 
and the ways states perceive one another. Thus, in establishing it as such, 
knowledge will be gained into state identities, perceptions and, in turn, behavior.  The 
invaluable insight into the nature of the political-criminal nexus as presented by Roy 
Godson is combined with the criminological, social network approach to determine 
the motivational and structural causes for political-criminal cooperation. And, to 
understand how the political-criminal nexus figures in international relations, the 
findings of the aforementioned chapters are combined to examine the interface 
between state security services, transnational organized crime and political ideology.  
                                               
20 Müller H. (2004). Think Big!: Der 11. September und seine Konsequenzen Für die Internationalen Bexiehungen, in Zeitschfift für 
Internationale Beziehungen 11. Jg. Heft 1. p. 126 
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 Fifth, it is expected that by answering this first set of questions, political-
criminal relations will be established as a social structure available as an instrument 
of foreign policy to be used in pursuit, or defense, of state interests. The theoretical 
findings of this part are expected to facilitate the profiling of political-criminal relations 
according to the region or state of origin. In the last chapter of part two, and in 
preparation for the case study, the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is profiled as a 
dynamic structure centered on the Russian state. By profiling the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus the comprehension of the geopolitics in the Black Sea Region 
and the security dynamics within the post-Soviet states is expected to be facilitated.  
 
Part Three contains the case study and is divided into two main chapters.  The first 
chapter sets the perspective; Ukraine‘s geopolitical position and the manner in which 
the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus figures inside Ukraine. In order to connect the 
linkages between soft power, national security and the post-Soviet political criminal 
nexus to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, particular attention is given to 
the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) and pro-Russian separatism in Crimea. Special 
attention is given to the city of Sevastopol where the fleet‘s main base is located. In 
the second chapter, a presentation and analysis are made of those Russian 
institutions linked to soft power operations aimed at trust-building between the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine‘s population in Crimea. In the end of this part, the 
framework for soft power security analysis developed in Part One is used to 
determine the relationship between soft power, the post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus and the promotion of separatism in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 
Ukraine. 
 By relying on open source materials, Ukrainian archives, information collected 
in the field including interviews with top ranking experts including Ukraine‘s Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Boris Tarasyuk, Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovainiy and the 
former Mayor of Sevastopol Viktor Semenov, the role the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
played in Sevastopol and in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is examined. 
Particular attention is given to the promotion of separatism, the actors, and the 
manner in which soft power was used in this regard. In the final part of the case study 
the information is analyzed to determine the extent to which it is possible to conclude 
that the promotion of separatism in Ukraine is interlinked with the use of soft power 
and the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
 The research at hand is not only founded on theories from the disciplines of 
International Relations, Security Studies, Criminology and international Law; its 
objective is also to enhance them. It is expected to find that states can provoke 
 - 11 - 
separatism using soft power. The inclusion of a political-criminal nexus into the state 
arsenal is expected to shed light on how states effectuate their unofficial policies.  
And, that a soft power security framework will be developed with which to analyze 
state behavior in this regard. It is also anticipated that the political-criminal nexus is 
linked to state-building and identity. It is expected that it is a social structure which 
influences state identity and affects the manner in which states perceive one another 
and behave.  
This study is also designed to provide insight into how Kremlin-oriented 
political-criminal relations pose a threat to democratic transformation and the 
sovereignty of post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region. In the case that it will be 
possible to conclude that the promotion of separatism in Crimea is linked to soft 
power operations and a transnational political-criminal nexus, the immediate greater 
implication of such a conclusion will be that this policy is not necessarily restricted to 
Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine, but is used in the other post-Soviet states in 
the Black Sea Region as well.  
 More importantly, it may be possible to extrapolate the conclusion to the 
global level of international relations as a whole and thereby shed light on how states 
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Part ONE: Soft Power Security 
 
In a competition with soft power, it matters very much what you and others think. If I shoot you 
to achieve my objective, it does not matter much what you think. 
     
          Nye 2008 
 
1. Introduction 
The power of the state and its ability to realize domestic and international goals 
derive from a combination of hard and soft power. Nye defines power as the ability to 
influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants by using sticks (i.e. 
coercion, inducement), carrots (i.e. attraction) or a combination of both (i.e. smart 
power).
21
 This multilayered approach to state power was presented by Cline in 1977 
as ―the ability of the government of one state to cause the government of another 
state to do something the latter otherwise would not choose to do - whether by 
persuasion, coercion, or outright military force‖.
22
 The focus here is on ―the carrots‖: 
persuasion and attraction.  
 Nye asserts that an entire playing field of foreign relations based on the 
power of attraction has been greatly ignored by policy makers and analysts.
23
 Moïsi 
has taken the concept of soft power a step further by asserting a ―geopolitics of 
emotion‖ which is compelled by three basic emotions (fear, hope and humiliation) 
drives state behavior and international relations.
24
 This anthropomorphization also 
supports the constructivist approach to understanding state behavior, which is based 
on the study of ideas, identity and perception. Yet, the analysis of how states use 
immaterial power such as the soft power of attraction and psychological attributes 
such as emotion remains vague in international relations studies. This is particularly 
disconcerting as these intangible attributes clearly influence national and 
international security.  
 To determine whether states use soft power to gain power over foreign 
territory illegitimately (i.e. whether its use is linked to the promotion of separatism and 
political-criminal relations) it is necessary to know what soft power is. Moreover, it is 
                                               
21 Nye 2004: 2, 34 and  Nye 2008: x, xii, 83t. 
22 Cline, 7. 
23 Nye, 2004. 
24 Moïsi D. (2009). The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation and Hope are Reshaping the World. New York: Doubleday. 
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crucial for analysts to be aware of the components of national security soft power 
operations target in order to promote insurgency by way of attraction.    
To this end, Cline‘s formula of perceived power potential, the sectoral 
approach to security as presented by Buzan et al. and Nye‘s notion of soft power are 
used in the following chapters. First, a presentation is made of Cline‘s calculus of 
perceived power. Developed in 1977, it presents one tangible and one intangible set 
of perceived power components of the state. Cline‘s formula is still of contemporary 
relevance. And, it is particularly interesting to the study of soft power because it allots 
more value to the intangible set. The reasons for their weighted significance will also 
be examined.  
 Second, for the security analyst an appealing feature of Cline‘s formula is that 
it appears to compliment and coincide with, the Copenhagen School‘s approach to 
international security studies. Territorial, economic, military, political and societal 
forces are the fundaments of both. The constitutive elements of political and societal 
security are presented to determine the structural commonalities existing between 
Cline‘s intangibles and the soft security sectors. Nye‘s conceptualization of soft 
power is used to clarify how the rather elusive notion of intangible power is used by 
states in their international relations. 
 Cline, Buzan et al. and Nye all have separate, but complimentary approaches 
to international security analysis. Their approaches are used here to identify the 
constituent parts of state power, the relationship between soft power and national 
security, and the manners in which soft power can affect the national security of 
states according to Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian interests. It is expected that by 
identifying the main intangible components of power and national security, a 
framework for soft power security analysis will be created. The soft power security 
framework will facilitate the analysis of how states use the power of attraction to gain 
geopolitical power.   
 - 14 - 
1.1 The Perceived Power of the State 
The ways in which humans relate to their own personal strength and communicate 
with one another are the fundaments of society and civilization, much in the same 
manner in which states relate to their own power and each other are the fundaments 
of international relations and diplomacy. When observing relations between states, 
Cline saw that ―the strength of nations and of the clusters of nations allied to one 
another waxes and wanes in conformity with subterranean rhythms of economic, 




Cline‘s theory of strategic drift, politectonics, was developed in the midst of 
the Cold War. Likening the shifts in regional cooperation to the Earth‘s tectonics, he 
developed the term politectonics to denote ―the formation and breakup of 
international power groupings, mainly regional in makeup, but also shaped by 
cultural, political, and economic forces‖. 
26
 Endeavoring to develop an analytical 
instrument for measuring the perceived power of states, he created a formula that 
identifies the main categories of state power and how they relate to one another. This 
formula is presented in the first section of this chapter. However, before considering 
this formula, it is important to consider its name.  
Already in the mid-seventies, before the Copenhagen school of thought 
introduced the concept of identity and perceptions to international security analysis, 
Cline named his formula the ―Formula of Perceived Power‖. By referring to and 
analyzing the ―power of perception‖ he also indirectly eluded to concepts which would 
be developed decades later by his peers in the United States and Europe, namely, 
soft power and state identity.  
 The correlation between perceptions and concrete elements of power is a 
potent one. This fact is readily exposed throughout nature where harmless animals 
are endowed with deceiving features that make them appear dangerous and, 
contrarily, predators are oftentimes cloaked as harmless, if not seductive. The same 
appears to hold true in the realm of politics and international relations where 
perceptions of power are not derived solely from material or physical qualities but 
from immaterial ones as well.  
 For Cline, it was crucial that his readers recognize the correlation between 
power and perceptions of power: ―we are talking about perceptions of power by 
                                               
25 Cline, 5. 
26 Cline, 3 - 4.  
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governments, which are often influenced by popular perceptions, and not necessarily 
about concrete elements of usable power‖.
27
 Thus, popular perceptions play an 
important role in how the state perceives its own power and that of others.  
 As the power of perception relates to interstate relations, Cline forewarned 
that states must temper their perceptions of one another because perceptions can 
lead to error and war: ―A national cannot afford to become mesmerized by the power 
potential of an adversary. An obsessive preoccupation with hostile governments can 
lead to error, either through exaggerated fear of the dangers they present or through 
anxiety to placate them‖.
28
 There is power in perception itself and, ultimately, the 
manner in which the ―other‖ is perceived may have less to do with who the ―other‖ 
actually is than with the perception one holds of the ―self‖.  
 However, according to Nye, ―Practical politicians and ordinary people often 
find questions of behavior and motivation too complicated. They turn to a second 
definition of power and simply define it as the possession of capabilities or resources 
that can influence outcomes. Consequently, they consider a country powerful when it 
has a relatively large population and territory, extensive natural resources, economic 
strength, military force and social stability. The virtue of this second definition is that it 
makes power appear more concrete, measureable, and predictable. But this 
definition also has problems.‖
29
 Cline was an analyst who did not shy away from 
problems of perceptions, behavior and motivation. Rather, he found the interface 
between the material and immaterial components of power pivotal to understanding 
international relations.   
 
It is no secret that measuring the power of states accurately is extremely difficult. 
Regardless of the selected approach, the results are bound to be inexact. Cline 
asserts that when analysts attempt to quantify the power of states, they enter a 
region where numbers can only be notations of highly subjective judgments and 
nothing more.
30
 His calculus of strategic drift is a macrometric technique, which 
seeks patterns and trends in international relationships by measuring power in a 
broad context where working with details is not always necessary or possible. Many 
of the variables are not truly quantifiable and, as a result, his calculus is not exact 
and the formula is not a ―magic measuring rod‖.
31
 Rather, it is a study of plausibility. 
                                               
27 Cline, 35. 
28 Cline, 8.   
29 Nye 2004:3. 
30 Cline, 44. 
31 Cline, 34-35.  
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This notwithstanding, the formula not only facilitates the calculation of perceived 
power, it indirectly identifies the components of power which states must modify in 
pursuit of geopolitical power. It follows that - lacking effective protection or 
securitization - their modification can lead to the loss of sovereign control over 
citizenry or territory, and unltimately the loss of sovereignty itself.  
 Two sets of power components are identified in the Perceived Power formula. 
The first contains three material components: the critical mass (C), economic 
capability (E), and military capability (M) of the state. Their aggregate constitutes the 
tangible power of the state. The second set contains the two immaterial components 
of state power: Strategic Purpose (S) and the National Will (W). Their aggregate 
constitutes the intangible power of the state.  The perceived power of any given state 
is the product of the tangible and intangible components of state power.
32
 The 
formula is expressed as follows:  
 
Pp = (C+ E + M) x (S + W) 
 
Although the focus here is on the intangibles, to understand their value within the 
power equation it is necessary to briefly consider the tangible components of power.  
The distribution of territory and population among states is obviously unbalanced. 
The Critical Mass (C) refers to the land mass of a state and the number of people 
economically supported by it.
33
 In the formula, it accounts for an arbitrary maximum 
of 100 points in which 50 points are allotted to the predominance in numbers of 
people and 50 to the predominance in the extent of the territory.
34
 A bonus weight 




The component of Economic Capability (E) is made up of two variables: the 
Gross National Product (GNP) and the state‘s resources. Cline uses the state‘s 
Gross National Product to determine a global ranking order. The state with the 
highest GNP is allotted 100 points; proportionately lesser scores are assigned to 
states with smaller GNPs.
36
 Using the same argumentation when awarding bonus 
points to states with crucial strategic locations, Cline identifies five broad factors that 
can adjust a state‘s Economic Capability ranking. The second variable affecting E is 
                                               
32 Ibid. 
33 Cline, 37. 
34 Cline, 38.   
35 Cline, 45-6. 
36 Cline, 58. 
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made up of bonus economic weights outside of the GNP. The five ―bonus factors‖ are 
energy resources, minerals, industrial strength, agriculture, and foreign economic 
relations.
37
  Each can deliver an additional 20 points to the state‘s perceived power 
(to an additional maximum of 100 points).
38
 Combining the GNP with the bonus 
factors brings the highest possible total to 200 points.  
 In formulating estimates of perceived Military Capability (M), units and 
weapons must be laboriously counted and great efforts made to obtain the raw data 
upon which to base statistics. Because the interest here lies in the intangible 
components of states power, it is neither the purpose nor intention to give a detailed 
account of how military capabilities should be counted. Thus, only a brief overview is 
given of components which are factored into it. A state may gain a maximum of 200 
points for its military capabilities:  100 points to the perceived power of states for 
strategic nuclear capability and 100 for conventional weapons force balance. 
 Together, the state‘s population and territory (C), economic capabilities (E) 
and military capability (M) form the tangible components of perceived power. Their 
maximum aggregate is 500.  
  
C 
Territory 50  
Population 50  
  100 
E 
GDP 100  
strategic resources 100  
  200 
M 
strategic nuclear capabilities 100  
conventional weapons 100  
  200 
total (C+E+M)  500 
 
Figure 1 Tangible Power Equation 
 
In the formula, this figure relies heavily on the value allotted to the intangible 
components of power. Whereas Nye asserts, ―soft power does not depend on hard 
power‖, Cline goes a step further. He asserts that intangible power can actually nullify 
the tangible components of state power not vice versa.
39
 It is not immediately evident 
how intangible or ―soft‖ power can actually nullify the value of a state‘s material 
                                               
37 Ibid. 
38 In a few cases of otherwise economically powerful nations, specific weaknesses are so apparent that a negative value maybe in increased or 
decreased in proportion to such a special economic strength or weakness. (Cline, 60). 
39 Nye 2004:9. 
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assets. It is therefore necessary to consider the total allotted value for intangible 
power and the way it is used in Cline‘s formula.  
 Working from the assumption that most states have little or no enlargement 
policies and that their strength does not reach very far beyond their territory at all, 
Cline allots an index weight of 1 to the aggregate of Strategic Purpose (S) and 
National Will (W) (.5 for each). In the case that a state achieves this arbitrary index 




Pp = (100+200+200) x (.5+ .5) = 500 
 
However, a maximum weight of 2 is possible for the combined intangible components 
of power. Strong states with clear strategic plans for international enlargement can 
receive a larger number of the factor S. The value of S can reach a value weight of 
up to an arbitrary maximum score of 1. Similarly, nations with a strong National Will 
that are unified socially, psychologically, and politically behind strategic aims, may 
also be assigned a larger index number (up to the arbitrary maximum of 1) for the 
factor W. This can thereby double the points allotted to the tangible components.
41
 
For instance, let us assume that a state has scored a full 500 points on tangibles, 
and also reached the maximum of 2 points for the intangibles. In such a case, the 
total perceived power score of that state would be 1000.  
 
Pp = (100+200+200) x (1+1) = 1000 
 
The opposite effect is also possible. States that are weak, strategically confused, 
and/or suffer national disunity may score below the ―normal‖ index weight of .5.
42
 A 
fractional index rating below .5 for one, or both, of the intangible factors results in 
reduced values for the tangible (material) components of state power.  
It is easy to perceive states as being weaker and stronger in these areas. 
However, it is difficult to imagine a state with no strategy and no National Will 
whatsoever. This is because ―lacking a coherent national strategy or organized 
national political will to carry out any strategy, the tangible elements of its power may 




                                               
40 Cline, 143.   
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 141, 143-44.  
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Pp = (100+200+200) x (.0 + .0) = 0 
 
Now that the manner in which tangible power components interact with the intangible 
ones has been presented, it should become apparent that from a security 
perspective, a state with Lockean or Hobbesian intentions would be wise to target the 
intangible components of state power. It is therefore important to know what the 
intangible components are and how they relate to national security.  
 
1.1.1 Intangible Power 
Cline identifies the intangible components of perceived power, the national Strategic 
Purpose and the National Will as the most important factors in any net assessment of 
state power.
44
 Since they are the key components of perceived state power, it is 
foreseeable that Kantian states will move to develop or nurture them both nationally 
and internationally. Conversely, because of their inherent value, it is in the interest of 
states with Hobbesian or Lockean intentions to target and modify them in a manner 
which provides them geopolitical power.  
 Before considering these two components of state power and how their value 
is quantified, it is important to distinguish between the manner in which strong and 
weak states use intangible power. Cline asserts most countries are normally 
preoccupied with local and regional interests but should be able to ―summon up 
sufficient political and social cohesion to pursue their rather limited national purposes 
with reasonable effectiveness in the international arena‖.
45
 Great powers have the 
capacity to influence international relations and create global strategies. Secondary 
powers are unlikely to influence international relations on their own; therefore they 
create associations with more powerful states.
46
  
Nye notes that throughout history, weaker states have either joined to 
balance and limit the power of a threatening stronger state, or have been attracted to 
―jumping on the bandwagon led by a strong country, particularly when they have little 
choice or when the large country‘s military power is accompanied by soft power.‖
47
 
An example of this is the perceived necessity of post-Communist and post-Soviet 
states to join NATO and the EU. Conversely, Russia‘s perception that such alliances 
                                               
44 Ibid., 144, 176. 
45 Ibid., 142. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Nye, 2004:25-26. 
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will lead to Russia‘s loss of influence leads to a policy of deterring such 
developments.  
 However, states influence the course of their international relations in ways 
that are not always blatantly connected to participation in one or another military or 
economic block. They also use soft power strategically to influence international 
relations on other social levels. For example, in the US ―powerful policy effects‖ have 
been traced back to a miniscule number (40-50) of college/graduate exchanges that 
took place in the 1950s.
48
  Another, rather novel, example of how soft power is used 
to influence interstate relations relates to food. For instance, Thailand‘s government, 
having discovered that foreigners love Thai food, set a goal of boosting the number 
of Thai restaurants overseas as a way to ―subtly help to deepen relations with other 
countries‖. Soft power is available to all countries, and many invest in ways to use 
soft-power resources to ―punch above their weight: in international politics‖.
49
  
 Equally, a lack of command or even knowledge of intangible power makes the 
state and its institutions particularly vulnerable to external penetration. A great power 
interested in preventing smaller states from summoning enough political and social 
cohesion to realize their interests, would aim at weakening their internal and external 
Strategic Purpose and National Will. It would strive to counteract balancing alliance 
strategies by making them appear altogether unappealing. Thus, to be successful in 
international relations, the state must have an effective strategy and the National Will 
to realize it. These  main components of state power considered in detail below. 
 
Strategic Purpose 
The national Strategic Purpose of a state depends on its specific category (i.e. great 
power, secondary or tertiary power). It also fluctuates with the political and security 
environment. Despite this fluid nature, national Strategic Purpose determines the 
conditions for cooperation or conflict with other countries, chances for political life or 
death and, eventually, national survival or extinction.
50
  
 It is possible to deduce from this assertion that the purpose of national 
strategy is threefold: 1) to protect and serve the interests of the nation, 2) to secure 
the political system and 3) to provide an international angle through which the state 
relates with others. Ideally, these functions should be served in a manner that 
protects and enhances the interests and agreed goals of the nation as expressed 
                                               
48 Ibid., 26. 
49 Ibid., 89. 
50 Cline, 142.   
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through their government leaders.
51
 Converting resources into desired outcomes 
requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership.
52
  
 Cline does not provide a set of criteria with which to measure or judge the 
strength of national Strategic Purpose. Rather, he identifies two pillars upon which 
national Strategic Purpose rests: the nation and its aggregate interests. Together, 
these pillars form the common purpose upon which (over and above individual goals) 
effective strategy depends.
53
 Those endowed with the responsibility of creating 
national strategy should use it to benefit the nation and, in turn, the power of the 
state. Although political colors may change, the state must maintain a general drift 
reflective of its nation.  
It is not necessary for everyone within the nation to agree with the trend or 
general direction which reflects its shared common purposes.
54
 Yet, ideology is the 
driving force of national Strategic Purpose and sets the norms for acceptable thinking 
and behavior.
55
 It is the responsibility of the state to support this generally 
discernable trend and progressively promote the common interests of its people.   
 It is important to note the government should first derive the common 
interests from its populace and then formulate strategy. However, since public 
opinion is moldable, the state is in a position to influence the formulation of interests 
within the populace. The shaping of public opinion by states is not a new 
phenomenon. It is both an internal and external practice which affects, and is 
affected by, the strength category of the state concerned.  
 According to Nye, the shaping of public opinion and interests is particularly 
important where authoritarian governments have been replaced by new 
democracies.
56
 States in transition often receive assistance from third states or 
international organizations to develop strategy and transformation policies because 
―where there is ambivalence there is scope for policy to try to improve the ration of 
the positive to the negative perceptions‖.
57
 However, forming the public opinion and 
national Strategic Purpose of states in transition is a particularly difficult task. The 
players are either in an ideological vacuum, or are divided between the old ideology 
and a new one. This makes their state particularly vulnerable to both internal 
instability and external influence.  
                                               
51 Ibid. 
52 Nye, 2004: 3.   
53 Cline, 141. 
54 Ibid.   
55 Cline, 152. 
56 Nye, 2004: 105. 
57 Ibid., 53. 
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In this regard, there is a fine line between democratic responsibilities of the 
state, the state‘s shaping of public opinion for its own Strategic Purposes, and 
external interference into national political processes. The Strategic Purpose of the 
state should secure the domestic interests of the nation. On the international level, it 
should strengthen the state and its international standing through the creation of 
alliances that serve the state‘s national security.  
 In his assessment of the Soviet Union‘s national Strategic Purpose, Cline 
awarded it with a high score. He did so because of its international power, coherent 
strategy, and formulations of national goals as rhetoric of ideology, and, tightly 
controlled population.
58
 Ironically, however, the social costs, particularly related to the 
tight controls placed upon its population, eventually led to the demise of the Soviet 
Union. 
 Viewing strategy from a slightly different angle, Nye presents a number of 
examples of how soft power was strategically used to by the United States to serve 
its foreign policy interests abroad: 
   
Not only was popular culture relevant to the achievement of 
American foreign policy goals in Western Europe but it also has 
been important for a number of other policy goals, including the 
undercutting of the apartheid regime in South Africa, the increase 
in the number of democratic governments in Latin America and 
parts of East Asia, the overthrow of the Milosevic regime in 
Serbia, pressure for liberalization in Iran, and the consolidation of 
an open international economic system, to name just a few. 
Indeed, when South Africa in 1971 was debating whether to allow 
television into the county, Albert Hertzog, a conservative former 
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, rejected it as a symbol of 
Western degeneracy that ―would lead to the demoralization of 
South African civilization and the destruction of apartheid‖. He 




In reference to the European use of soft power he notes, ―In addition to its attractive 
culture and domestic policies, Europe also derives soft power from its foreign 
policies, which often contribute to global public good. … Europe gains credibility from 
its positions on global climate change, international law, and human rights treaties. 
Moreover, Europeans provide 70 percent of overseas development assistance to 
                                               
58 Cline, 152, 175. 
59 Nye, 2004:51. 
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poor countries – four times more than the United States.‖
60
 It follows from these 
examples that soft power plays an important role in national strategy and world 
politics. The national Strategic Purpose of strong states, unions, or governmental 
organizations appears to focus on serving the global village, its interests and, in turn, 
a sort of supranational common purpose.  
However, there is also value in hampering the development of national 
Strategic Purpose of smaller states. By influencing the interests which lend to the 
unity of the common purpose it is possible to strategically confuse a state and affect 
its capacity to realize its national or international interests. This also affects their 
capacity to form or join international organizations and international alliances. 
Inevitably, it renders them weaker players vulnerable to external penetration. 
 Albeit a result of internal political infighting or external interference – a badly 
formulated national Strategic Purpose can lead to the demise of the state. Without it 
the interests of the populace are either disregarded or disunited. As a result, the 
citizenry, or parts thereof, may turn away from the state and seek support for their 
interests from other organized institutions or third states. Under such prevailing 
circumstances it is foreseeable that migration would flourish and separatist 
sentiments fester. Thus, a state unable to create effective national strategy runs the 
risk of deteriorating national cohesiveness to the extent of loosing effective control 
over its economic and military capability, and, eventually its critical mass.  
 To be strong and successful, individuals and nations alike require articulated 
goals and strategies, unity and ideology to drive it. To judge a man‘s success one 
must observe his goals as well as the manner and extent by which he reaches them. 
To judge a government‘s capacity to make national strategy requires direct 
observation of each nation at work.
61
 Thus, a nation must want to work towards 
realizing the national Strategic Purpose. This necessity brings us to the second 
intangible component of perceived state power, namely the National Will.   
 
National Will 
The National Will is that which enables a nation to utilize the tangible components of 
state power to the fullest. It is affected by the authority of national leadership together 
with the degrees to which attitudes, values, and purposes are shared in a nation.
62
 In 
the previous section it was shown that effective national strategy requires a common 
purpose derived from a state‘s nation. Nationhood is an important factor affecting 
                                               
60 Nye, 2004:80. 
61Cline, 149.   
62 Ibid., 145. 
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international relations and the National Will. From a strategic point of view, it can be 
used to unite people to promote peace (e.g. Switzerland). It can also be manipulated 
to stimulate conflicts and war. As with national Strategic Purpose, the nature of the 
National Will is not static. Rather, the elements of the National Will are multiple, 
diverse and rely heavily on perceptions.
63
  
It is important to note that since we are dealing with perceptions, we are also 
dealing with the part of state power which greatly relies on human reactions. Three 
types of perceptions affect the cohesiveness of nationhood and, in turn, the strength 
of the National Will: 
 
1. The manner in which people of a country perceive themselves 
in relation to each other.  
2. The manner in which the people of a country perceive 
themselves in relation to the world around them.  
3. The manner in which their society provides modes and 




The third factor is important. It indicates the vital role played by the state in 
influencing perception. At times, states may develop policies or institution-dependent 
ideas to shape the perceptions of its citizenry. This shows that part of the soft power 
of manipulating perceptions is in the hands of governments.   
 While the concept of perceptions is quite vague, a number of constant 
elements of the National Will are identifiable. Cline identified the following broad 
elements as repeatedly emerging contributory strands of the fabric of National Will: 
 
1. The level or degree of national integration; 
2. The effective strength of national leadership, and; 
3. The relevance of national strategy to national interests as they 




These are the constituent parts of the National Will which must be included into the 
general framework for analyzing if and how foreign policies target the national 
security of third states by manipulating intangible power. In the following sections, the 
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level or degree of national integration, effective strength of national leadership and 
the relevance of strategy to the coomon interest are considered in further detail.  
 
Level or degree of national integration 
Liberal globalization, the promotion of universal human rights, and the free 
movement of peoples within unions of states affect the traditional notion of 
nationhood. The notion of belonging to a larger ―human race‖ or ―human nation‖ shifts 
territorial loyalties towards other supranational structures/ideas. Paradoxically, 
postmodernism also gives rise to feelings of resentment to foreigners, nationalist 
movements and violence. This lack of, or resistance to integration is a result of us 
and them perceptions held by peoples within the state.  
 The level of national integration within the state affects the way citizens 
perceive one another. The greater the prevalence of the we perception, the higher 
the level or degree of national integration. National integration is a key element of the 
National Will and national security. It is subdivided into three main categories: cultural 
uniformity, the strength of territorial integration and a shared common history. 
  
Cultural Uniformity 
The values and practices that create meaning for a society clearly differ within and 
among states. When addressing culture, Nye identifies it as ―the set of values and 
practices that create meaning for a society. It has many manifestations. It is common 
to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art and education, which 
appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.‖
66 
All its 
possible variations aside, cultural practices remain the fabric of society. They are 
also the key to understanding societal security.  
 According to Cline, cultural uniformity is the first component affecting the level 
of national integration. It can be assessed based on ethnic, linguistic and religious 
uniformity. Of course, there is hardly a state in the world where all three of these 
come to bear full uniformity. Thus, although the degree of uniformity of each does 
contribute to the level of national integration, one can replace the other as a 
dominant integrating force.
67
 Thus, uniformity in each of the aforementioned factors 
is not essential to nationhood. For instanace, Canada, the United States, and 
Switzerland are good examples of strong states with diverse ethnicities, languages 
and religions. What is essential however, is that the diversity within a nation is 
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accommodated by a national strategy which promotes positive perceptions between 
the groups. Contrarily, following the logic of divide et impera, hostile foreign policies 
should aim at creating schisms between ethnic, linguistic and religious groupings 
within the targeted area. 
 
Strength of the concept of national territoriality 
International relations and geopolitics revolve around state interests. The concept 
that certain peoples belong to the territory in which they are found (and the territory 
belongs to them) is pivotal to state interests, the National Will, and the existence of 
the state. Ideally, state officials represent populations with a unique relationship to 
the territory upon which they live. Cline asserts that it is essential for citizens of a 
state to have a feeling of belonging to their country. The stronger their psychological 




 Strong nationhood requires that the people occupying a particular geographic 
area look outside their local environs and feel part of a larger community, i.e. the 
state to which they belong.
69
 The strength of the state‘s nationhood is negatively 
affected If citizens look outside their local environs and not to the unseen larger 
community of their own state but rather to another community (albeit a territorial 
entity within the nation or a third state). For example, if each ethnic group in the 
United States or Canada (e.g. Armenian, Italian, or Chinese) were to identify itself 
more with the interests of their ethnic states than the common purpose of their state 
of citizenship, the power of both the ―home state‖ and the ―ethnic state‖ would be 
affected. It may even drive them to promote policies within their home state that are 
more beneficial to their ethnic state (e.g. the Armenian lobby‘s call for US embargo 
with Azerbaijan and strained impact of relations with Turkey as a result of recognition 
of the 1915 Massacre of Armenians by Ottoman Turkey as genocide). 
 Nye uses the significant immigrant populations/diasporas in Britain and the 
United States as examples of how these groups provide ―culturally sensitive and 
linguistically skilled connections‖ in international relations.
70
 He continues by noting 
that Germany was the front-runner in using government funds to build and maintain 
political party contacts in foreign states. This form of outreach through soft power is 
certainly a model to follow in peacemaking and the development of peaceful 
international relations.  
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However, the line between using such soft power to create peace on the one 
hand, and the exportation of state policy into third states in violation of sovereignty on 
the other, is a fine one. The manner in which these relationships of attraction (i.e. 




The final element affecting the level or degree of national integration is the nation‘s 
collective memory. The regard which people have for their heritage, i.e. their 
collective memory of an ―often greatly-idealized past‖ plays a significant role in 
unifying or segregating peoples.
71
 It is through the notion of a shared common past 
that history plays a role in joining or fractioning nations. The uniting power of a 
people‘s ability to look at the past through the same observing lens plays a strong 
role in nationhood.  
 An example of how collective memory can create a schism within states is 
found in the post-Soviet states in transition. During the Soviet days, Russia directed a 
policy where greater loyalty was to be accorded to the Union rather than to individual 
nation-states. Today, one still finds a schism within post-Soviet populations. Some 
look back at their Soviet days and authoritarian group-think ideology (which was 
necessary to create the Soviet Union as a super power) with fondness. Others look 
to the past and see the Kremlin‘s rule as suppressive and/or oppressive of their own 
national/ethnic cultures and identities. The former perception supports a continued 
affiliation and loyalty towards the identity and policies of the Kremlin over those of 
their own or occidental states. The latter perception, foreseeably leads to the 
opposite. 
 
Effective strength of national leadership 
The second broad component of National Will is the ability of a national leadership to 
serve its nation‘s needs or common purpose effectively. It is assessed from two 
angles: the government‘s capability to create coherent policies and, the level of 
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Governmental policy capability 
The import of governmental policy capability is found in the fact that Strategic 
Purpose is the other intangible component of Cline‘s perceived power calculus. 
However, having a national strategy is insufficient. ―The real authority of the 
government is bestowed upon it by the nation, albeit by established tradition, force or 
popularly chosen governmental organization, it is limited and its fate rests, ultimately, 
in the reaction of the people toward both the leadership and its stated national 
strategy.‖
73
 A high response norm remains a requirement of the National Will. The 
nation must respect the authority of the government that created the strategy. The 
only contradiction of the notion of the state serving the common purpose is if the 
attainment of government policies and power was accomplished through force.  
 
Response Norm (level of social discipline within the populace) 
For the national leadership to have legitimate strength, its national strategy must 
reflect the common purpose. It must also establish a positive level of expectation that 
the policy will in fact be realized.
74
 Whatever the chosen strategy of the leadership 
may be, the perceived relevance to the aggregate interests of the people will be a 
significant determining factor of the response norm.
 
The response norm is critically 
important to both internal and external state matters. The strength of a state‘s 
National Will depends, partly, on whether strategic aims have been wisely formulated 
and skillfully explained in terms of national interest.
75
  
 Whereas Cline asserts that the level of response may be gained through 
attraction or force, Nye calls attention to ―the second, or ‗structural‘‖ face of power – 
the ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change 
their behavior though threats or payments.
76
 On the national level, this means that a 
state/government must elicit respect from the governed either because it is investing 
in their interests or, at least, portrays itself as doing so. Importantly, the respect 
gained must transpose itself into a citizenry that actually works to give effect to the 
state‘s strategy.  
 Perceptions and ideas are immaterial and manipulatable. States effectuate 
policies designed to influence the identity ideas of their populations. The manner in 
which the idea of the national interest is molded by government policies is important. 
On an international level, Hobbesian or Lockean powers may weaken a state‘s 
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national strategy by either promoting the perception of the targeted state‘s 
government as unworthy of national respect or, conversely, by encouraging state 
officials to act in a self-serving manner. Both cause the population to lose respect for 
the state and the will to give effect to its policies. Since the degree of coherent 
behavior and consistency in a body politic is the main cause of its success or failure, 
reducing the nation‘s faith in its politicians, the governmental system, and the 




Perceived Relevance of the national strategy to the national interest  
The nation‘s perceptions play an extremely important role in regard to strategy. 
Policies can soften or sharpen hard structural edges affecting the ration of love to 
hate in complex love-hate relationships.
77
 Cline asserts that strategies perceived as 
directed toward national self-protection or survival  (albeit through enhancing the 
economic well-being of the majority of the population, achieving a superior position 
over an established enemy, or preventing an established national enemy from 
achieving a superior position over one‘s own country), can be assured of some 
degree of positive response.
78
 Furthermore, the extent to which a nation perceives its 
government as serving national interests impacts policy effectiveness. Strategies 
concerned mainly with aggrandizing the personal glory of the leadership, or elevating 




 A nation may be either efficient or inept in carrying out its government 
policies. It all depends on the strength of the political will of the people and their 
interests, as expressed in their national decision-making. The basic fundament of 
successful strategy lies in the ability of the state to please the basic internal and 
external needs and interests of its citizenry.  
 Nye asserts that to measure power in terms of the changed behavior of 
others, it is first necessary to know their preferences.
80
 The basic needs of the 
populace include the satisfaction of economic needs, distribution of wealth, balance 
between authority and civil order and the protection of civil and minority rights. 
However, there are ideas and identity issues that supersede basic material interests. 
These are the things people are willing to sacrifice their material comforts for. If those 
in power are unable to strategize and satisfy national interests (both basic and 
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identity-idea based), their impotence may lead to the loss of governmental or 
executive power, political crises, social uprising or the crumbling of the state.  
1.1.2 The Power of Persuasion 
In response to Cline‘s publication, Brazilian Major General de Meira Mattos asserted 
that the set of intangible components was incomplete. According to de Meira Mattos, 
a psychosocial component, the ―capacity to influence‖ should be factored into the 
concept of state power.
81
  
  According to Nye, the capacity to influence is an important factor in obtaining 
desired policy effects. In relation to soft power, he asserts the power of persuasion 
also lies in the ability of the power seeker to project his/her objectives as legitimate.
82
 
It is important however, not to confuse perceived legitimacy as truly legitimate or soft 
power with nice power, ―Like any form of power, soft power can be wielded for good 
or bad purposes, and these often vary according to the eye of the beholder‖.
83
 In 
presenting soft power, Nye asks his reader to consider it as a separate chessboard in 
the three-dimensional chessboard made up of hard (military) power, economic power 
and soft power. Each form of power is paired with behaviors, currencies and policies.  
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 Behaviors Primary Currencies Government Policies 























bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy 
Figure 2 Three Dimensional Chessboard of Power   [Nye 2004: 31] 
           
Accepting this, the competition for geopolitical control takes place, simultaneously, on 
all of the above power chessboards, making the distinction between hard and soft 
power one of degree. However, although soft power does not depend on hard power, 
it is implausible to view each separately with the presumption that the primary 
currencies and government policies do not intermix. As this interrelationship relates 
to soft power Nye notes, ―hard and soft power is often combined, sometimes with a 
soft layer of attraction overlaid on underlying relationships that rest on coercion or 
payment‖.
84
   
It is this overlay that is of particular interest to this study. It connects the 
primary currencies of soft power to coercion or payment. An example of this can be 
found in Russia‘s policy toward Azerbaijan as it pertained to matters related to 
Ukraine‘s soft power, particularly, its common history. In an effort to suppress 
information about the Kremlin-directed forced starvation of millions of Ukrainians in 
1932-1933, President Medvedev threatened Azerbaijan with war:  
 
The Prince [Prince Andrew, Duke of York] pounced at the sound 
of that name. He told the Ambassador that he was a frequent 
visitor to Central Asia and the Caucasus and had noticed a 
marked increase in Russian pressure and concomitant anxiety 
among the locals, post-August events in Georgia. He stated the 
following story related to him recently by Azerbaijan‘s President 
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Aliyev. Aliyev had received a letter from President Medvedev 
telling him that if Azerbaijan supported the designation of the 
Bolshevik artificial famine in Ukraine as ―genocide‖ at the United 
Nations, ―then you can forget about seeing Nagorno-Karabakh 
ever again.‖ Prince Andrew added that every single other regional 
President had told him of receiving similar ―directive‖ letters from 




The three-dimensional chessboard of power also viably interlinks political-criminal 
relations with the use or suppression of soft power. The end of the Cold War provides 
another example. Nye notes The Cold War was won by a mixture of hard and soft 
power; soft power including media, the BBC and the Beatles eroded the Soviet 
system from within.
86
 The American dream, wrapped in the attractiveness of blue 
jeans, Rock and Roll, foreign press and even McDonalds also played a role in 
eroding the Soviet system. However, the manner in which these components of soft 
power actually made it into the Soviet territories (where some legally prohibited) 
deserves attention. Thus, it appears that the export of soft power currencies also 
depends on a mixture of primary currencies and behaviors including the 
transgression of laws.  
 Both hard and soft power relate to the ability to achieve one‘s purpose by 
affecting the behavior of others. A spectrum of behaviors ranging from command 
(hard power) and co-option (soft power) has been charted by Nye who warns that the 
relationship between the two is imperfect.
87
 The distinction between them is a matter 
of degree. 
 Hard Soft 




     attraction  
                                       Co-opt 
Most Likely Resources  
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                  culture 
                   policies 
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Figure 3 Hard and Soft Power Behaviours    [Nye 2004: 8]  
Nye asserts that ―people‘s decisions in the marketplace of ideas are often shaped by 
an intangible attraction that persuades them to go along with other‘s purposes 
without any explicit exchange of tangible threats or rewards taking place‖ and that, 




 However, a nexus is of interest here, particularly, the grey area between 
inducement (using incentives such as payments and bribes) and agenda setting 
(using values, culture and policies). Whereas it is difficult to imagine one state bribing 
or coercing an entire population to promote its institutions, culture or policies, a top 
down use of such methods is easier to imagine. For instance, hard power resources 
and behaviors are used to persuade decision makers (or other authoritative actors) to 
implement policies or accept business deals that promote the soft power of the 
intervening party. Examples of this include bribing or coercing officials to overlook 
procedural as well as other legal requirements.     
 Leaving questions pertaining to the sincerity of the power seeker and the 
manners in which the legitimacy of his/her interests is projected aside for the 
moment, it should be clear that it is necessary to influence human behavior to gain 
power. For these reasons, General de Meira Mattos proposed to improve Cline‘s 
formula by adding the factor ―P‖, the power to influence the course of events in 
international relations (the power of persuasion) to Cline‘s set of intangible 
variables.
89
 The new value P would correspond to ―the capacity of a state to convince 
or influence other states‖.
90
 According to de Meira Mattos‘ logic, the perceived power 
formula would be more accurate expressed like this:  
 
Pp = (C + E + M) x (S + W + P) 
 
The consideration of ―the power to influence‖ as a separate component of certainly 
has merits. De Meira Mattos refutes the move to treat the value ―P‖ as intrinsic to the 
values ―S‖ and ―W‖ because of the existence of states who, despite a steady will to 
win (strong combination of S + W)  nonetheless, remain ―without capacity to convince 
other states of the justice of its cause‖.
91
 Although his logic is valid and the power to 
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influence is indeed necessary to be able to use soft power, de Meira Mattos neither 
explains the components of P nor proposes a detailed system of measurement within 
Cline‘s framework. Furthermore, in the preceding sections on national Strategic 
Purpose and National Will, a distinction was made between strong and weak states 
in this regard. It showed that stronger states are in a position of greater influence and 
that weaker states are often ―victimized‖ by the consequential policies of great states.  
Thus, the ―power to influence‖ will be treated here as intrinsic to the components (S + 
W) but will also be given separate consideration in this study. It is important to bear 
the three-dimensional chessboard of war in mind and realize that soft power does not 
necessarily mean nice power. The manners in which soft power currencies may 
become attractive within a state may be the result of foreign policies of bribery and 
coercion that belong to either the economic or military chessboards of power. 
1.1.3 Conclusion 
State power consists of tangible and intangible components. Within the formula of 
perceived state power, the intangible components carry more value. In fact, they are 
able to nullify the value of the tangible components. Due to their immaterial nature, 
measuring intangible components of power is more challenging than measuring the 
tangible ones. The main reason is that this is an area where ideas and identity really 
matter. When considering intangible power, we enter a ―region where numbers can 
only be notations of highly subjective judgments, nothing more‖.
92
   
 Moreover, the identity and perception of the observer affect the values given 
to the intangible components of soft power invariably. For example, national 
legislation granting freedom and full rights to homosexuals may be seen as social 
strength in occidental states such as The Netherlands or Canada, but may be 
perceived as social and cultural deterioration by eastern states like Iran or 
Uzbekistan. Another example can be found in the reception of foreign (owned) press 
and censorship. In a mature democracy such as the United States or Great Britain, 
mass media, the freedom of the press, and access to it, have become pillars of 
society. However, in a weak state in transition such as Georgia, foreign (anti-
democratic) press critical of the government‘s democratization policies may actually 
pose a threat to its transition and national security thereby justifying censorship.  
 Cline does not provide a list of criteria upon which to value Strategic Purpose. 
Its nature is fluid and determines the conditions for of peace or conflict and, in turn, 
national survival or extinction. The purpose of national strategy is to protect and 
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serve the interests of the nation, to secure the political system, and, to provide an 
international angle through which the state relates with others. Theoretically it rests 
on the common purpose, which is a combination of the nation and its aggregate 
interests. 
 The National Will is the other intangible component of state power. It is an 
expression of the aggregate emotions and desires of a people; essentially a 
measurement of human responses.
93
 Since human beings respond with greater 
intensity to some situations than to others, the level of response is related to their 
perceptions of themselves, of the world around them and the modes and procedures 
made available to them to act upon these perceptions. All of these factors are in turn 
affected by the following components of National Will: 
 
I. Level or degree of national integration of the people in  
  the feeling of belonging to a nation. 
   Degree of national integration 
   Cultural integration 
   Ethnicity 
   Language 
   Religion 
  National Territoriality  
  Collective memory 
 II. Effective strength of national leadership.  
    Governmental policy capability 
   Response norm (level social discipline of the  
   populace) 
 III. Relevance of national strategy to national interests as they  




The capacity of a state to influence its nation or that of another state lies in the fact 
that perceptions can be manipulated as they relate to both, tangible and intangible 
sources of power. The fact the intangible components can nullify tangible power 
makes it important for security studies. It is foreseeable that a state with a long-term 
aggrandizement strategy would employ tactics in the international sphere that 
weaken/modify the intangible state power of third states to its own advantage. For 
security analysts to scrutinize such policies and, in turn, for states targeted by such a 
strategy to recognize and securitize against such tactics, knowledge of the 
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components of intangible national security is needed. This is a difficult order. 
Nonetheless, given the particular value of the intangible components of state power, 
and the extents to which states are willing to go to in their hungry grab for power, 
judgments on the use and modification of intangible, ―soft power‖, are critical and 
must be made.  
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1.2 Soft Power Security 
The multisectoral approach to security analysis presented by Buzan et al. is useful to 
this study because an important correlation appears to exist between the elements of 
power presented in Cline‘s Calculus of Strategic Drift and the sectoral approach to 
security. Traditionally, the study of international security has been limited to the 
military and political sectors. In 1991, Buzan extended the concept of security to 
include five separate, interdependent sectors namely, the military, political, 
economic, societal and environmental ones:  
 Generally speaking, military security concerns the interplay of the armed 
offense and defense capabilities and state perceptions of each other‘s intentions. 
Political security concerns the organizational capability of states, systems of 
government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security 
concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain 
acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the 
sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of 
language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental 
security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the 
essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. 95 
 Two decades after Cline presented his calculus of perceived state power, 
European security experts widened the concept of security and security analysis 
even further. In 1998 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde elaborated Buzan‘s multisectoral 
approach with concepts such as (securitizing) actors, referent objects and levels of 
analysis to the sectoral analysis.  Buzan et al. add referent objects (other than the 
state) to the realm of security analysis. They assert that securitization occurs when 
something is presented as an existential threat to a referent object, and that to 
understand the nature of the threat requires knowledge of the particular character of 
the referent object within the given sector.
96
 Their sectoral approach shows that 
threats to national security do not necessarily have to be aimed directly at the state. 
Rather, they may be directed against certain sections within the five security sectors, 
which, in turn, negatively impact the targeted state.  
 Reiterating Buzan‘s 1991 approach, they present security as something that 
does not simply pertain to the use of force. They note that fears stemming from 
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sectors other than the military one, if left unaddressed, may rear their heads as 
military issues. One of the main points made by the authors of the sectoral approach 




 Importantly, it appears possible to pair the security sectors as presented by 
Buzan et al. (and eventually their referent objects) under the components of 
perceived state power. From the onset, the tangible components can be paired as 
follows: the critical mass with the environmental sector; Military capabilities with the 
military sector and Economic ones with the economic sector: 
  
   C = environmental/societal sector 
   E = economic sector 
   M = military sector 
 
Of particular interest to this study is the relationship between intangible components 
of state power (Strategic Purpose: S, and National Will: W) and the political and 
societal security sectors. Buzan et al. assert ―existential fears about sociocultural 
penetration by a dynamic neighboring area, albeit nonmilitary in nature, may lead to 
separatist sentiment, ethnic and military conflict.‖
98
 Addressing the matter from a 
power perspective, it is necessary to identify externally projected security acts that 
modify intangible power of the targeted state. In the political sector, security is linked 
to the ―organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies 
that give governments and states their legitimacy.
‖99
 The societal security sector 
concerns political threats made to the ―organizational stability of a state but then by 
targeting the state‘s society (identity).‖
100
 Therefore, it may be possible to pair them 
off as follows: 
 
   S = political sector 
   W = societal + political  
 
Moreover, it is expected that Hobbesian soft power acts will target referent objects 
within the political and social security sectors to lower the value of the targeted 
state‘s intangible power.  
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 Although Cline‘s study is focused on power, and Buzan et al. focus on 
security, both recognize the pivotal role perceptions play in international relations. 
Buzan et al. note that the same system, looked upon by different sectoral experts will 
be viewed differently. The political realist‘s perception of a system and that of a 
societal sector analyst is different. The former looks at systems in terms that highlight 
sovereignty and power (thereby justifying restrictive assumptions such as the 
motivation of behaviors to the desire to maximize power). The latter looks at the 
same systems in terms of patterns of identity and the desire to maintain cultured 
independence.
101
 However, accepting Cline‘s approach to power analysis, this 
example shows that approaches of the aforementioned experts share important 
commonalities. They both consider the same system and recognize the import of 
intangible, soft power, to international security. The political realist views it as 
national Strategic Purpose and National Will. The societal analyst views it as national 
identity and cultured independence; the intricate parts of National Will and national 
Strategic Purpose respectively.  
 The weighted value awarded to the intangible components of power by Cline 
makes such a pairing particularly significant. In the case that the societal and political 
security sectors should coincide with Cline‘s intangible components of power, it will 
be possible to assert that these key national security sectors require extra attention 
from security experts. It will also show that long-term geostrategists must concentrate 
here.Thus, although Buzan et al. effectively explain the tangible security sectors 
(military, environmental and economic), their referent objects, and the actors therein, 
the focus here is on identifying how the political and social security sectors relate to 
intangible power. It is expected that by analyzing the political and societal sectors 
within the framework of intangible power, it will become clearer why the (Hobbesian) 
use of soft power may justify securitization from the state.  
 From the outset, it should be noted that the fundamental components of 
security in both these sectors are ideas. According to Joseph Nye, ―people‘s 
decisions in the marketplace of ideas are often shaped by an intangible attraction 
that persuades them to go along with others‘ purposes without any explicit exchange 
of tangible threats or rewards taking place.
102
 However, it appears that some of the 
tactics used by states on the market of influencing ideas may fall outside the realm of 
legitimate state behavior.  
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1.2.1 Political Sector Security 
The purpose of this section is to determine how political security is related to the 
intangible power of a state, particularly, the national Strategic Purpose.  In the 
previous sections it was shown that for states to have an effective strategy, they 
require an effective ideology, government and a common purpose. It therefore 
appears that the value of national Strategic Purpose can be reduced by threats to the 
political sector. To determine the veracity of this proposition it is first necessary to 
ascertain what is meant by ―political sector‖ and ―political security‖. Then, because 
we are searching for components of intangible/soft power, it is necessary to identify 
what can be targeted in the political sector and how.  
 Buzan et al. assert that since the political sector is composed of threats to 
state sovereignty, the ―heart‖ of the political sector is sovereignty. However, because 
―all security is political‖ and ―anything that can be portrayed as a violation of 
sovereignty can be presented as a security problem‖, the specifics of the political 
sector are unclear.
103
 Thus, it is worthwhile considering the meaning of sovereignty 
for a moment.  
 In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia introduced state sovereignty (the exclusive 
self-right over a specified territory and its population) as foundations of the state and 
official cornerstone of international relations.  From this definition, it is possible to 
deduce the three attributes of the state: 1) a specified territory; 2) a human 
population and; 3) an institutionalized exclusive authority (e.g. government) to 
preside over the aforementioned and decide upon the political form of the state. This 
exclusivity to govern precludes foreign interference. Importantly, even if those in 
power are undemocratic, ―sovereignty can be claimed to be violated if the political 
form is suddenly to be decided or even decisively influenced from abroad‖.
104
 This 
having been said, the difference between the state and the government should be 
clear and the political sector easier to understand. 
 Both the political and military sectors belong to the traditional realm of 
security analysis. However, an important distinction must be made between the types 
of power used within these sectors. In the military sector, the threat to the state is 
one of hard, ‗muscle‘ power. The effects of military operations are usually blatant and 
violent. Conversely, the power used to threaten the political security of states is softer 
and its effects are not immediately visible.  Rather than using the power of ―sticks 
and stones‖ belonging to the military sector, the power used in the political sector 
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should be seen in terms of principles.
105
 This difference in power categories often 
leads to the perception that states should fear military sector threats over political 
ones. However, at least on the state level, this perception is effectively rebuked by 
the political nature of the sovereign state. As a result, political threats to the state 
justifiably pose an equally severe threat as military ones.
106
  
Political security is about the organizational stability of states i.e. the systems 
of government and the ideologies that give governments, and states, their 
legitimacy.
107
 Political sector threats are those which threaten the sovereignty and 
the organizational stability of the state and do not fall within the realm of the other, 
more tangible, security sectors. Although they may originate from (or be aimed at) 
the military, societal, economic, environmental and/or the political sectors, to be 
classified as political threats, they must threaten the organizational stability of the 
state without using massive military, identificational, economic, or environmental 
means.
108
 Thus, moving away from a tangible power analysis of security and 
entering the realm of immaterial power and security, it is necessary to consider the 
intangible foundations of political institutions.   
 
The Threat: what and how 
Ideas are the building blocks of political institutions. They are multifold and the 
manner in which they present themselves in the material world varies significantly. 
For instance, ideas about the planets have resulted in a multi-trillion dollar air and 
space defense industry as well as Holst‘s symphonic creation ―The Planets‖. Very 
different ideas about the same things lead to very different results. It has been 
established that political sector security threats target ideas and ideologies. But what 
does this mean exactly? And what is the nature of the idea which can be classified as 
a threat to the political sector?  
 Institutions and the ideas upon which they are built are the main constituting 
factors of political security. In 1991, Buzan asserted that political sector security 
threats are directed against the national identity, organizing ideology, and the 
institutions, which express the idea of the state.
109
 Thus, to pose a threat to political 
security, a given action must have the power to influence (as de Meira Mattos 
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asserted) the ideas or ideologies held within a state in a manner that endangers the 
legitimacy, or recognition, of either political units or their essential structures.
110
  
Buzan et al. attempted to clarify the category of ideas that belong to the realm 
of political sector security analysis. Whereas, in 1991, Buzan admitted national 
identity ideas into the realm of political security, Buzan et al. identified three main 
categories of ideas that affect the organization of the state and belong to the political 
sector: civil-nationalist, ethno-nationalist and ideological ideas and asserted: ―It is all 
a question of the ideas on which political institutions are built‖ and only institution-
dependant ideas belong to the political sector.
111
  
 Thus, it is clear that in the political sector, the structure of the government, the 
state‘s territorial integrity or right to autonomy are targeted through the subversion or 
denial of the legitimacy of the ideas upon which the state and/or its institutions are 
built.
112
 And, it follows that a Hobbesian, international actor interested in deteriorating 
a given state‘s political security must organize human activity in such a way as to 
draw the legitimacy of the state and/or its institutions into question. 
 Yet, there is no clear-cut line between identity ideas influenced by state 
institutions and those that develop independently. It is up to the state to decide which 
identity ideas it promotes to realize its national and foreign strategies. Formal 
institutions of the state may promote identity ideas and values that should be 
independent of the state. This grey area is depicted well by the role of state 
intelligence services and their covert operations.  
 For instance, next to generating soft power through intelligence sharing and 
the establishment of long-term relationships with friendly foreign intelligence 
agencies, the CIA also gains control using ideas and values in another, less kosher, 
way. ―…in the early stages of the Cold War, the Central Intelligence Agency covertly 
supported the budgets of cultural organizations such as the Congress for Cultural 
Freedom. Even at the time, there were misgivings. ‗In its starkest terms, the problem 
was how to use intellectual freedom as propaganda without turning it into 
propaganda in the process. … The political logic of this novel situation entailed the 
covert manipulation of liberal ideals and their proponents.‘‖
113
 Thus, a strict 
delineation between institution dependent and independent ideas appears superficial. 
Delineation between national identity ideas that are used to serve the state‘s 
                                               
110 Buzan et al., 1998: 144. 
111 Ibid., 150. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Nye, 2004: 115. 
 - 43 - 
strategic interests and those that are superfluous to its strategies and survival at any 
given moment may be more accurate.  
 On an international level, a policy of calling the legitimacy of a third state - or 
its government - into question can spur insurgent war by convincing a given 
population of the need to rebel against their leaders and system, or convince a given 
population of the need for a preemptive or ‗humanitarian‘ war (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Libya). The applied tactics would aim at planting and nurturing the relevant ideas 
inside the minds of the targeted citizens. To promote insurgency, the relevant ideas 
would lead the targeted population to question the legitimacy of the state, its 
structures and their own subjugation to them. In turn, this foreseeably also divides 
the peoples and weakens their perceived common purpose.  
Because of the nature of ideas, security responses to such political threats 
run the risk of limiting or even abusing human and civil rights. This is where the 
aforementioned political threats become interesting. The line between the freedoms 
of speech, expression and the press on the one hand, and the (ab)use thereof by 
states and international media on the other, remains fine. For instance, using the ―ill-
defined‖ war on terrorism (a pre-cursor to the destruction of Iraq, war in Afghanistan 
and pending tensions in Iran) as an example, Nye shows how the state can modify 
identificational ideas (in casu, ―us‖ and ―them‖ ideas):  
 
In 2002, frustrated with American public diplomacy, the Pentagon 
developed plans for the Office of Strategic Influence, whichwould 
provide news items, possibly including false ones,to foreign media 
organizations in an effort to influence bothfriendly and unfriendly 
countries. After the plans were revealed in the press, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld had to quickly disavow the project. But 
the damage to American credibility and soft power had already 
been done.‖114 
 
Another example of such manipulation is found in the United State‘s employment of 
the global public relations company Hill & Knowlton during the first Iraq war. In order 
to generate support for the war, the company manufactured a story that Iraqi soldiers 
were throwing Kuwaiti babies out of incubators. The public relations stunt prompted 
citizens to support the war. Moreover, ―six senators cited the incubator story to justify 
their support for the war in a vote which was won by a margin of five.‖
115
 Ironically, 
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Nayira al-Sabah, the lady who appeared across the world press as an eyewitness, is 
a member of the Kuwaiti royal family and daughter of Saud bin Nasir al-Sabah; the 
Kuwaiti Ambassador to the US at the time. 
116
 
 The aforementioned examples show how culture and fear can be manipulated 
and affect the political security of a state. The ultimate objective of political threats is 
to call the following legitimacy and/or recognition of the targeted state into question: 
  
1) The internal legitimacy of the political unit, which  
  relates primarily to ideologies and other constitutive 
  ideas and issues defining the state, and; 




Effective attacks on internal legitimacy negatively affect the external perception of the 
state and vice versa. Although by nature ―soft‖ and intangible, threats to the political 
sector are real. They can originate from within the state, through some organized 
group, from the state, or from part of a third state‘s foreign policy. However, there are 
important differences between political threats that materialize from within the state 
and those aimed against the political sector from abroad.  
 First, the vast majority of external threats come from strong states or 
organizations and may violate international law.
118
 Second, they aim at weakening 
the ethno-civic identity and state ideologies by manipulating the loyalties of the 
peoples. They do so by making propagating greater feeling of loyalty towards the 
policies of third states (or institutions) over those of their own. Third, external political 
threats depend on an (amicable) reception by one or more groups within the targeted 
state to whom the schism is of interest, through whom they are able to operationalise 
their strategies. 
 Thus, when a strong state chooses to threaten the political sector of a weaker 
state, it will have to rely upon established, favorable, minority relations or opposition 
forces (both of which are at times referred to as the fifth column) within the third 
state. Such relations may arise through NGO cooperation, partnership agreements, 
Friendship Treaties or other targeted covert intelligence operations. It is also 
noteworthy that growing skepticism towards governmental authority in postmodern 
societies has led governments to exert influence over people using private sector 
institutions, ―…though they are difficult to control, they can be useful channels of 
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communication‖.
119
 As a result, tracing the resulting political threat back to a third 
state‘s foreign policy will not always be easy.  
Such claims may be justifiably brushed aside at times. Buzan et al. assert that 
weak states sometimes (erroneously) blame an outside great power for political 
destabilization when the destabilization is in fact a result of their own incapacity or 
irresponsible forms of governing.
120
 The lack of a government‘s capacity to formulate 
and give effect to the national Strategic Purpose appears to be conducive to this sort 
of paranoia. It is easier to blame others for shortcomings than to take control of them. 
In the long-run, despite the difference in the nature of external and internal political 
threats their effects remain the same. The major schism-causing factors are 
differences in the interests held by the population, albeit ethnic, cultural or 
ideological.  
 
Weak versus Strong State 
Another correlation between political sector threats and intangible components of 
power is found in the difference between the Strategic Purpose of great powers and 
weaker states. The category to which a state belongs influences its international 
strategies. Cline asserted that strong states must design national strategies to 
influence international relations. As this pertains to political sector threats, it was 
shown that - in the majority of cases - political threats are devised by strong states to 
target weak ones. Secondary powers, or weak states, are unlikely to influence 
international relations by politically threatening strong states. They must strategize to 
rely on greater powers, albeit third states or associations of states. For this reason, to 
recognize political security threats and understand why they are used, knowledge of 
the interplay between global politics and regional security complexes is needed.  
 It was already noted above that the majority of inter-state political security 
threats occur between strong and weak states.
 
This relevant to international security 
studies because it can be used to understand global and cross regional security 
dynamics. Buzan et al. assert that the distinction is important because it couples the 
degree of vulnerability of states to political threats to state power.   
 The vulnerability factor is related to the relative strength or weakness of the 
state. However the reasons Buzan et al. offer for the greater state‘s invulnerability 
(i.e. the strong state is not ethnically divided or open to secessionist action, its 
government is not divorced from the general opinions of its citizens nor dependent 
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upon suppressing views and information) are debatable. For instance, Canada, 
China and Russia are examples of strong but very different states, with either ethnic 
divisions, secessionist movements and/or governments who suppress human rights 
and freedoms. Their relative (and apparent) invulnerability to political sector threats 
may be related to their foreign and internal policy capability and securitization of the 
political sector more than the level of ethnic unity within the state. 
 Although the majority of political sector threats take place from strong states 
to the weak state, great power versus great power tactics aimed at political 
destabilization also occur. During the Cold War, the West generally did not question 
the recognition of the Soviet Union as a sovereign state in the international system. 
Nonetheless, it did aim at weakening its domestic legitimacy.
121
 The recent move of 
the Russian Federation to inject billions of dollars into soft power to promote its good 
image in the US and EU is another example. It shows how strong states spend 
money to promote themselves and their policies by influencing the ideas of the 
citizenry and governments of third states. 
 However, the political destabilization of weak states by great powers is more 
prevalent. Rather than directly destabilizing the political sector of another great 
power, the geopolitical power game is played out in weak states. The logic behind 
this is clear and, conversely, without backing from a distant great power or other form 
of international cooperation, weak states have little chance of singularly posing a 
political threat to strong ones.  
 
Purpose and Form of Threat 
It is necessary to consider how ideas and ideologies can be threatened politically. 
Political sector threats aim at weakening or destroying the organizational stability of 
the state. They do so by targeting those binding ideas and ideologies that add to the 
citizenry‘s sense of belonging and loyalty to their state. Their objectives range from 
pressuring governments to behave in a certain manner on policy matters to 
overthrowing governments or provoking separatism and preparation for war.
122
 The 
establishment of puppet regimes, separatism, annexation, and even the creation of 
new states (e.g. Taliban in Afghanistan vis a vis Pakistan up to 1998, arguably the 
Shah in Iran, Abkhazia, East Timor, Kosovo etc.) can be traced back to external 
pressures/support.  
 Nine forms of political sector threats have been identified by Buzan et al.:  
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1) Intentional threats to (weak) states on the basis of their 
state/nation split in terms of the effects on the stability of state 
structures and the undermining of state-carrying national or 
state ideologies.
 
2) Intentional threats to (weak) states on political-ideological 
grounds. 
 
3) Inadvertent, unit-based threats to state-nation vulnerable 
states. Unavoidable threats should be sorted into two groups. 
Accidental, one-time threats are not very interesting to us. 
Unavoidable, interlocking, inadvertent threats, however, 
happen when two or more states are locked into a security 
conflict because of incompatible organizing principles. 
4) Unintentional threats to states on political-ideological grounds. 
5) Security of and against supranational, regional integration. 
6) Systemic, principled threats against states that are vulnerable 
because of a state-nation split. 
7) Structural (systemic) threats to (weak) states on political-
ideological grounds. 
8) Threats to transnational movements that command supreme 
loyalty from their members. 




The majority of the aforementioned threats occurs on an inter-state level in 
violation of state sovereignty and established codified and customary law. Of 
particular interest to this study are the threats listed under numbers 1, 2, 6 and 
7 because they concern threats that are intentional, political-ideological, 
directed from strong state to weak state and focus on the state nation split. 
 Regardless if it is a state, international governmental organization, or 
the international system as a whole, the above list shows that political threats 
are directed against the political system, unifying principles, and ideologies. 
From the above, we also see that in the post-modernizing world, founding 
principles of regional and supranational organizations are targeted and 
(conversely) used to justify wars against ―rogue‖ states. This notwithstanding, 
such policies often appear to go unpunished in the international realm.  
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1.2.2 Societal Sector Security 
The purpose of this section is to determine how societal security is related to the 
intangible power of a state. Particularly, if and how it relates to the National Will. The 
nation is an aggregate of societal groupings within the state. It therefore seems 
probable that effective threats to the societal sector will reduce the value of the power 
component of National Will. However, to determine the veracity of this proposition it 
is first necessary to ascertain what constitutes the societal sector. Also, since 
security is being discussed from the perspective of intangible power (or soft power), it 
is necessary to identify what can be threatened in the societal sector and how.  
 The first sentence of Buzan‘s et al. chapter on societal sector security 
eloquently lures the reader into the concept of societal security. They note, ―National 
security is the key concept for the entire area of security affairs, but, paradoxically, 
there has been little reflection on the nation as a security unit.‖
124
 The nation plays a 
key role within the societal sector but it is not without reason that the sector is called 
the ―societal sector‖ and not the ―national sector‖. The concept of ―nation‖ as used in 
reference to societal security must therefore be well understood.  
 It is apparent that the state and its borders do not strictly coincide with 
nations. Even if they did, within that ―pure nation‖ one would find numerous social 
networks and societies. In the societal sector, it is not the nation per se which serves 
as the analytical focal point but rather, parts thereof, namely the societies from which 
the nation-state is composed. The organizing concept in the societal sector is 
identity.
125
 It concerns identity ideas that drive members of a nation to form and 
participate in collective groupings within the state. 
 According to Buzan et al. despite objective factors of nationhood beyond 
historical or contemporary ties, such as language or location which impact national 
identity, it remains a political or personal choice to identify with a given community by 
adopting one or more of its traits.
126
 Since it is a ―choice‖ to participate in a given 
society, threats to the societal sector encompass activities which influence this 
decision-making process by manipulating the aforementioned pillars of nationhood.   
The main groups targeted by societal threats have been identified as those which 
carry the ―loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create 
a socially powerful argument that their ―we‖ is threatened‖, i.e. tribes, clans, nations, 
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nation-like ethnic units (a.k.a. minorities, civilizations, religions, and race).
127
 The 
battle over self-definitions takes place within these main referent objects. Moreover, it 
is because this battle is fought with identificational ideas and not ―sticks and stones‖ 
that societal security appears to belong to the intangible theater of state power.  
 
The Threat: what and how? 
The objective of social security is to have societies with a strong ―we‖ identity. This 
―we‖ identity must be constructed in a manner that benefits the state, and vice versa. 
Thus, in international relations, threats to the societal sector of a given state are 
designed to modify the construction of the societal identities to benefit the intervening 
state or organization. However, before such modification can be categorized as a 
national security threat, the rather illusive notion of identity and the concept of ―we‖ 
must be perceived as existentially threatened.
128
 This having been stated, exactly 
what such a threat must target remains unclear. 
 In the previous section, it was shown that one way Hobbesian and Lockean 
powers divide and rule foreign states is by destabilizing the political system of the 
state. They do so by attacking the institution dependent national identity ideas and 
ideologies that give the state form and strength. In the societal sector, the national 
identity ideas of import are (formally) institution independent ones. Namely, those 
ideas that make people join and participate in social groupings/societies without 
governmental interference i.e. language, cultural habits and religion.  
 Language, cultural habits and religion are not the only factors. The collective 
memory or historical ties play a major role in societal security. According to Wendt, 
the ―collective memory‖ (which contains historical ties) not only ―constitutes who a 
group is and how it relates to others‖, but it is from ―the virtue of such memories that 
groups acquire continuity and identity through time‖, moreover, collective memories 
are ―a resource for mobilizing collective action‖.
129
 Thus, the historical ties or 
collective memories that bind a nation (or societies) together strongly influence the 
decision of whether one participates in a given societal grouping or not.  
 It is important to grasp the concept of identity ideas based on historical ties as 
a ―resource‖ that can be (and has been) ―mobilized‖ by powers intent on influencing 
the societal ―decision-making‖ process. The modification of history and history books 
serves as a good example of how this seemingly institution independent quality of 
national identity can be modified using state institutions. Thus, distinction between 
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institution dependent and independent identity matters remains problematic because 
even these cultural factors rely on government policies and infrastructure to 
reproduce. 
Viewing this from the perspective of integration and globalization policies, 
Buzan et al. provide the following examples of how cultural habits, language and 
nationalism can be perceived as threatening to a society: 
 
If national identity is tied to specific cultural habits, a 
homogenizing ―global‖ culture, such as the U.S.- Western Coca-
Cola (or, more recently, McDonalds) imperialism, will be 
threatening (e.g., Bhutan, Iran, Saudi Arabia). If language is 
central to national identity, the contemporary global victory of 
English combined with an increasing interpenetration of societies 
will be problematic (e.g., France). If a nation is built on the 
integration of a number of ethnic groups with mobilazable histories 
of distinct national lives, a general spread of nationalism and 
ideas of self-determination can be fatal (e.g., the Soviet Union, 





Along the same line of thought, Nye brought forth the example of Jose Bové, a 
French sheep farmer, who destroyed a McDonald‘s restaurant in his local region to 
resist the cultural impact of economic globalization and American power. Nye wisely 
notes it is easy to confuse the two and in turn use nationalism to resist both.
131
 This 
example of the French sheep farmer also shows how perceived threats to the 
components of the National Will (which fall within the societal security sector) 
provoke violence from citizens. It also illustrates that the manner in which cultural 
habits, language and nationalism can be used to promote Kantian-like regionalization 
and globalization policies does not differ much from the way they can be used to 
promote less pure, Hobbesian or Lockean, policies such as the promotion of conflict 
and separatism.   
 Effective strategies of this sort would result in the modification of perceptions 
within the group. A state or organization interested in gaining power over a given 
foreign territory must either integrate (i.e. globalization and regionalization policies) or 
create a schism (i.e. secessionist policies) by targeting the established ―we‖ identity. 
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In the first case, those that previously perceived one another in terms of ―us‖ and 
―them‖ would be mobilized to perceive each other in terms of ―we‖. In the second, 
those that previously perceived one another in terms of ―we‖ would be mobilized to 
perceive each other in terms of ―us‖ and ―them‖. Which perception wins the ―us‖ and 
―them‖ competition is the ultimate determinant of whether a security conflict arises.
132
  
To result in conflict, one of the targeted groups must perceive its constructed identity 
as existentially threatened.  
Examples have already been provided of how governments can use policies, 
institutions as well as private business channels and media to export ―soft power‖ 
and promote their internal and foreign policies.  Buzan et al. note that the media is an 
important actor contributing significantly to the definition of situations that pertain to 
identificational concepts within society.
133 
In this regard, the principle of the freedom 
of the press in this regard can be a Pandora‘s Box. 
 To many, the shaping of perceptions by media sources may seem generally 
benign. However, its power and government involvement should not be 
underestimated. The Berlin Wall, ―pierced by television and movies‖ would not have 
fallen the way it did ―without the years-long transmission of images of the popular 
culture of the West‖ and; despite restrictions and criminalization of Western medias in 
the Soviet Union, they nonetheless ―made it through the filters‖ with indirect, direct, 
unintended and intended ―devastating political effects‖.
134
  
 China is another example where, despite national legislation and 
criminalization, ―American news seeps across the border‖ and ―many believe that the 
recent trickle of Hollywood films into Chinese theatres, along with those illegal DVDs, 
has played a role in spurring yearnings for accelerated change among ordinary 
Chinese citizens.‖
135
 Although often operating under a soiled cloak of immunity, one 
should not overlook the role intelligence agencies play in influencing ideas of 
―national identity‖ and ―we‖ perceptions particularly, when such exports of soft power 
transgress both national and/or international laws. In such instances, the common 
culture and interests are targeted: 
 
Integration projects, whether democratic or imperial, that seek to 
shape a common culture to match the state may attempt to control 
some or all of the machineries of cultural reproduction (e.g., 
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schools, churches, language rights). In more repressive instances, 
minorities may lose the ability to reproduce their cultures because 
the majority uses the state to structure educational, media, and 
other systems to favor the majority culture. Thus, some types of 
societal security issues are fought in the hearts and minds of 
individuals, whereas others are about more tangible matters that 
influence identity. In the first case, the threat is about conversion – 
people start to think of themselves as something else. In the 
second, political decisions will influence identity, such as using 
migration or political structures to compromise the reproduction of 





From the above excerpt, we see that in the societal sector, the battle over identity 
ideas is fought with identity directly as well as indirectly. The ultimate aim of societal 
sectoral threats is either a) the conversion of the referent object‘s perception of the 
self or; b) its elimination through the limitation or destruction of its culture‘s 
reproductive capacity. 
 When political decisions and infrastructure are used to promote or block 
reproduction of a given societal identity, albeit indirectly through migration or directly 
with education policies, the distinction between institution dependent and 
independent identity ideas fades. Nonetheless, since ―society is about identity, the 
self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members 
of a community‖, the ―key‖ to society in international security analysis is the 
identification of the ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a 
social group.
137
 Due to the manipulatable character of societal ideas and practices, it 
is important for state representatives, analysts and even citizens to be more aware of 
the channels of influence, who owns them and how they relate to international politics 
and (foreign) state or organizational strategies. 
 
The Threat: purpose and form 
Importantly, the perceptions members of a nation‘s society hold of themselves, their 
co-citizens and the world around them are changeable. States can influence them 
internally and externally. They may do so with Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian 
intentions. Lockean or Hobbesian actors use identity ideas and perceptions to 
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integrate through the elimination of cultural reproductive capacity, create fear and 
promote schisms and ultimately conflict, insurgency and war.  
 Societal security issues are always, ultimately, about identity. However, the 
medium used is not necessarily identificational. Buzan et al. provide a number of key 
ways in which societal security can be affected:    
 
1) Migration – X people are being overrun or diluted by influxes of Y 
people; the X community will not be what it used to be, because 
others will make up the population; X identity is being changed by a 
shift in the composition of the population (e.g., Chinese migration 
into Tibet, Russian migration into Estonia). 
2) Horizontal competition – although it is still X people living here, 
they will change their ways because of the overriding cultural and 
linguistic influence from neighboring culture Y (e.g., Quebecois fears 
of Anglophone Canada and, more generally, Canadian fears of 
Americanization). 
3) Vertical competition – people will stop seeing themselves as X, 
because there is either an integrating project (e.g. Yugoslavia, the 
EU) or a secessionist – ―regionalist‖ project (e.g. Quebec, Catalonia, 
Kurdistan) that pulls them toward either wider or narrower identities. 
Whereas one of these projects is centripetal and the other 
centrifugal, they are both instances of vertical competition in the 
sense that the struggle is over how wide the circles should be drawn 
or rather – since there are always numerous concentric circles of 




From the above, we see that both horizontal and vertical competitions are based on 
fears of identity loss. The major distinction between the two is that horizontal 
competition concerns fear of influence from a neighboring culture (albeit within the 
state or from a third state), vertical competition concerns fear that is the result of 
organized integrating projects. Horizontal competition can be found at both ends of 
the spectrum because of the spill over effect of these fears.  
 Threats from the state are typically vertical. Internally, it is in the state‘s 
general interest to construct (even using coercive means) loyalties oriented toward 
an identity that will serve the state rather than the other way around.
139
  Such 
projects - albeit regionalist or secessionist - are organized to influence the identity of 
given groups within a given territory. To prevent the populace from fearing or 
revolting against globalization, regionalization or secessionism, the respective 
policies must influence identity structures without being (perceived) as existentially 
threatening to the common interests and ideas shared by the targeted populace.  
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External vertical threats are designed to do the opposite. Namely, Hobbesian 
and/or Lockean actors need to influence the loyalties within the population of a third 
state away from the state to which they belong. They need to provoke fear and revolt 
against the state to which they belong by projecting their common interests and ideas 
as threatened. 
 The nature of the fears driving horizontal competition is more complex.  They 
may be the result of unintended effects caused by the ―interplay between large, 
dynamic cultures on the one hand and small, anachronistic ones on the other‖ but 
also of intentional, strategic policies, as depicted by the ―remaking of occupied 
enemies (e.g. the Americanization of Japan and Germany) and in the cultural 
aspects of contemporary trade policy‖.
140
 Whereas horizontal competition can occur 
intentionally or unintentionally, vertical competition is found at the intentional end of 
the spectrum.
141
 Thus, migration, horizontal and vertical competition can be placed 
on a sliding scale, or a spectrum running from unintended and structural (horizontal) 




unintentional         intentional 
structural H h              h            h              h           h           h     V political  
   m   m  m  m  m  programmatic  
      
H-horizontal competition, V = vertical competition and M = migration 
Figure 4 Competition Spectrum 
 
It is the intentional end of the spectrum which is of particular interest to this study. 
The focus is on identifying the soft power elements of national security which 
Hobbesian/Lockean states must target in order to promote vertical and horizontal 
competition inside weaker states within their geopolitical spheres of interest.  
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1.2.3 Conclusion 
Intangible power of the state is directly linked to its national security. When 
embarking to link national Strategic Purpose to political security it is useful to 
consider a short and accurate definition of politics provided by Buzan, ―Politics is the 
shaping of human behavior for the purpose of governing large groups of people‖.
143
 
Already from this definition, commonalities between national Strategic Purpose and 
the political sector appear. Both are concerned with the organizational quality of the 
state and the shaping human behavior.  
 In the section on strategic national purpose, it was shown that the relationship 
between the state and the nation is pivotal to the intangible power of the state. The 
purpose of national strategy is threefold: 1) to protect the interests of the nation; 2) 
secure the political system, and; 3) provide an international angle through which the 
state will relate with others. Precisely these elements of state power are targeted by 
political security threats in to destabilize the state.  
 Whereas a strong Strategic Purpose aims at protecting and enhancing the 
nation‘s common purpose, political sector threats aim to distort it and divide the 
nation. The unity of the common purpose is weakened by operations that target the 
national interests pivotal to national strategy (beyond basic economic needs) i.e. 
ethnic/civic identity ideas and state ideologies. Threats to the political sector cast 
doubt on the internal legitimacy of the state and its institutions. On the international 
level, the Strategic Purpose should make the state a responsible and stronger player. 
For this reason, Hobbesian and Lockean policies aim at diminishing or eradicating 
the state‘s external recognition and legitimacy. The table below shows how Strategic 
Purpose interlinks with political security: 
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Category Strategic Purpose/Political Security 
Purpose 1) Protection of national interests 
2) Security of governmental order 
3) Paradigm for international relations 
Physical  base Sovereignty:  
 Territory 
 Institutions 
 Formal membership 
 
 
Constituent ideas Institution dependent identity ideas 
 Civic-national 
 Ethno-national 
 Political ideology 
Goal of existential threats Subversion of legitimacy 
 Internal 
 External 
Target of intentional threats  State/nation split in terms of effects on 
stability of state structures and undermining 
national/state ideology 
Figure 5 Strategic Purpose and Political Security Interlinked 
 
From the above, it is possible to conclude that the relationship between the value of 
the intangible component of state power Strategic Purpose (S) and the level of 
political security is proportional. Thus, the more security there is in the political 
sector, the higher the value of S will be and vice versa. 
 The nature of the political security threat is soft. It attacks national (identity) 
ideas and ideologies rather than the physical body, territory or other tangible 
elements of state power. Ideas and ideologies are the glue that binds the nation‘s 
common purpose to its organizational strength, structure and the strategic capability 
of the state. Threats to the political security of the state dilute the nation‘s 
cohesiveness and, in turn, state effectiveness.  
 Ideas and perceptions are the heart of the societal sector; particularly those 
that pertain to the self-conception of communities and individuals within the 
community.
144
 The foundation of Cline‘s National Will is also identity and perception, 
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namely, how the people perceive themselves in relation to each other and, 
additionally, in relation to the world around them. From the perspective of national 
security, the societal sector appears closely related to the intangible component of 
state power; the National Will. However, Cline also recognized that identity 
perceptions that belong to the National Will are affected by the manner in which the 
populace is provided modes and procedures for acting upon these perceptions 
through their government.
145
 Here, an important yet menacing distinction exists 
between the two.  
 Buzan et al. assert that the perceptions and identity ideas belonging to the 
societal sector are independent of institutions and that institution dependent ones 
belong to the political sector. Cline follows a similar logic insofar as he distinguishes 
between the National Will and the Strategic Purpose. Yet, he also recognizes the 
value played by government institutions in empowering the National Will. As a result, 
he includes the effective strength of national leadership and perceived relevance of 
national strategy to national interests. In doing so, attributes the necessity of the 
government structures to use identificational concepts to effectuate the common 
purpose. Thus the strict line between institution dependant ideas as belonging to the 
political sector and institution independent ones to the societal one as proposed by 
Buzan et al. which was already problematic, is not shared by Cline. Further, Buzan et 
al. distinguish between nations and societies. The distinction is not expressly made 
by Cline. He only refers to nations.  
 However, this does not seem to be a matter of great contention; as an 
important consensus exist between the two approaches. Both assert the value of 
common interests above and beyond individual and economic ones. Also, Buzan et 
al. claim that societal security is about the level of collective identities and actions 
taken to defend them. Similarly, Cline asserts the nation and its combined, shared 
interests make people join together in a nation and work toward a shared common 
purpose. In both cases it is necessary to consider the elements constituting collective 
identities and interests. These elements are found in the concept of nationhood.  
 In considering nationhood, Buzan et al. identify objective factors such as 
language, location, historical and contemporary ties as identificational factors that 
can be targeted in the societal sector. Cline‘s angle is slightly different. He identifies 
national integration as only one constituent category of the National Will. Yet, within 
this category, he identifies cultural uniformity (i.e. ethnicity, language and religion) as 
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well as strength of territorial integration, and collective memory as its constituent 
factors.  
 Cline and Buzan et al. also agree that whether or not members of a populace 
identify with a particular community or nation remains a choice. This ―choice‖ is 
important. Because, where there is ambiguity there is always room for policy to 
influence.
146
 Buzan et al. address this explicitly and assert that the decision-making 
process can be influenced by emphasizing one or another trait of a given society.
147
 
In so doing, they create room for the use of state institutions to influence identity 
perceptions. Moreover, because effective threats to the societal sector will reduce the 
value of the power component of National Will and vice versa, the relationship 
between them is proportional. 
 
Category National Will/Societal Security 
Purpose Mobilization of common interests to ensure 
fullest utilization of tangible power 
Physical  base Nationhood – common interests – ―we‖ 
identities 
Constituent ideas Institution independent identity ideas 
 National identity 
 Self conception of communities 
 Self conception of individuals 
Goal of existential threats Conversion of perceptions of self  or 
Elimination through limitation or destruction of 
cultural reproductive capacity 
Targeted by intentional threats  Level or degree of national integration 
 Cultural -ethnic-linguistic-religious 
Level or degree of territorial integration 
Collective memory 
Figure 6 National Will and Societal Security Interlinked 
 
From the aforementioned, it is possible to conclude that the relationship between the 
political and societal sectors of state security on the one hand, and intangible sate 
power on the other, is complimentary. Together, they encompass the most important 
components of state power and, hence, national security. 
 
                                               
146 Nye, 2004: 53. 
147 Buzan et al., 1998: 120. 
 - 59 - 
1.3 Conclusion Part One 
The objective of this part was to determine what soft power is and identify the 
elements national security which must be targeted to promote insurgency with 
attraction. It was expected that a framework could be developed with which one 
could analyze the foreign policies of third states for the use of soft power as a 
security instrument. 
 To this end, Cline‘s formula of perceived power was used to identify the 
components of state power. It was shown that in calculating state power, the 
intangible elements national Strategic Purpose and National Will carry more value 
than the tangible components (i.e. critical mass, economic and military capability). 
This added value makes it possible to conclude that hostile powers intent on gaining 
geopolitical power would benefit from lowering the value of the targeted state‘s 
intangible power.  
 Soft power is found to be related to intangible power in a number of ways. Its 
currencies, i.e. values, culture, policies and institutions, are the main elements of 
intangible state power. Furthermore, intangible and soft power both use perceptions 
and ideas to attract the hearts and minds of a given population. The power of 
attraction can either promote the sense of loyalty, or shift it away from the state 
toward some other actor. As a result, a policy aimed at attracting members of a given 
population or policy makers to adopt certain values, cultural habits, policies and 
institutions is not restricted to pure intentions. The intentional shifting of loyalties 
away from the state toward a third actor simultaneously removes power from the 
targeted state and transfers it to the strategic soft power actor. This shift of power 
provides the third actor more influence over the population and (foreign) territory of 
the targeted state.  
Nye‘s understanding of soft power and metaphor of the three-dimensional 
international power chessboard (military, economic and soft power) were presented. 
They show that the ―pure‖ policies of attraction are bilateral, multilateral and public 
diplomacy. However, the interplay between the three forms of power makes soft 
power policies vulnerable to the influences of less pure policies of persuasion albeit 
inducement or coercion. Following the same logic as Cline and Nye, Buzan et al. also 
assert that security is not just the use of force, but an intersubjective politics. 
Furthermore, they recognize existential threats, albeit non-military in nature, may 
lead to separatism, ethnic conflict and war. Particular attention was paid to existential 
fears of socio-cultural penetration by a dynamic neighboring area.  
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Perceptions and ideas are affected by the currencies of soft power and the light in 
which they are presented. Foreign policies directed at influencing the loyalty of a 
given population to remove power from the state and thereby deteriorate its national 
security are bound to be illegitimate. Thus, it should not be assumed that the 
manners in which states or nations are attracted to the soft power currencies of third 
states or organizations are inherently pure. They may rely, albeit indirectly, on 
inducement or coercion. The fact that the power being used is ―soft‖ should not divert 
attention from the damaging effects.  It can cause to the targeted state‘s national 
security. 
 Important structural commonalities exist between Cline‘s intangible 
components of power and the constitutive elements of political and societal security 
sectors. At the core of both (S + W one the one hand and the political and societal 
sector on the other) lie perceptions and ideas. The perceptions of import are the ones 
people within a given state have of themselves in relation to each other, the world 
around them and of the modes and procedures their government provides to act 
upon these perceptions. The ideas are national identity ideas. They are either 
institution independent or dependent.  
  Most damaging to the National Will is the breakdown of the level of national 
and territorial integration, and perceptions of government policy efficacy in serving 
the common interests. The ultimate aim of societal sectoral threats twofold: the 
conversion of the referent object‘s perception of the self, or; its elimination through 
the limitation or destruction of its culture‘s reproductive capacity. The objective is 
achieved by attacking institution independent national identity ideas and the self-
conception of individuals and communities. Ultimately these threats can lead to 
ethnic conflict or separatism, particularly when a result of intentional horizontal or 
vertical competition. 
 In the political sector, the ultimate threat aims to breakdown internal and/or 
external legitimacy of the state, by attacking sovereignty and state organization using 
institution dependent identity ideas (civic-national and ethno-national) and/or the 
political ideology. The strength of national Strategic Purpose also depends on state 
institutions, political ideology and the common purpose which is derived from the 
nation and its aggregate interests. Institutions and the ideas upon which they are built 
are the main constituting factors political security. The ideas and perceptions that 
matter to both the political sector and national Strategic Purpose relate to national 
identity, common interests, ideology, and the institutions, which express the idea of 
the state.  
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By combining the political and societal sector threats with the intangible components 
of perceived state power the objectives and targets of soft power threats are 




Objective of existential 
soft power threat 
 
- Conversion or elimination of perceptions through limitation 
or destruction of cultural reproductive capacity 
 






- Level or degree of national integration 
- State/nation split in terms of effects on stability of state 
structures and undermining national/state ideology 
 
Figure 7 Soft Power Threats 
  
Markedly, nationhood and national identity ideas are fundamental to both intangible 
power and the ―intangible security‖ sectors. When considering nationhood, Buzan et 
al. identify language, location, religion, historical and contemporary ties as 
identificational factors that can be targeted in the societal sector. The same 
(relatively) institution independent identity ideas are also identified by Cline. 
However, he also includes ideas/perceptions pertaining to the strength of territorial 
integration (level of conviction that the territory inhabited by individual or group of 
individuals belongs to them), the effective strength of national leadership and 
perceived relevance of national strategy to national interests to the perceptions 
affecting the National Will.  
 These later two factors (strength of leadership and relevance of strategy) 
belong more to the political sector than to the societal one. The ideas upon which 
they are based generally tend to be more institution dependent than independent 
ones. An overlap exists between the national Strategic Purpose and the National Will 
on the one hand and the category of ideas that belong to the societal and political 
security sectors. Yet, the line between the two is not always clear and for the purpose 
at hand, this difference is unimportant. What is important is that Cline‘s formula 
coincides with, and compliments, the Copenhagen School‘s approach to international 
security studies as it pertains to intangible, of soft power security. 
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It is possible to conclude that perceptions derived from institution dependent and 
independent national identity ideas are the building blocks of both, intangible power 
as well as political and societal security. Moreover, the relationship between them is 
correlative and proportional: the higher the value is for S the more political security 
there is, the higher the value is for W the higher the level of societal security. Their 
structural commonalities permit the merger of intangible power with the two security 
sectors and facilitates the identification of the main components of soft power 
namely, institution dependent and independent identity ideas pertaining to the 1) 
Level of  national integration a) ethnic b) linguistic c) religious d) territorial e) 
collective memory; 2) Strength of national leadership a) government policy capability 
b) state institutions c) level of social discipline; 3) Perceived relevance of national 
strategy a) common interest b) ideology.  
 The following diagram shows how the merger of intangible power with the 
societal and political sectors, which are built on the aforementioned ideas, constitutes 
the realm of soft power security:  
 
   
Soft Power Security            Soft power components 
 Figure 8 Soft Power Security 
 
Thus, a workable model of soft power security analysis has been created by merging 
the intangible components of state power with the political and societal security 
sectors. The extra value allotted to intangible power in calculating perceived state 
power is indicative of the paramount import of soft power security. If successfully 
targeted by Hobbesian or Lockean third parties, the loss of soft power greatly 
deteriorates the perceived power of the state and its ability to utilize its tangible 
power components to the fullest.  
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Also paramount is the fact that vertical competition i.e. intentional, programmatic and 
political integrating/secessionist projects are carried out using soft power tactics. 
They are organized to influence the identity and loyalties of selected groups within a 
given territory. The Hobbesian/Lockean soft power actor uses institution dependent 
and independent identity ideas to attract and shift loyalties toward itself and gain 
geopolitical power.  
 













 Figure 9 Soft Power Aggression 
 
Importantly, the power of persuasion also lies in the ability of the power seeker to 
project his/her objectives as legitimate. When states use soft power for Lockean or 
Hobbesian purposes, such as the promotion of secessionism in third states, the 
legitimacy of such policies, and their currencies, become questionable. It is 
foreseeable that in such cases there would be a closer interplay between the soft 
power and less pure policies of persuasion, albeit inducement through bribes or 
coercion. After all, ―corruption is an essential component of power relations and 
cannot be separated from power.‖
 148
 Thus, the Hobbesian state‘s behavior may not 
only be illegitimate, it may be criminal.  
 It is therefore interesting to consider the relationship between the state and 
organized crime and to determine if political-criminal relations really do belong to the 
state‘s arsenal of foreign policy instruments.  
                                               






































 1. Level or degree of national integration  




 National-territorial  integration 
 Collective memory 
 
2. Effective strength of national leadership  
 Government policy capability 
 Response norm (level of social discipline)  
 
3. Perceived relevance of national strategy to 
      national interests 
 Common interests  
 Ideology 
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Part TWO: Politically Organized Transnational Crime 
 
Behind the ostensible government sits enthroned an invisible government owing no allegiance 
and acknowledging no responsibility to the people. To destroy this invisible government, to 
befoul the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics is the first task of the 
statesmanship of the day. 
       - Theodore Roosevelt, April 19, 1906 
 
2. Introduction 
There appears to be a disturbingly dichotomous quality to transnational organized 
crime. Whereas it is the root of national and international insecurity, states can also 
use it to realize their political and geopolitical objectives. On the national level, much 
research already exists on organized crime and, to a lesser degree, political-criminal 
relations. However, little information is available on how states benefit from 
transnational organized crime and political-criminal relations in international relations.  
 The purpose of this part is to determine whether transnational organized 
crime belongs to the state arsenal and to ascertain the nature and role of the 
political-criminal nexus in inter-state relations. It is anticipated that states rely on illicit 
products and revenues to support illegitimate geopolitical pursuits, particularly as 
they pertain to war and state-making. In the case that transnational organized crime 
does belong to the toolbox of foreign policy instruments, it is foreseeable that 
Hobbesian/Lockean foreign policies use it to target the military, economic, and soft 
power security of third states.  
 What is more, such an organized political-criminal relationship may even 
constitute an internal social structure which lends itself to state identity. In fact, it is 
expected to constitute the ―dark side‖ of state identity which keeps up the warring 
status quo.  The purpose of the following chapters is to ascertain the validity of the 
aforementioned hypotheses by taking the following steps.  
 First, to understand how and why states may use transnational organized 
crime, it is necessary to know what it is and what it means to international security. 
The best place to start in this regard is by considering the formal perspective of the 
international community and the manner the United Nations has defined it in the 
2001 UN Palermo Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  
 Second, since the dominant perception of transnational organized crime is as 
an activity separated from the state, it is necessary seek out historical binds and 
theories that link state behavior to organized crime. The works of scholars including 
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Max Weber‘s concept of the state monopoly over the use of force, Horkheimer‘s state 
racket theory and Tilly‘s analysis of state making will be used to determine how 
transnational organized crime is connected to state power. This chapter provides a 
historical background to the political-criminal relationship and an introduction to how 
the relationship has influenced the identity of certain states. 
 Third, since the query at hand pertains to the pursuit of geopolitical power, it 
is necessary to determine whether formal (upperworld) and informal (underworld) 
structures affect each other‘s spheres of influence; particularly their power over 
territory. To this end, the stage evolutionary model of organized crime is used. This 
model appears to be a useful instrument. It presents the political-criminal relationship 
as dynamic and its actors influence each other‘s spheres of power. To date, this 
theory has only been applied to internal political-criminal relations. Here, it will be 
expanded upon and extrapolated to the international realm. This move is expected to 
facilitate the understanding of how states use transnational organized crime in 
international relations. It is also expected to be pivotal to the profiling of the character 
of political-criminal relations of any given state.  
 Fourth, it must be determined whether the political-criminal nexus is a 
structural part of state identity. When considering the formation of state identity, 
constructivists argue, ―Structures affect behavior and the very definition of identity 
and interests of states‖.
149
 Thus, a theoretical instrument is needed that shows 
political-criminal relations constitute a social structure within the state. To this end, 
the social network approach to political-criminal relations will be adopted. It is 
expected to show that the character of political-criminal nexuses is state-specific; 
determined by actor motivations as well as cultural and structural causes. 
 Fifth, it is interesting to consider how the political-criminal nexus serves state 
interests in international relations. In this chapter, the interface between political-
criminal relations and geopolitics is considered. Also, the question if political-criminal 
actions are ideologically driven is also asked. This section is expected to shed light 
on how the political-criminal nexus influences international relations and the manner 
in which states perceive one another. Special attention is given here to the role of 
state security agencies. 
 Finally, if it will be possible to conclude that the political-criminal nexus is a 
dynamic, social structure and foreign policy instrument, it should be possible to 
profile the political-criminal nexus of any given state. To test this assertion, the 
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aforementioned theoretical constructs will be used to profile of the character of 
Russia‘s post-Soviet political-criminal nexus.  
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2.1 Transnational Organized Crime  
 
If 'Thou shalt not covet' and 'Thou shalt not steal' were not commandments of Heaven, they 
must be made inviolable precepts in every society before it can be civilized or made free. 
      
    J.Adams, "A Defense of the American Constitutions," 1787 
 
The Copenhagen school of security studies asserts that the ‗securitizing speech act‘, 
calling something a national security threat, permits the state to resort to exceptional 
measures which lie outside of the regular political process to deal with it.
150
 It is 
there, behind the national security veil, that a system appears to exist which deviates 
from publicly legitimized principles, laws and values. However, little attention has 
been given to transnational organized crime as a part of the state structure that can 
be employed for its defense or pursuit of its security interests.
151
  
 Although transnational organized crime is as old as human civilization, it was 
only in the 1970‘s that critical international relations theorists began to argue that the 
process of globalization would set free enormous conflict potentials resulting in global 
crisis; manifest in intra- or international conflicts, personal violence, crime, organized 
crime and global anomie.
152
 Yet, if nomen est omen holds true in the security sector, 
and something becomes a security issue by being named one, then the ancient 
practice of transnational organized crime became an international security issue 
when the Cold War ended.  
 It was in 1989, while the Iran Contra scandal was slowly subsiding under the 
dust in America, that political and economic transformation in East Germany and the 
Soviet Union caused a rapid growth of transnational organized crime in Europe.
153
 
According to Volker Foertsch, the former First Director of Germany‘s Federal 
Intelligence Service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the KGB in East Berlin and 
the Ministry for State Security were known for either supporting or sanctioning the 
trafficking of nonferrous metals, cigarettes and embargoed goods by Berlin 
underworld bosses. Thus, illegal trade and cooperation between the communist 
services and foreign criminal groups was not a new phenomenon. The organized 
                                               
150 Buzan et al., 1998: 26. See also Guzzini, 5. 
151 Naylor R. T., (1993). The Insurgent Economy: Black market operations of guerrilla organizations in Crime, Law and Social Change. issue 
20: 13-51.  p 22. 
152 Schulte-Bockholt, p 20. 
153 Foertsch V. (1999). The Role of Counter Intelligence in Countering Transnational Organized Crime, in Trends in Organized Crime, Winter 
1999. p 123. 
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criminal trade was an established practice where ―the leadership of the Western 
Group of Troops, with the assistance of Russian criminal groups, hawked goods that 




 However, what was new was the largest peacetime military withdrawal in 
history: the pullout of the Soviet Army‘s Western Guard from Eastern Germany. With 
over 300,000 men, it was the Soviet military‘s largest foreign presence. The Soviets 
were given almost 8 billion German marks for the relocation of their forces and 
construction of 36 thousand apartments on Soviet territory in Europe, (Belarus, 
Ukraine and parts of Russia).
155
 According to Foertsch, the manner in which these 
funds were appropriated and used was almost as scandalous as what had been 
occurring on the ground in East Berlin. The withdrawal affected the criminal trade, 
particularly the trafficking of Red Army weapon‘s systems. 
 
And, athough a number of 
suspects, including the commander of the Soviet Western Guard, General Burlakov, 
were investigated, the cases against them were all suspended.
156
  
 In 1989, the Sicilian Mafia, its ―American offspring‖ and its ―Colombian 
partners‖ were already present in East Germany and much of Eastern Europe. Yet, 
that year the Communist-Soviet mafia was freed. According to the politically 
influential criminologist and author, Claire Sterling, this was when ―the last borders 
went down for the international underworld – well over a year ahead of the European 
Community‘s borders, rendering most of its strategy for defense obsolete‖.
157
 For the 
rest of the 1990‘s the international community turned its focus to the international 
effects of transnational organized crime as a global security threat.  
 In June 1990, former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl requested that the 
Prime Ministers of the European Community make time at the Dublin Summit to 
consider the international threat of organized crime.
158
 In the autumn of 1993, the 
Head of Italy‘s Parliamentary Anti-Mafia Commission pronounced Russia the new 
world capital of organized crime.
159
 In the autumn of 1995, President Clinton called 
on the United Nations for global cooperation against transnational organized 
                                               
154 Foertsch, 130
-131
 (citing Herschel Leibermann
,






―Commercial Coordination‖ as an 
example). 
155 Dubinin Y. V. (Дубинин Ю. В.), (2005). Diplomatic Marathon (Дипломатический Марафон), Москва (Moscow): Авиарус-21. р 8. (Dubinin 
notes that in the long run and after much political hardball Russia received 
most
 of the total amount). 
156 Ibid.  
157 Sterling C. (1994). Thieves World: The Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime, New York: Simon and Schuster. p 51. 
158 Ibid, 49-50. 
159 Ibid 17. 
 - 69 - 
crime.
160
 The following year, the U.S. National Security Strategy declared 
international organized crime to be a national security issue.
161
 In 1996, The 
Brown/Rudman Commission on ―the Roles and Capabilities of the United States 




 Politicians, criminologists and jurists in the US, EU and UN recognized the 
destabilizing power of transnational organized crime. Then in 2001, a decade after 
the Soviet Union collapsed, the international community met in Palermo, Sicily, the 
seat of the Italian mafia, to create the first UN Treaty against Transnational 
Organized Crime. 
2.1.1 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime 
What is transnational organized crime? The international community pondered this 
question for many decades. In fact, the First Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders was held at Geneva in 1955.
163
 Thirty years later, 
the Seventh Congress met in Milan and codified the Guiding Principles for Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice in the Context of Development and a New 
International Economic Order (The Milan Principles).  
 It is of paramount importance to national security studies to note that the 
Milan Principles opened up a new perspective on transnational organized crime. 
Having addressed conventional ―civilian‖ organized criminal behavior, the United 
Nations linked state behavior to transnational organized crime. It identified ―common 
features, evident in many forms of commercial, economic and technological crime‖ to 
include ―…acts of institutional violence … as well as institutional collective or 
individual state actions aimed at severely damaging the economy of, or causing 
widespread social disruption in other countries‖.
164
 This reference is pivotal for two 
main reasons because it links transnational organized crime to a) state behavior and 
b) to the societal sector of national security.  
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 Recognizing the effects organized crime has on development and state 
security, the United Nations urged states to control and abstain from activities which 
are likely to harm the economic, social, cultural and political development of other 
countries.
165
 To this end, they drafted Principle 5 of the Milan Principles. This 
principle extends the fight against transnational organized crime to include non-
conventional and economic crimes.
166
 Both are identified as ―dangerous to the 
development process, in which official and non-official institutions, organizations of 
various sorts and individuals may be directly and indirectly involved‖.
167
  
 Importantly, it was the international community‘s ―deep concern of the 
negative economic and social implications related to organized criminal activities‖ 
which was the driving force behind the creation of an international treaty against 
transnational organized crime.
168
 This conviction of the urgent need to develop a 
convention resulted in the 55th UN General Assembly adoption of the 2001 United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Treaty).
169
 The 
treaty entered into force on 29 September 2003, 90 days after Armenia became the 
40th state to deposit an instrument of ratification.
170
 
 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
codifies rules of international cooperation on technical matters such as: prosecution, 
adjudication and sanctions; confiscation and seizure of property; extradition; legal 
assistance; investigative techniques; witness and victim protection; law enforcement 
cooperation; information on the nature of organized crime; training and technical 
assistance, and; prevention. The international struggle for peace through principled 
moral order also led to the development of three protocols to the Convention: The 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children;
171
 the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and 
Air
172
; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition.
173
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 It is important to note the low ratification numbers to the protocols (particularly 
the protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition, to which only 77 of 192 UN states are a party to 
at this time). They are indicative of the interplay between states, foreign policies and 
transnational organized crime.    
 
The Scope of the Convention (Article 3)  
The aim of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime is 
to prevent, investigate and prosecute transnational and national organized crime. It 
must be noted that the Palermo Treaty is not applicable to transnational organized 
crimes of a purely political or social nature. The crimes must be committed for the 
purpose of gaining material benefit. It appears that by including this stipulation in the 
Travaux Preparatoires states wished to separate the concepts of transnational 
organized crime and geopolitics. However, transnational organized crimes are rarely 
purely political or social. Moreover, the UN encourages states to interpret the term 
―material benefit‖ broadly.  
 
The issues of import to this study are the activities the United Nations has 
established as an offence or serious crime. The scope of the convention is 
established in the first paragraph of Article 3: 
 
1. This Convention shall apply, except as otherwise stated herein, 
to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of: 
(a) The offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 
and 23 of this Convention; and 
(b) Serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention; 






Participation in a Criminal Group (Article 5) 
An organized criminal group (Art. 2 (a)) is distinct from ―participation in a criminal 
group‖ (Article 5(1)). The international community provides states with two forms of 
‗participation‘ to choose from and they are at liberty to decide whether to criminalize 
one or both forms.
175
 Both definitions of participation constitute an international 
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criminal offence within the scope of the Palermo Treaty. States are bound to 
criminalize the acts of the accomplice: organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, 
facilitating or counseling the commission of serious crime involving an organized 
criminal group.
176
 The ―knowledge‖, ―intent‖, ―aim‖, ―purpose‖ or ―agreement‖ of the 
person may be inferred from objective factual circumstances.
177
 It is important for 
states to note that the actual ―participation in a criminal group‖ is an offence distinct 
from the actual attempt or completion of a crime.
178
 Both forms of participation are 
considered below. 
 
Participation in a Criminal Group – 2 or more participants  
Whereas an organized criminal group is made up of three or more persons, 
participation in a criminal group (Article 5) requires a minimal of only two participants. 
Two or more persons need to agree to commit a crime which carries a penalty of 4 
years (or more) of liberty deprivation for each of them to be considered as 
participants in a criminal group. The individuals partaking in the criminal group must 
be doing it for some sort of material benefit. Here the same meaning is given to 
―financial or other material benefit‖ as given in the definition of ―organized criminal 




Participation in a Criminal Group – 1 person aware and active 
In the second form of ―participation in a criminal group‖ the accent lies on the conduct 
and awareness of a single person.
180
 The person must be aware of both the aim and 
general criminal activity of an organized criminal group, or of its intent to commit 
serious crimes, and, with this knowledge, actively participate in the group‘s activities. 
Unlike in the first form of participation, no mention is made here of the aim of the 
perpetrator to achieve some sort of financial or material benefit. The activities of the 
person participating in an organized criminal group as provided in the second form 
may be criminal or simply of the kind that contribute to the attainment of the criminal 
aim. Importantly, the fact that a perpetrated act is not a crime in itself is irrelevant, as 
long as it contributes to the realization of a criminal aim, the commission of a serious 
crime. 
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Laundering the Proceeds of Crime (Article 6) 
If corruption ―provides the air that organized crime needs for survival‖ then laundering 
the proceeds of crime is its heart.
181
 Without the possibility of legitimizing material 
wealth gained through organized criminal activity, the incentives to participate in 
organized crime wanes. Moreover, of the main reasons criminal organizations, states 
and socioeconomic elites cooperate is to profit share, or launder money.
182
 
Laundering the proceeds of crime represents an important dimension of international 
criminal behavior. This is perhaps most importantly pertains to global financial 
institutions, multinational corporations and international banks.
183
 According to some 
scholars, ―global organized crime is part of a ―financial-industrial complex‖, a global 
society where one sees ―the corporate capitalism of McDonalds, Starbucks, and 
Microsoft, as well as the illegitimate non-ideological criminal enterprises that lauder 
drug money and supply arms to corrupt states‖.
 184
 
  Experts agree that the ―underground economy – where economic activity 
evades scrutiny, regulation and taxation by the state‖ is what makes it possible for 
transnational criminal groups to threaten the existence of the state system.‖
185
 If 
money laundering is the lifeline of organized criminal groups, it may also be that 
underground economy is used by states to fund illegal trade, illegitimate operations 
such as separatism and war around the world.  
 In the early 1990s, the Peruvian ―cash starved military‖ allied itself with drug 
traffickers to finance the civil war against the Maoist Sendero Luminoso rebels. It is 
been estimated that Peru earned approximately $500 million USD from its 
involvement in the cocaine economy in 1993.
186  
Naylor cites Lebanese forces as an 
example of how by laundering the proceeds of crime, organized criminal groups and 
state structures create a parallel political economy which can reproduce almost all of 
the functions of a formal state.
187
  
 Money laundering, and its equivalent, the laundering the proceeds of crime, is 
subject to mandatory criminalization within the national criminal codes of all states 
party to the Palermo Treaty.
188
 The constitutive elements of money laundering are 
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knowledge, intent and purpose. Each of these three factors may be inferred from the 
objective factual circumstances of each case.
189
 The concealment or disguise of the 
proceeds of crime, in all its forms, is to be criminalized, as is the acquisition, 
possession, or use of property that is the proceeds of crime.
 190
  
 Article 6 (1) (a) defines two main forms of money laundering namely, the 
conversion or transfer of property to conceal or disguise illicit origins, and, conversion 
or transfer of property to help any person. The difference between the two lies mostly 
in the difference in motive. In one, the motive is to make illicit property look legal and 
in the other, the motive is to help a person who committed the profit bearing 
predicate crime. 
 
Conversion or Transfer of Property to Conceal or Disguise Illicit Origins  
Knowingly and intentionally converting or transferring of any kind of property 
(corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal 
documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in such assets) is to be 
criminalized when it is the proceeds of crime.
191
 The illegal nature of this form of 
money laundering lies in the knowledge that the property is derived from or obtained, 
directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence and the intent to disguise 




Conversion or Transfer of Property to Help any Person 
In this form of money laundering, the conversion or transfer of any kind of asset is 
criminalized when it is done for the purpose of helping any person involved in the 
commission of any predicate offence from which proceeds have been generated. The 
term ―any person‖ implies the person can be a natural, legal or official one. The 
predicate offences from which the property is derived may have been committed 
within or outside the jurisdiction of the State Party in question.
193
 Importantly, 
offences committed outside the jurisdiction of the State implementing or applying this 
article constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal 
offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed as well as under 
the domestic law of the State Party implementing or applying this article. 
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Corruption (Article 8) 
The international community, trying to gain control over corruption worldwide, 
identified three individual levels of corruption that distort upperworld processes. The 
bribing of officials, the solicitation and acceptance of a bribe by officials, the bribing, 
soliciting or accepting of an undue advantage of/by a foreign public official or 
international civil servant and being an accomplice to the acts of corruption are all 
internationally criminal offences. Article 8 (1) of the Palermo Treaty criminalizes both 
the bribery of a public official, and a public official‘s solicitation or acceptance of a 
bribe.  
 However, the definition of corruption as ―the abuse of a public position of trust 
for private gain‖ is argued not to take into consideration endemically corrupt state 
societies, resulting from an absence of public and democratic control.
194
 It is claimed 
that in such contexts, ―Corruption refers to a specific manifestation and management 
of power, an essential component of power relations that cannot be separated from 
power, ‗a tool in the hands of the powerful‘‖.
195
 Importantly, the Iran Contra scandal 
has shown that there is no need to limit this claim to states without so-called 
functioning public and democratic control.  
 The criminalization of corruption is a principle in the fight against transnational 
organized crime and all states agreed to its mandatory criminalization. However, it is 
here, where the rule of law is often lacking due to the lack of political will. It is here 
that organized criminal organizations develop symbiotic relationships with the state 
and its authorities, and, it is here where the system fails. Corruption ―provides the air 
that organized crime needs for survival.‖
196
  Corruption, how it is done and at which 
levels, can say a lot about a state. This is exemplified in the difficulties experienced 
by the United Nations in finalizing the world‘s first binding anti-corruption treaty. 
States such as China, Russia, Algeria, Pakistan, Egypt and Zimbabwe do not wish to 
cede to control mechanisms envisaged by the treaty.  
 
Bribing an official 
All state Parties are to prohibit and penalize the bribing of officials. A legal or natural 
person may not promise, offer or give an undue advantage to a public official with the 
purpose of influencing the exercise of his official duties.
197
 All states are under legal 
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obligation to criminalize such behavior, even when the official is not the benefactor of 
the undue advantage, but another person or legal entity.
198
 However, what 
constitutes an ―undue advantage‖ is not specified. Therefore, it is possible to 
conclude that the same threshold applies here as it does for the interpretation of 
―material benefit‖. Thus, the advantage may be material or immaterial in nature.  
 
Soliciting or Accepting a Bribe 
All state Parties are to prohibit and penalize the solicitation and acceptance of a bribe 
by officials. The intention of the perpetrator here is to negotiate an undue advantage 
for acting or refraining from acting in accordance with his official duties. The undue 
advantage may be material or immaterial in nature and the official does not have to 
be its recipient. The international community has bound legal entities like companies 




Corruption involving a foreign public official or international civil servant 
Perhaps indicative of where the real problems lie in international relations, states 
party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime are not legally 
obliged to criminalize the bribing, solicitation or acceptance of an undue advantage 
of/by a foreign public official or international civil servant.  For the purposes of this 
Article, ‗public official‘ means a public official or a person who provides a public 
service as defined in his domestic law.
200
 Thus, when a foreign public servant or 
international civil servant uses bribery to promote the interests of his/her state or 
organization, the Palermo Treaty does not have the power to make it an international 
crime. States are, however, strongly encouraged to consider the criminalization of 
such acts. 
 It is conceivable that a state or state agency can qualify as an ―entity‖ in the 
meaning of Article 8. In such cases, the line between corruption, organized criminal 
activity and ‗high-level diplomacy‘ fades. An example of this murky area of law and 
corruption-politics can be found in use of American Airlines (the CIA Airline), in 
Vietnam. ―Air America regularly transported bundles of opium from airstrips in Laos, 
Cambodia, and Burma to Saigon and Hong Kong‖.
201 
U.S. law did not permit the CIA 
or any of its agents to engage in the smuggling of opium but, ―. . . so long as the Meo 
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leadership could keep their wards in the boondocks fighting and dying in the name of, 
for those unfortunates anyway, some nebulous cause . . .the Meo leadership [was 
paid off] in the form of a carte-blanche to exploit U.S.-supplied airplanes and 
communication gear to the end of greatly strengthening the opium operations…‖
202
 
This situation paints an ironic picture of simultaneous hegemony through dominance 
and ideology. And, it points to the fact that, the money earned by these drug deals 
notwithstanding, that governments are willing and able to provide an undue 
advantage to actors willing to support their internal and foreign policies. 
 
Accomplice to corruption 
Article 8 (3) directs states to criminalize the participation as an accomplice to the acts 
of corruption as they have been codified in Article 8 (1) of the Palermo Treaty.  
 
Obstruction of Justice (Article 23) 
The offer often made by criminals between silver (accepting an undue advantage) 
and lead (being shot for not cooperating) is mandatorily criminalized in the first 
paragraph of Article 23. Both, the pledging, offering or awarding of an undue 
advantage (the silver), and, the intimidation, use or threat of physical force (the lead), 
are to be established as crimes.
203
 This includes inducing false testimony, interfering 
with the giving of testimony or the production of evidence also obstructs justice 
criminally.
204
 The threat or use of physical force, against a justice or law enforcement 
official must also be criminalized.
205
 However, the criminalization of the 
aforementioned acts is only obligatory in so far they relate to offences within the 
scope of convention.  
2.1.2 Conclusion 
The fall of the Berlin wall and collapse of the Soviet Union caused a flux in the 
international criminal world. It also prompted the international community to identify 
Transnational Organized Crime as an international security threat. The United 
Nations recognize the destabilizing power of transnational organized crime and the 
threat it poses to weaker nations by creating great social, economic and political 
                                               
202 Ibid.  
203 Article 23 (a) United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 8 January 2001. 
See also: Travaux Preparatoires, p.216. 
204 Article 23 (a) United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 8 January 2001. 
205 Article 23 (b) United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 8 January 2001. 
 - 78 - 
costs at home and in international relations.
206
 To confront this ―new threat‖ to 
international security, the states of the United Nations created The United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.  
 The convention applies to the prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
serious crime that is transnational in nature and involves and organized criminal 
group. Participation in a criminal group, corruption, money laundering and the 
obstruction of justice are established as mandatory offences. State parties are legally 
obliged to criminalize them. The international threshold of what constitutes other 
serious crimes has been set as an offence that can be penalized with the deprivation 
of at least 4 years of liberty. For the purposes of the Palermo treaty an organized 
criminal offence must be committed to obtain financial or other material benefit. 
 It is exceedingly important that the international community did recognize 
state use of transnational organized crime. However, despite finding common 
features of crime to include ―collective or individual state actions aimed at severely 
damaging the economy of or causing widespread social disruption in other 
countries‖, states are merely encouraged to criminalize corruption involving a foreign 
public official or international civil servant.
207
  This notwithstanding the mere 
recognition of such state behavior and a codified, strong encouragement to 
criminalize it appears indicative of a new approach to political-criminal relations. 
 In this light it is interesting to consider the view renowned historian Charles 
Tilly holds of the state as it relates to organized crime. Tilly concludes: ―If protection 
rackets represent organized crime at its smoothest, then war making and state 
making – quintessential protection rackets with the advantage of legitimacy- qualify 
as our largest examples of organized crime‖.
208
 Thus, it becomes all the more 
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2.2 The State: A protection racket? 
 
The medium is the message. 
    M. McLuhan 
 
In January 1919, Max Weber addressed the state monopoly over the legitimate use 
of force in his famous lecture ―Politics as a Vocation‖. He quoted Loen Trostksy‘s 
1918 Brest-Litovsk proclamation, ―Every state is founded on force‖ and concluded, ―If 
no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence; the concept of 'state' 
would be eliminated.‖
209
  Similarly, Horkheimer, a founder and guiding thinker or the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory maintained that throughout history, domination of 
groups took place through protection rackets and their resort to coercion.
210
  
 These understandings of coercion as the historical, common denominator of 
dominance imply that the state is a product of coercion: a legitimized protection 
racket, a ―regime model of socioeconomic repression‖ formed by state and/or non-
state elites ―to preserve domination through the, often violent, exclusion of large 
groups in societies‖.
211
 Importantly, particularly as political-criminal relations pertain 
to this study of geopolitics, Horkheimer also observed, ―the circumstances of 
domestic and foreign policy‖ determine whether a ‗bandit leader, condottiere, guerilla, 
[or] racketeer‘ is categorized as ‗warrior‘ or ‗criminal‘‖.
212
 Both Horkheimer and 
Canadian criminologist Schulte-Bockholt, support the Marxist observation that elites 
give up political power to maintain social power, ―…elites who cannot achieve 
hegemony by consent rely on coercion to maintain dominance and to assure capital 
extraction while engaged in endless struggles against counter hegemonic forces.‖
213
   
 Along the same lines, Weber believed that organized domination requires the 
―conditioning of human obedience towards masters who claim to be the bearers of 
legitimate power‖.
214
 In this regard, power meant violent force. Weber claimed that it 
is by virtue of this ―obedience‖ that organized domination requires control of those 
material goods which in a given case are necessary for the use of physical 
violence.‖
215
 He did not qualify those ―material goods‖ or ―physical violence‖. Rather 
                                               
209 Weber M. (1965). Politics as a Vocation, Philadelphia: Fortress Press. p. 2.  
210  Schulte-Bockholt, 27. 
211 Ibid., 35. 
212 Ibid., 184-185. 
213 Ibid., 30. 
214 Weber, 5. 
215 Ibid. 
 - 80 - 
he asserted their legitimate use must be restricted to the territory and population over 
which the state has legitimate rule.  
His limitation appears to ignore the dynamic quality of international relations 
namely; states seek geopolitical power. National security clauses and ‗securitization 
speech acts‘ help states in this regard by allowing state actors to escape legitimately 
and publicly established legislation. Moreover, history shows that while engaging in 
politics, or as Weber described it, ―any activity to influence the relative distribution of 
force‖, states regularly resort to violence both within their legitimate territories and 
beyond.
216
 Markedly, Weber‘s notion of ―any activity‖ does not imply a restriction on 
the forms nor the actors of violence belonging to the state‘s ‗legitimate‘ monopoly. 
Contrarily, he suggests the state may delegate the ―right to use physical force… to 
other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it‖.
217
 
This argument fallaciously begs the question. It implies the state‘s power to delegate 
the use of force lies within its own power.  
According to Tilly governments organize to monopolize violence. And, ―It 
matters little whether we take violence in a narrow sense, such as damage to 
persons and objects, or in a broad sense, such as violation of people‘s desires and 
interests; by either criterion, governments stand out from other organizations by their 
tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence. The distinction between 
‗legitimate‘ and ‗illegitimate‖ force, furthermore, makes no difference to the fact‖.
218
 
This historically fickle nature of legitimate force is illustrated by the ―long love-hate 
affair between aspiring state maker‘s and pirates or bandits‖.
219
 For example, to 
partake in the gold rush resulting from the Spanish/Portuguese colonial pillaging 
(which destroyed countless Native American lives and cultures), the governments 
which were excluded from the Papal division of the New World i.e. England, France 
and the Netherlands, issued letters of marquee to ‗their‘ pirates in which they were 
directed to rob Spanish treasure fleets.
220
  
 The fine line between criminal behavior and state behavior is depicted here in 
the fact that the ‗profession‘ of pirating was punishable by death, privateering, was 
not. It was rewarded. There are three main distinctions between pirates and 
privateers, 1) the latter operated in times of war or political conflict; 2) governments 
protected and harbored them because their actions served the state‘s political and 
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economic purposes;
221
 and 3) in return for state ‗protection‘, the sea robbers had to 
share their plunder with the governments backing them.
222
  
As though by magic, the ‗legitimizing‘ letters of marquee transformed thieving, 
raping, murderous pirates into privateers in a symbiotic relationship with the state.
223
 
Technically criminals, infamous pirate-privateers became honored state heroes: 
Francis Drake and Henry Morgan were knighted. Morgan was appointed Lieutenant 
Governor of Jamaica and, ironically, put in charge of suppressing piracy in the 
Caribbean.
224
 Charles Tilly eloquently remarked, ―Behind piracy on the seas acted 
cities and city-states, behind banditry, that terrestrial piracy, appeared the continual 
aid of the lords‖.
225
 Thus, the relationship between organized crime and the state 
drive for power appears to be a rather intimate. It is therefore interesting to consider 
this relationship in further detail. 
2.2.1 The Stage-Evolutionary Theory of Organized Crime 
For over half a century, academicians and government experts have debated the 
relationship between the upper and underworld. As a result, three major paradigms 
have been developed to define and comprehend organized crime.
226
 In the 1960‘s 
experts used the ―institutional approach‖ and viewed organized crime as a viable 
organization or institution.
227
 In the 1970‘s the formality of the institutional approach 
was rejected and replaced by the ―patron-client‖ theory. The patron-client theory is a 
reflection of anthropology and political science. Its focus is on the relationships 
formed between those in need of illicit goods or services and those who provide 
them. In the 1980‘s, the focus switched from patron-client relations to the business of 
organized crime. This led to the development of the ―enterprise paradigm‖ which is 
focused on how economics and organized crime influence one another.
228
  
 The theory used here evolved from these theories in the 1990‘s. It is called 
the ―phases‖ or ―stage-evolutionary‖ model. It was developed to explain the dynamic 
relationship between formal and informal societal structures. The stage-evolutionary 
model also supports Horkheimer‘s racket theory. It also shows why, and how, 
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organized crime can threaten the security not only of individuals, but to the nation 
state as well.  
 The stage evolutionary theory identifies 3 stages of the dynamic relationship 
between the underworld and the social, political and economic sectors of the 
upperworld. They are called the predatory, parasitic and symbiotic stages. They have 
been formulated using the anthropological, social network approach to modeling the 
political-criminal dyad. The social network approach is of additional value because it 
facilitates understanding of the political-criminal nexus, the causes for its existence 
and the role it plays as a constituent element of state identity.  
It is important to note that the aforementioned theories are based on the 
national level of anaysis. Here, the conclusions are extrapolated to the international 
level. This is a new application of the stage evolutionary model and the reader is 
asked to consider how organized crime may be directed from a third state to affect 
the institutional power and eventually territorial power of another. 
 
Predatory Stage 
The first phase of organized criminal development in society is the predatory one. At 
this stage, the criminal group is still at the level of a gang operating at a 
neighborhood or local level.
229
 The nature of the violence and crime tends to be 
defensive in nature and motivated by the need to maintain dominance over territory, 
eliminate enemies, and create a monopoly over the illicit use of force.
230
 Rather than 
long-range plans or goals, the organized criminal offences are motivated by 
immediate benefit.  
 Lupsha likened organized crime to a disease the state must remove from the 
system in the predatory stage, ―It must act in the predatory stage to decapitate the 
emerging criminal organizations. It must act before the disease spreads, reached a 
tipping point and infects the body politics as a whole.‖
231
 In his study into insurgent 
economies, Naylor identified the predatory nature of criminal groups in regard to their 
behavior towards formal society.
232
 Both Naylor and Lupsha concede that at this 
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 On an international level, the infiltration of organized actors into a third state 
should be seen as the transborder spreading of a disease within the state. 
Importantly, it is rooted in another state which exercises some control over it through 
the political-criminal nexus (this will be considered in further detail in the following 
sections). It is important that the state be aware of the existence of any connections 
organized criminal grouping may have to the geopolitical ambitions of the ethnic state 
of origin. 
 At the predatory stage of organized criminal development, the problem is 
mainly one of law enforcement and it is here that the state has the highest chances 
of eradicating the problem. If the state fails to remove the organized crime problem at 
this stage, the groups will be able to establish neighborhood, territorial or ethnic 
enclave dominance.
234
 This facilitates the move to the next stage of its development 
where ―legitimate power brokers, local political notables and economic influentials 
who can use the gang‘s organizational skills and impersonal violence for their own 





The Parasitic Stage 
At this stage, organized criminals are able to move onto other illicit activities, using 
violence to engage in embezzlement, protection rackets, illegal gambling and 
trafficking.
236
 The disruptive effects these activities have on society are clear. Less 
clear are the effects of organized criminal groups‘ ―corruptive interaction‖ with the 
legitimate power structures of the state.  
 In the parasitic stage, organized criminals ―meld their control of a territorial 
base with the power broker‘s need for illicit services‖.
237
 As the professional criminals 
accumulate capital, information and organizational skills they simultaneously network 
their way into society‘s formal structures.
238
 It is foreseeable that at this level of 
integration, avenues open up for the organized criminals to influence institutional 
decision-making.  
 On a national level, ―organized crime extends its influence over entire cities 
and regions and becomes an equal of (rather than a servant to) the state.
239
  
Extrapolated onto the international level, transnational organized crime extends its 
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influence into state institutions, cities, regions and other structures of the third state. 
Political corruption has been described as ―the essential glue binding together the 
legitimate sectors of the community and the underworld criminal organization. 
Through corrupt interaction with the upper-world, the organized criminal group is able 
to camouflage itself with legitimacy. However, at this stage, the political and criminal 
realms although potentially equals in respect to power, they remain separate in their 
own rights.‖
240
 In this phase the legitimate sector becomes intertwined with informal 
structures and the problem moves away from being one of law enforcement and 
towards becoming one of public policy.  
 
Symbiotic Stage 
The third stage in organized criminal evolution is the symbiotic one. Lupsha 
describes the symbiotic stage as one where the state - the ―host‖ - has become 
dependent upon the ―parasite‖, the criminal monopolies and networks.
241
 In the 
symbiotic phase, the territorial reach of organized criminal has extended far beyond 
the neighborhood and to the national or international forum where it provides goods 
and services to otherwise legitimate institutions.
242
 It is at this level where the 
extended influence of organized criminal groups is so intertwined with the centers of 
social, economic and political power that they are a part of national and international 
structures.  
 Symbiosis is the heart of the political-criminal nexus. It is where transnational 
organized criminal groups infiltrate into state security services, and the state 
structures into transnational organized criminal ones.
243
  Because the political and 
criminal elites are organized around their respective interests, the state‘s security is 
held in a delicate balance. The formal structures depend on their illegitimate services 
and the informal depend in turn on their legitimacy.  
 At this level, the organized criminal groups are a consolidated or 
―corporatized‖ structural part of the political and economic system which can confront 
the nation-state, geographic regions of specific sectors as equals or as superiors.
244
 
Once an organized criminal group has entered into a symbiotic stage with the upper 
world it becomes ‗upgraded‘ from a law enforcement problem to a pubic policy 
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problem because, ―organized crime has become a part of the state; a state within the 
state.
245
 It is here that the political-criminal nexus flourishes. 
 Transnational organized crime is a key political actor, an interest group, a 
sectoral player that must be taken into account by the legitimate political system; 





Of the three stages, the symbiotic one is of most interest to this 
study because from an international perspective, when a powerful state functions in 
symbiosis with its underworld, it is able to use its transnational organized criminal ties 
in its international affairs.  
 The social contract dichotomy which exists in the use of crime to realize state 
interests is found in the fact that the political criminal relations deprive the state of 
security, transparency and accountability. The ―unholy ties‖ divert state resources 
from legitimate state operations and deny tax money from serving the citizen.
247
 
Lupsha asserts that on a national level in the Unites States, ―contract fraud, public 
corruption, faulty construction of housing, inflated costs for public works and 
government projects, corporate extortion, as well as public and private bank 
failures...  …assassination, murder, intimidation and fear... incalculable loss of 
regime legitimacy and public trust have caused tens of billions of national treasure.
248
 
Today, this figure would certainly reach astronomical figures if it were calculated on a 
global level.   
 
Symbiotic Tilt 
In his study into black market operations of insurgent groups R. Naylor notes, 
―Whatever its precise form, modern underground politics shares with modern 
underground economics the basic perception that the formal state apparatus has lost 
(or never had) legitimacy.‖ 
249
 According to Foertsch, an increasing symbiosis of 
state and organized crime provides more security to the latter as it is able to collect 
and utilize more information about the state, its security services, economic 
organization, and political factors. He names the growing power of transnational 
organized crime within the security sector ―progressive symbiosis‖ and concludes 
that targeting and fighting it will increasingly require counter intelligence and 
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cooperation with foreign intelligence services.
250
 A conundrum he does not address 
is that when the political-criminal nexus and security services of a weak or small state 
have been penetrated by a regional power, the chances of having an effective 
counterintelligence institution to counter it are rather slim.  
 Transnational organized groups who oppose the state and its status quo are 
inspired to create conditions that would lead to a tilt within the symbiotic relationship. 
The objective of breaking the symbiosis of the political-criminal nexus is to exclude 
the formal state from enjoying its legitimate benefits and powers within a specified 
territory.
251
  This being so, it is important to note that a fourth stage, the ‗symbiotic 
tilting stage‘ should be added to the ―phases‖ model in which the symbiotic 
relationship progresses, once again, in the favor of criminal groups and eventually 
tilts the concentration of power to organized criminal structures. At this stage, the 
state or parts its formal structures and actors lose control and become subservient to 
the criminal organizations.  
 To maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty the state must react against 
the transnational organized crime to the extent that it deteriorates its sovereign power 
potential. On an international level, one state may utilize its political-criminal nexus to 
―progressively erode‖ the formal economy of a region or a state to cause the 
population to shift to the informal for survival.
252
  
 For instance, in Colombia, the symbiotic relationship between cocaine 
traffickers and the state was expressed in the fact that cocaine profits were used to 
keep the state‘s balance of payment from collapsing.
253
 However when the symbiotic 
tilt was initiated by the Medellin cartel through ―narco-violence …terrorist attacks on 
the agents and agencies of the state and its institutions of civil society (press, media, 
courts, elite publics)‖ the Colombian state responded against them.
254
  
 Importantly, organized crime can be used ―to discredit the government in the 
eyes of the poorest sectors of the population who are most prone to accept‖ a foreign 
political message with the hope of a better tomorrow.
255
  This capability points to the 
use of the soft power of attraction against the population and the state. It also points 
to another manner in which transnational organized crime jeopardizes the territorial 
sovereignty of states, which is important to this study. This possibility is what makes 
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transnational organized crime a threat to national security, foreseeably influencing 
the way states perceive each other.  
When the symbiotic level is kept in balance, it is where the political-criminal 
nexus operates at its fullest. For this reason it is interesting to consider the structure 
of the political criminal nexus and determine whether it is a social structure within the 
state and thereby part of state identity.  
  
2.2.2 The Political Criminal Social Network 
For transnational organized crime to be an instrument of a state‘s foreign policy, a 
symbiotic relationship between formal and informal structures must exist. If it is true 
that in the ―upper reaches of power‖ one finds ―the uncertain, ‗elastic line‘ between 
legitimate and illegitimate violence‖
 
then this elastic line is where the upperworld 
connects with the underworld.
256
 Relationships of varying degrees of cooperation 
between formal and informal structures exist at the local, national and trans-state 
levels and form the political-criminal nexus.
257
 For this reason, Kelly asserts that the 
political-criminal nexus may not be ―monolithic‖ but a ―plurality of possibilities and 
relationships at micro and macro levels of political/criminal collusion‖.
258
  But what is 
the political-criminal nexus? Who participates in it and why? 
 A ‗nexus‘ is ―a tie, link, connection between two members of a group‖.
259
 
McIllwain argues the social network system of organized crime analysis transcends 
most organized criminal theories because it emphasizes their commonality, namely, 
that human relationships form the basis for organized criminal activity.
260
 Within a 
social network, relational ties bind actors i.e. discrete individuals, corporate and other 
collective social units to another.
261
 Thus, to understand ties among pairs, one must 
concentrate on the dyad as the unit of analysis and the ties between them.
262
  
 The least common denominator of organized crime is the dyad engaged in 
the process of social networking for the provision of illicit goods, services and 
protection.
263
 The political-criminal nexus is a social network based on sustained 
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collaboration between a dyad, two sets of groups and institutions, the formal, political 
establishment and the informal criminal underworld.
264






Figure 10 Political Criminal Dyad and Nexus 
 
Within the political-criminal nexus, the upper and underworlds form a dyadic 
relationship in which both sets of actors have separate motives for participating and 
keeping the symbiotic relationship alive.  
 Within the political-criminal nexus, the relationship between the underworld 
and upperworld is a symbiotic one; organized criminals make use of the state and 
state authorities make use of them. Both members of the dyad simultaneously 
strengthen and erode one another. As an instrument of ―silent wars‖ the two-way 
character of the political-criminal nexus also provides states with power they would 
otherwise not have. From the perspective of the state, it‘s recourse to organized 
crime makes it a more effective predator, contrarily its sovereignty is weakened by 





The term ―political-criminal nexus‖ clearly names the pair of actors belonging to the 
dyad: political and criminal actors. A variety of causes, both motivational and 
structural, lend to the development and character of the state‘s political-criminal 




The criminals (Underworld) 
The international community recognizes a criminal group as two or more individuals 
acting together to commit a serious crime.
267
 Organized criminal group activities are 
not limited territorially; ―their geographic location can be local, regional, or transstate. 
Wherever they operate, they systematically and purposefully violate national laws 
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and international conventions.‖
268
 Relational ties bind the criminal individuals to each 
other and facilitate their activities that are ―primarily a variety of clandestine, profit-
making activities deemed illegitimate or criminal by one or more states‖.
269
  
 Organized criminals participate in criminal organizations of varying 
institutional forms; they hold immaterial and material values, have professional 
criminal behavior and resort to the use of violence.
270
 The threat or actual resort to 
the use of violence to obtain their objectives is perhaps the most important element 
of their being as it incites the fear necessary to emit obedience, control and hence 
power.  
 The primary source of income for organized criminals comes from crime; this 
however, does not suggest that they do not partake in legitimate business. Rather, 
their ‗legitimate‘ endeavors are often used as fronts for their illicit activity and the 
laundering the proceeds of crime. For example, ―the gangster Al Capone had dozens 
of politicians, law enforcement officials, and bureaucrats on his payroll.‖
271
 The same 
holds true for other famous figure heads of crime, ―Mayor Lansky and Lucky Luciano 
were businessmen, criminal businessmen, but nonetheless they were in business. 
Their contracts, however, were enforced not by courts of law or judicial decision but 
by violence and strong-arm tactics. Recognition of their effectiveness was 
everywhere. Their American patriotism and roots were recognized by legitimate 
society, whose illegal hungers he satisfied when, during the Second World War, the 
U.S. Navy asked Lansky for help in combating the German U-boats operating off the 
coast of Long Island.
272
 
 Organized criminal groups have a number of advantages over the state. 
These advantages continue to develop along with the globalization process. Lupsha 
has identified eight prime advantages: 
 
1. Vast sums of capital to: a) undercut and undersell competition 
and (b) purchase expertise. 
2. No jurisdictional, bureaucratic, or legal limits on actions or 
decisionmaking. 
3. Corruption: The ability to acquire information, take actions, 
acquire influence, access to rule makers and rule enforcers and to 
penetrate opponents and targets of interest. 
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4. The threat and use of violence to obtain ends;  
5. Organizational (bureaucratic) flexibility and quick (rapid) 
decisional responsiveness. 
6. Terminal sanction to remove organizational inefficiencies and 
organization ‗dead wood‘. 
7. An emerging global network of contacts and associations and 
marriages of convenience. 
8. Organizational secrecy and covertness..273  
 
The aggregate of these advantages puts criminals in a position where they can be 
useful to the state. They are able to provide services and favors such as ―providing 
intelligence on rivals at home and abroad, disrupting or even eliminating political 
rivals, securing votes in particular regions‖.
 274
 
 Organized criminals are used by states or state authorities. However, the 
danger of doing so is that organized criminal groups pull political interests and 
loyalties away from the state and towards those of the criminal organization.
275
 This 
increases their strength and level of political criminal collaboration. This pattern is 
what makes transnational organized crime an international security threat not only to 
humans, but to states as well. 
 
The Political Establishment (Upper World) 
In his research into the political-criminal nexus, Roy Godson includes all forms of 
―state authority‖ into the ―political‖ category. In so doing he shows that no layer of 
politics is immune from the political criminal relationship. Thus, it is a dynamic 
structure existing in all layers of government and opposition.  
 The individuals forming this part of the political criminal dyad generally pursue 
their ends via legal means. Office holders, front men (i.e. political party officials, 
public relations firms, businesses, legal advisors, accountants and NGOs) and the 
legal opposition all have local, national and international influence that is of interest to 
the organized criminal groups.
276
  
 Notably, Godson asserts that although some political actors may start 
participating in crime voluntarily or under authoritative command, the usual corrupting 
offers come from the criminal side. They are offered between accepting an undue 
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reward or being killed: ―Silver or Lead?‖
277
 This is rather important when one 
considers the fact that the United Nations recognized that state officials and 
representatives influence foreign affairs by offering some kind of undue advantage. 
When viewing the political-criminal nexus from the level of international relations, 
surprisingly little attention is given to the ways this sort of transnational organized 
crime is used to target the intangible, societal and political powers of the state. 
 
The Motivations 
There is a dual quality to the political-criminal relationship. Both sets of actors need 
one another to exist but appear greatly at odds with each other. Moreover, while 
organized crime requires the absence of the state for its proliferation, it also depends 
on it because ―the managements of the illicit economic system require the 
cooperation, or rather the corruption of state agents‖.
278
 Conversely, state figures 
often depend on the financial or other material support for their political and financial 
success while the state‘s peace is dependant on the control and eradication of 
organized crime. As a result, although publicly identified organized criminals may not 
necessarily be part of formal state structures, by being part of the political-criminal 
nexus their interests and those of the economic and political elites play an important 
role in the formal sector.
279
 
 To understand the political-criminal dyadic relationship better, it is necessary 
to consider some of the motives the actors have for participating in the nexus. The 
application of the Palermo Treaty against Transnational Organized Crime is restricted 
to offences that are not purely political. Moreover, they must be motivated by some 
sort of financial or material benefit. As we have seen, what qualifies as a ―material 
benefit‖ is open to broad interpretation. Importantly, the driving motives for 
participating in organized crime are material and immaterial in nature. Thus, 






Criminal organizations need more than money to be able to make a financial or 
territorial profit from their criminal enterprises. Their success depends on having 
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someone on the ‗inside‘ to provide protection, impunity, security and assistance.
281
 
Kelly identifies two main objectives criminals have in holding relationships with the 




 One key way this is done is through criminal ―assistance‖ of electoral 
candidates. Some candidates may receive more than others, but according to Kelly, 
all of the cooperative authorities are likely to receive something.
283
 On an 
international level, this criminal promotion of candidacy doubly jeopardizes the given 
politician‘s loyalty to the state. This is particularly important when  the foreign 
organized criminal group functions is functioning from within their own state‘s 
political-criminal nexus. It runs the risk of giving effect to the foreign policies of third 
states over the policies of the common interests and good of the state itself.  
 On the international playing field, organized criminals may be motivated by 
rewards that are provided by the state, which hires them to impact the economy or 
political situation of a third state.  By way of violence, intimidation, bribery, and 
massive campaign donations, organized criminal actors escape the laws of the state 




 Finally, an additional motive for organized criminals to participate in the 
political-criminal relationship is their longing for acceptance and social mobility for 
themselves and their family.
285
 ―I.O.U.‘s‖ are central to the political-criminal nexus in 
which political authorities owe favors to organized crime and in turn, organized crime 
owes favors to the upper world authorities. 
 
Political Motives 
Marx observed that elites give up political power to preserve their social power.
286
 
Political elites collaborate with the organized criminals for a combination of reasons 
and they all appear to relate to power, albeit social, political or financial. Godson 
identifies the political elite‘s principle motive for partaking in the political-criminal 
nexus as ―money for personal or political purposes – to finance lavish lifestyles to win 
elections, and maintain their leadership roles.‖
287
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 Criminal connections also facilitate money services for corrupt business or 
money laundering for the politicians.
288
 However, by allowing criminal groups to 
‗serve society‘ by meeting the demand for low prices on various goods and services, 
they institutionalize organized crime in their societies.
289
 On the political level, 
politicians may hire hooligans to intimidate voters to gain electoral support. They may 
also promise undue benefit for other electoral support. In this regard, the political side 
of the political-criminal nexus may assist criminals in gaining control of key sectors of 
the economic security infrastructure, such as telecommunications or financial 
services to contribute to local instability in geostrategic regions of concern.
290
 
 The upperworld may also collaborate with the underworld for the provision of 
social order.
291
 Such cooperation is reflected in Colombian Law 48, which allows 
armed forces to extend the right to use violence to non-military members.
292
 
Similarly, the ―Extra-departmental Law‖ in Russia allowed law enforcement officials to 
work for private entrepreneurs at a time when it is estimated that over 80% of private 
business was in the hands of organized criminal groups. Criminal organizations are 
often in a position of being able to both, offer intelligence on rivals at home and 
abroad and the capability of disrupting or even eliminating local or foreign political 
rivals.
293
 Weakening, controlling or eliminating rivals are other obvious reasons for 
upperworld figures to cohort with the underworld.
294
 
 At times, states require their exercise of power to be hidden or masked. 
Organized criminal groups have in the past and do in the present serve the interests 
of the state by providing a mechanism to obscure the exercise of state power in 
domestic and even international spheres‖.
295
  
 The political-criminal nexus is an international actor and security threat 
because it threatens the political, economic, social infrastructure of the formal 
system.
296
 For instance, supporting transnational organized crime to secure foreign 
elections, expand business onto foreign territory or eliminate candidates through 
scandals or assassination are all ways states can ‗control‘ their enemies and secure 
their positions on foreign soil. By extrapolating these motivations from the national to 
the international level, the effects become geopolitical. 
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The National Strategy Information Center, a Washignton D.C. based think tank, 
studied political-criminal relations throughout the world. It recognized that the national 
and international situation of any given state influences the development of the 
political-criminal nexus.
297
 This is particularly true when crime is ubiquitous and 
institutionalized. In such cases, Kelly suggests the answers for its causes are best 
found in the structural characteristics of the political, economic and social systems.
298
 
Godson also asserts that structural economic, political and cultural factors facilitate 
the development, functioning and proliferation of political-criminal relations.
299
 Thus, 
it is necessary to know how and why economic, political and cultural factors influence 
political-criminal relations of the state.  
 
Economic Factors 
One of the simplest approaches to understanding the economic causes of the 
political-criminal nexus is the supply and demand of illicit goods and services. The 
illicit market has been identified as the basis for organized crime and analogously the 
political-criminal nexus, but the lack of certain goods and services from the formal 
market are not the only economic causes of the political-criminal nexus.
300
  
 A state‘s weakness and devaluation (or instability) of its domestic currency is 
one of the root causes for political-criminal cooperation particularly as access to 
foreign currency or markets may only be possible through criminal political 
cooperation.
301
 Weak or failed states may actually come to rely on the underworld to 
prevent social crisis or collapse. In fact the state can be in such an inferior economic 
position as to rely on organized crime for the provision of licit goods.
302
 For instance, 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil drug traffickers have taken over the provision of official 
government functions and services and in Peru, ―drug traffickers, such as Chachique 
Rivera‘s group, paid teachers and other loyal civil servants 100 dollars a month to 
maintain public services in jungle drug towns and supplement their meager 
government salaries‖.
303
 A good example of how drug traffickers help build society is 
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found in the Colombian drug activity in the Andean territories where cocaine is 
produced. There, ―Colombian drug traffickers fund satellite dishes, electric 
generators, water purification systems, soccer equipment, widen and improve roads 
for landing strips, and pay salaries to buy local cooperation and support. An 
economist and former board member of the Colombian central bank, Kalmanovitz, 
wrote that ‗cocaine stopped the balance of payments from collapsing, which would 
have pushed is into the spiral of hyper-devaluation and hyperinflation that shook 
most of the rest of the continent… [during] the 1980s‖.
 304
 
 Also of great importance is the loyalty that develops between the citizens of 
the state towards the organized criminals over the state institutions. An example of 
this is depicted by the 2010 riots in Jamaica where citizens came to rise against the 
state and extradition to the United States of the drug lord Christopher Coke. Coke is 
revered in his neighborhood for providing necessities to the people, something the 
Jamaican state does not do. 
 Whereas these examples show how drug trafficking enriched ―larger sectors‖ 
of the state‘s population, supported economic growth, increased jobs and financial 
investment, there is little cause to believe that other illicit trades such as arms and 
human trafficking would not have the same effect. It is clear however, that such 
―social benefits‖ are only possible through corruption or ―informal taxation‖ that 




Political Factors  
State weakness and inability to maintain law and order also leads to the political 
criminal relations. The inability of states to realize its obligations under the social 
contract albeit due to ―inefficient premodern institutions, personalistic and/or 
patronage systems‖, weak rule of law, or other political actors explain the 
development and utilization of the political-criminal nexus.
306
  
The weakness of a state inevitably leads citizen‘s to distrust it and its structures. In 
their search for protection and facilitation of their survival, citizens may be inclined to 
cooperate with criminal groups who have power and a willingness to use violence.
307
 
This exemplifies Horkheimer‘s protection racket theory. By turning to local criminal 
organizations for protection, the underworld gains power against the upperworld 
sectors through infiltration and in turn, electoral support. This political criminal 
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process is a ―major threat to the infrastructure of governability and the rule of law‖ in 
the world‘s weak and small sates.
308
 
 A particularly fertile environment for the development and use of the political-
criminal nexus is the state in transition.
309
  Uncertainties regarding the norms and 
acceptable behavior, inherent to political and economic transition, foster a society in 
which the line between what is deemed legitimate or illegitimate is not only elastic, 
but at times even invisible. Their ―fluid and complex conditions‖ and ―lack of 
functioning state structures‖ are conducive to the battle over the redistribution of 
power.
310
 Importantly, the transition from one system to another creates an 




This fact is of particular concern to post-Communist and post-Soviet states. Their 
former system had a strictly Moscow-centered character loyal to Russia. Most, if not 
all, former communist/totalitarian states and authoritarian regimes, in the post-Cold 
War era are at a particular risk.
312 
Lupsha identified this form of political-criminal 
cooperation as the ―In-Flux: Emergent‖ transnational organized group.
313
 The groups 
materialize from the absence of civil society, insurgence or conflict. Their members, 
are usually linked to prior state institutions such as the intelligence, military or 
totalitarian bureaucratic and economic sectors.
314
  
However, weak states and states in transition are not the only states where 
political-criminal relations flourish. When a state is too strong, bureaucratic, unitary or 
uncompetitive, civil society can offer little to console the development of a political-
criminal nexus and the need to make use of goods and services provided by the 
underworld.
315
 For instance, in the United States, local officials cooperated with 
construction contractors to bypass inefficiencies, meet deadlines and avoid problems 
related to labor forces.
316
 In the Soviet era, citizens were forced to turn to the black 
market because of product scarcity i.e. unavailability or yearlong waiting lists. And, in 
the meanwhile higher communist party members and nomenklatura were awarded by 
―legally‖ being able to bypass bureaucracy and access to the black market.  
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Cultural Factors 
At the core of the political-criminal nexus lay human relationships with separate but 
equal interests. The cultural nature of the group affects its interests and thus the 
character of its organized crime. It is therefore necessary to consider the role of 
social networks and culture as they relate to organized crime.
317
  
Cultural variables can explain ―subtle and not-so-subtle differences between 
organized criminals of different ethnic heritages‖.
318
 The impact and influence culture 
has on the development and functioning of the political-criminal nexus is perhaps 
best understood from empirical and recognizable variables i.e. perceptions of 
corruption, family, economy, and, other cultural variables i.e. shared history, religion, 
language and territory. These are the cultural factors which provide the glue 
necessary for the bonding and solidarity of the political-criminal nexus.
319
 
 A quality of organized crime that is particularly dangerous to the sovereign 
state is that it ―…may take on different roles as quasi-governmental functionaries, as 
informal or alternate ―governments‖ and policing agencies‖.
320
 Importantly, Godson 
suggests, ―Changes in culture can facilitate a break up of a political-criminal‖.
321
 
However, it must be noted that governments may actually promote organized crime 
by ignoring cultural differences or preferences within the state.
322 
By inference, it is 
possible to conclude that organized crime and separatism can be advanced by 
government policies that feed cultural differences through social policies. How a state 
changes culture, a thing already controversial, is complicated by ―history and 
prevalence of secret societies; widespread public perception that corruption is 
―normal‖; and the perception of criminals as cultural heroes or ‗men of honor‖.
323
  
 Transnational organized crime has always been ―greatly shaped by 
ethnicity‖.
324
 In fact, most transnational organized crime groups have a single ethnic 
character or national identity root albeit Chinese, Colombian, Israeli, Italian, 
Japanese, or Russian etc. and are rooted regionally, national-organizationally, 
ethnically and linguistically.
325
 Moreover, the capital generated by ethnic crime 
permits members of criminal organizations to exercise power beyond their territory 
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 Thus, since nationality, region and ethnicity define the interests and behavior 
of states and individuals, they must also affect the character of the political-criminal 
nexus. It is expected that this character will reveal itself in foreign affairs. 
2.2.3 The Political-Criminal Nexus in Foreign Affairs 
In his state-level assessment of the political-criminal nexus on the national level, 
Godson concludes it ―plays a role in determining major aspects of the state 
infrastructure, e.g. in elections or the appointments of key executives or judicial 
figures, or in key public investment decisions, tax policy, trade policy, coalitions on 
diverse issues will be formed between political and criminal leaders.‖
327
 Such 
penetration clearly has the power to affect the national and foreign policies of the 
state. Viewed from the international perspective, the usefulness of the political-
criminal nexus stems from its ability to affect all sectors of national security. It follows 
that strong states seeking greater geopolitical power may instrumentalise their nexus 
to undermine the economic development, democratic governability, rule of law, and 
human rights within a weaker, strategically interesting state.  
 Despite the proliferation of international law, critical criminologist, William 
Chambliss, asserts that the state use of organized crime as an instrument of state 
power has changed little since the early days of Capitalism. He asserts that today, as 
in the past, ―states organize smuggling, assassinations, covert operations, and 
conspiracies to criminally assault citizens, political activists, and political leaders 
perceived to be a threat‖.
328
 By asserting that laws prohibiting organized criminal 
offences are good for the state, but only when control of such activity serves state 
interests Chambliss paints a legal dichotomy.
329
 Organized crime is a national 
security threat which is instrumentalised to serve the interests of the state.  
 Thus, organized crime is not a set of activities which exists exclusively 
outside law and government. Rather, it is ―integral‖ to them and ―may be a creation of 
them‖.
330
 The national security clause appears to be the portal to the lacuna existing 
between the international law and politics. By referring to something as a matter of 
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national security the state is permitted to act beyond the realm of established 
legislation.  
 Noting that the resort to violence and intimidation is a key factor to the 
maintenance of political-criminal power, Godson remarks ―the political-criminal nexus 
can mobilize the forces of the state when necessary to attain its goals‖.
331
 Whereas 
transnational organized criminal groups function by way of corruption, states function 
by offering immunity, financial support or by spurring groups against each other.
332
  
 According to Charles Tilly, ―the rather ideologically based ideas‖ of a social 
contract, open markets, and a society whose shared norms and expectations call 
forth certain kind of government, fade in light of ―the war and state making, coercive 
and self-seeking entrepreneurs of European history‖.
333
 In fact, mainstream 
criminologists in the United States generally do not include ideology into the study of 
organized crime. This approach focuses on the economic aspects of organized 
crime. It also appears to deflect attention from state use of transnational organized 
crime in politics.  
 Limiting the study of transnational organized crime to methodologically 
individualistic, entrepreneurial and material analysis overlooks the fact that 
throughout history war, organized violence and crime have been fueled by both 
material and immaterial structural differences. Immaterial structures include culture, 
religion and ideology. Schulte-Buckholt refutes the trend which accentuates the non-
ideological nature of organized crime in mainstream North American criminology.
334
 
He emphasizes it is erroneous to disregard the links between organized crime, 
economic power and political interests.
335
  
 By its very nature, the political-criminal nexus poses a significant threat to 
democracy.
336
 However, it has also been instrumental in its promotion. For instance, 
Chambliss made the practice of privateering analogous with the activities of US 
intelligence agencies who collaborated with criminal organizations in their fight 
against communism during the Cold War. He described this element of foreign 
security policy as ―state organized crime‖ because the state ―specifically instructed 
selected individuals to engage in criminal acts‖.
337
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  The international drug trade and the ―war on drugs‖ provide some of the 
clearest historical examples of state use of organized crime. For instance, in the 
times of colonization, the objective of the ―predatory‖ drug trafficking colonial states 
was not only to earn money to fund their colonizing wars.  It was also to ―morally 
weaken‖ the enemy populations by affecting the human security.
338
 An early account 
of such an attack on human security is found in the activities of the Dutch East India 
Company. Between 1640 and 1799 fifty-six tons of opium were imported to Java 
(Indonesia) ―to soften up tribal chiefs‖.
339
 Through much of the Twentieth Century the 
illicit drug trade provided significant funding for wars against communism. In the 
1930‘s and 1940‘s, Japanese Yakuza crime groups cooperated with the Japanese 
military to sell opium and heroin to the Chinese population in occupied Manchuria; 
earning an estimated $300 million US per annum.
340
 In the 1940s and 1950s the 
French Secret Service, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et du Contre-
Espionage (SDECE), was able to fund its clandestine operations by entering a 
symbiotic relationship with the Binh Xueyen mafia in Vietnam. It did so by ceding 
control over the red-light districts in Vietnam in exchange for the service of 
processing raw opium into smoking opium.
341
 Later, in Vietnam, the ―United States 
inherited the dependency on opium profits‖ and ―provided the opium-growing feudal 
lords… with transportation for their opium‖ via the CIA airliner ―Air America‖.
342
 
Ironically, the heroin was also exported to the United States.
343
 In turn, the imported 
heroin became a threat to the human security in the United States.  
 The political-criminal nexus has also been used to fight the spread of 
democracy. Russia‘s policy of preventing the spread of democracy provides a case in 
point. Going back to the Cold War, Foertisch provides an illustrative example of how 
the drug trade fueled the ideological Cold War. In 1971, Sverdlev, a Bulgarian 
intelligence (KDS) officer defected to the West. He provided a protocol from a 
meeting that took place in Moscow in 1967. It was a meeting of the Chiefs of the 
Services of the Warsaw Pact countries. The protocol exposed their plan to 
destabilize the capitalist West. Illicit drugs were to be supplied to the West from the 
Middle East; the revenue was to be used for the purchase of weapons for the 
―liberation movements‖ in the Middle East.
344
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The aforementioned examples provide substantial reason to believe that the 
mainstream understanding of transnational organized crime, particularly in the US 
(where it is generally limited to non-ideological, non-state actors) is limited and 
misconceived. They also show that formally accepted institutions such as secret 
services are used by states relying on organized crime in pursuit of their geopolitical 
agendas.  
 The promotion of separatism is perhaps one of the clearest examples of how 
states use underworld structures to gain power in third states. Naylor describes an 
insurgent strategy (often backed directly or indirectly by foreign governments) of 
replacing the formal economy with a cooperative parallel economy, a political 
economy and social services that involve all aspects of production and distribution, 
with marketing links that stretch into cities where the sale of products on informal 
markets creates an underground economy.
345
  
 He notes that humanitarian aid, NGOs and an ―elaborate propaganda 
apparatus in the form of newspapers and magazines, radio and television services; 
and a transportation system‖ play a major role in shifting the loyalties of the 
population away from formal state structures and toward the insurgent groups.
346
 In 
doing do, Naylor inadvertently describes how the political-criminal nexus figures in 
relation to soft power security. Just like states traffic illicit goods to stimulate the 
underground economy; they penetrate societal structures to promote institutions that 
reflect the ideology, language, culture, religion etc. of the insurgent group.  
 Albeit under the guise of promoting democracy or fighting it, this attack on the 
soft power security of the targeted state promotes separatism and benefits the 
foreign government supporting the insurgent groups. However, very little attention 
has been given to the relationship between the political-criminal nexus and soft 
power security in this regard.  
 
2.2.4 Conclusion  
Transnational organized crime has only relatively recently been recognized as an 
international security threat. Yet, upper and underworld structures have helped one 
another realize their geopolitical objectives for centuries. In fact, the state and its 
monopoly over the use of force is the oldest form of protection racket.  
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The stage evolutionary model identifies three stages of the political-criminal 
relationship. Importantly, it shows how the political-criminal relations are dynamic and 
ultimately threaten national security. In the symbiotic stage the relationship is 
reciprocal; informal structures use formal ones and vice versa. This level of dynamic 
reciprocity is what allows the political-criminal actors to tap into each other‘s realms 
of power. The following figure depicts the dynamic relationship between the rule of 
formal and informal structures. 
 
Rule of Underworld Rule of Upperworld 
 
Figure 11 Dynamics of the PCN       
 
When states, or parts thereof, cooperate with transnational organized criminals they 
weaken their own institutional base and open avenues for third states to penetrate 
their politics and interests. Thus, a fourth stage has been added to the stage-
evolutionary model, namely the level of symbiotic tilt. This level was added to show 
that if it is not kept in balance the relationship can tilt and eventually lead to the 
demise of a state. Making this addition to the model is important. It shows that states 
can and do loose territory and economic power to organized crime. The 
phenomenon, when extrapolated to the international level, takes on a more ominous 
character. It shows that through its political-criminal nexus the state can use 
transnational organized crime to gain power in third states.  Consequently, the 
susceptibility of states to experience transnational organized crime, corruption and 
separatist subversion as existential threats is likely to be related to the political-
criminal relations within their borders and beyond. 
How and why formal and informal structures cooperate and influence one 
another is best understood from the symbiotic stage. It is the crossing of the 
relational ties in which the upper and under world relations are ones of mutuality. The 
nature of the dynamic relationship between organized crime and formal societal 
structures is social. It is a social network created by two sets of actors; criminals and 
officials. This social network constitutes an upper and the underworld dyad. It is 
within this dyad where one finds the level of symbiosis and the political-criminal 
nexus.  
 The underworld seeks legitimacy and the upperworld illegitimate services and 
funds. Thus, the actors within this dyad struggle for power and in doing so, they 
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cooperate. The criminals exert influence over formal structures, to the extent of 
eventually becoming legitimized, and, simultaneously the formal actors seeking more 
power become criminalized. The motives are separate but equal. And, at the heart of 
it all lies corruption and behind it, the choice between silver and lead.  
The following figure shows how the political-criminal nexus connects and 
influences both, developments within the formal state structures as well as the 




Figure 12 The PCN and Dynamic Relationship within the Dyad 
 
Paramount to the study of international relations is the fact that it is at the level of 
symbiotic coexistence, where strong organized criminal groups have a dynamic 
relationship with state security structures. It is within the political-criminal nexus that a 
level of organized crime is politically organized. Throughout history this relationship 
has been used by states to gain power.  
 At times the political-criminal nexus and the transnational organized crimes it 
promotes carry an ideological character. If indeed the current view of the state‘s 
monopoly of the use of force is too limited, or ―one dimensional‖, it is perhaps 
because transnational organized crime and corruption have not been duly recognized 
as a geopolitical weapon.
347
  
 The political-criminal nexus is also a social structure within the state. 
Accepting that social structures determine fundamental state interests and identities, 
the constructivist approach to the study of international relations supports the 
inclusion of the political-criminal nexus to the of state identity. The manner in which it 
develops and behaves in international affairs is determined by state histories, actor 
motivations as well as the economic, political and cultural structures of the state.  
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2.3 Profiling the Post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus  
        
’Looking at the West as a wolf looks at a sheep, the Russian Mafiya intrudes in every field of 
Western concern: the nascent free market, privatization, disarmament, conversion of the 
military-industrial complex, foreign humanitarian relief and financial aid, even state reserves of 
currency and gold. 
      C. Sterling 
 
In his Social Theory of International Relations, Alexander Wendt attributes identities 
to states that are constituted by internal and external structures.
348
 In fact, 
Constructivists argue: ―Structures affect behavior and the very definition of identity 
and interests of states‖.
349
 Guzzini explains structure as something that must be 
understood as social ‗practice‘, not as objective constraint, ―…it cannot be materials 
only or even mainly‖.
350
 In fact, the view that social, not material, structures 




 In the previous chapters, the political-criminal nexus was presented as a 
social structure within the state. Importantly, the view that social, not material, 
structures determine fundamental state interests, identities and international relations 
unites Critical IR theorists.
352
 Thus, it can be asserted that as a social structure, the 
political criminal nexus is a formative component of state identity. 
 McIllwain identifies a social network as the relational structure of a social 
system consisting of the pattern of relationships among the collection of actors which 
is influenced by social, political and economic factors that place opportunities and 
constraints on individual action.
353
 Since the political-criminal network is a social 
network, it should be apparent that the relational ties within it form a structure that 
reflects the environment in which they exist. Each state‘s political-criminal nexus will 
have a specific character which is determined by the specific factors within that state. 
These facts, combined with the assertion that organized crime, the heart of the 
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political-criminal nexus, is ―a hidden but nonetheless functional component of 
governmental structure‖ are valuable to the science of international relations.
354
 They 
make it possible to deduce that the political-criminal nexus not only reflects a state‘s 
identity but is an important component of it. Thus, it should be possible to profile the 
character of the political-criminal nexus of any given state. 
 Unfortunately, no single paradigm in International Relations theory has been 
identified which would explain the role and character of the political-criminal nexus. 
Only particular aspects of the phenomenon have been illuminated and they are 
rather limited.
355
 It is expected that knowledge of this part of state identity will lend to 
a better understanding of why certain states perceive one another the way they do. It 
will also make their actions and reactions in international relations more transparent. 
 In this chapter, at least some of these limitations will be overcome by 
constructing, or profiling, the character of a political criminal nexus. It has been 
shown that the specific character of any given state‘s political-criminal nexus is 
influenced by a number of considerations. Namely, the stage evolutionary model 
points to the need to be familiar with the historic, evolutionary, relationship between 
the upper and underworlds. The social network approach indicates that actor 
motivations and structural causes (i.e. economic, political, and cultural) play a key 
role in sustaining the nexus. Yet, it does not suffice to focus on the historic 
development of political-criminal relations, motivations and structural causes of the 
respective criminal and political elites. Rather, the specific conditions of their national 
environment, in light of contemporary world politics must also be considered.
356
  
 In the following sections, the aforementioned theoretical constructs are used 
to profile the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. The post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus has been selected for the following main reasons: 
  
 1) It is expected that the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus will be unique 
 because it is rooted in the history of the Russian Empire. And, after the fall of 
 the Soviet Empire, a once ―internal‖ political-criminal nexus became an 
 international one spanning the entire post-Soviet space.  
 
 2) The post-Soviet political-criminal nexus appears to be instrumental to 
 Russian foreign policy. Particularly, it appears to threaten the transitions and 
 sovereignty of those states in the Black Sea Region which have voiced a 
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 desire to either democratize or intensify cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic 
 community.  
 
 3) The post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region (i.e. Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
 Moldova and Ukraine) constitute a pivotal global energy corridor. This is 
 important because energy security is also an instrument of Russian Foreign 
 policy. The Russian Federation has demonstrated the use of energy security 
 as an instrument with which to influence Western engagement in areas it 
 considers to be its ―exclusive sphere of influence‖. What is more, the energy 
 sector is reputedly penetrated by transnational organized criminals.  
 
 4) All of the aforementioned states host separatist regions. The majority of 
 which are renowned as black holes of transnational organized crime. 
 Moreover, each separatist territory is openly supported by the Russian 
 Federation and is considered either a Russian protectorate or enclave. 
 
 5) Separatist and insurgent groups rely upon covertness and illegitimate 
 material support. It has been shown in Part One of this study that the ultimate 
 effect of Hobbesian soft power operations is separatism through vertical 
 cooperation. It is therefore foreseeable that if a post-Soviet political-criminal 
 nexus which is centered on Moscow‘s foreign policies exists, that its 
 currencies are not limited to those of military or economic power (i.e. threats, 
 force, payments, and sanctions). Rather, it is expected that the nexus also 
 employs soft power currencies (i.e. Values, culture, policies, institutions) to 
 promote ethnic conflict and separatism. 
 
Thus, to profile the character of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus, and 
eventually determine whether it is connected to the use of soft power and pro-
Russian separatism in the Black Sea Region, particularly in the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea, a number of steps must be taken. First, the stage-evolutionary 
model must be used to establish the historical development and roots of this political-
criminal nexus. Second, the actors and their motivations must be considered. Third, 
the structural causes which have lent themselves to the development of the political-
criminal nexus must be considered. Fourth, it is necessary to consider the manner in 
which the political-criminal nexus has figured in the foreign affairs of the post-Soviet 
states in the Black Sea Region.  In this regard, special attention is given to the 
energy sector and frozen conflicts. 
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2.3.1 The Stage-Evolution of the Post-Soviet Political-Criminal 
Nexus 
The stage-evolutionary model identifies three phases of political criminal relations, 
the predatory, parasitic and symbiotic. A third phase has been added to this model in 
which the level of symbiosis tilts and the upper world structures loose power and 
territory to the underworld structures. This additional stage has therefore been 
named symbiotic tilt. Let us now consider these stages as they pertain to the Russian 
Federation and the post-Soviet states. 
 In the predatory stage, organized criminals aggressively move to gain territory 
and power against the state.
357
  The oldest known organized criminals in the Russian 
Empire are the Vory-v-Zakone (thieves in law). Dating back to Tsarist times, the 
original nature of this organization was that of ‗predator‘ against the state. The state 
was perceived as the enemy and any ―Vor‖ (thief) who would act to the benefit of the 
state was punished by death. However, this relationship with the state progressed to 
the parasitic stage in the Soviet era. 
 The parasitic stage is where organized criminals feed off the state, and 
penetrate the establishment.
358
 Importantly, it is also at this stage that the 
relationship starts to move away from being a policing problem and becomes a 
matter of public policy.
359
 The anti-state Vory-v-Zakone transformed into an unofficial 
instrument used by the state against the political enemies of the Soviet regime. At 
this level, even though organized criminals fed off the formal structures, the Soviet 
regime still controlled the political-criminal relation. However, Soviet political-criminal 
relations transformed after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. This transformation is 
marked by the sponsoring of the black market in which apparatchiks offered 
organized criminals protection from the law in exchange for bribes.
360
 The [Vory-v-
Zakone] leaders or ―shop managers‖ were paid an illicit 30 percent margin for scarce 
consumer goods and the diversion of raw materials and finished goods from 
production lines to the Nomenklatura, the educated elite and criminals.
 361
 
 Symbiotic political-criminal relations became inherent to the Communist 
culture, which rewarded party members with status and access to informal structures 
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and the shadow economy. This ―reward system‖ legitimized the shadow economy 
and was, ironically, partially responsible for keeping the Soviet economy afloat.
362
 At 
this level of political-criminal relations, the political no longer merely used criminals 
for its purposes; it became dependent on them infesting the Soviet Union and 
economy with corruption and criminality.
363
  
 With the fall of the Soviet Union this dependency on the criminal underworld 
revealed itself at a level of symbiotic tilt. Formal structures not only became 
subservient to organized criminals, organized criminals transformed into the 
figureheads of the state. Thus, the ―unholy troika‖ of the mafia, nomenklatura and 
current and former members of the government, military and security services did not 
suddenly appear with the fall of the Iron Curtain.
364
 It is a result of a dynamic process 
captured by the stage-evolutionary theory of organized crime.  
 To date, the model has been primarily applied to political-criminal analysis 
within a single nation state. However, since the Russian/Soviet Empire was a highly 
centralized political amalgamation of states, nationalities and cultures which predated 
the Warsaw Pact, its collapse resulted in the internationalization of the political-
criminal nexus. This is unique. It facilitates understanding of how and why this 
formerly Moscow centered political-criminal nexus affects the sovereignty of post-
Soviet states. And, from a theoretical perspective, it supports the extrapolation of the 
stage evolutionary model to the international level. 
2.3.2 Motivational and Structural Causes 
To understand the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus as an existential threat to 
Western leaning, post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region, it is necessary to be 
familiar with the specifics of the society from which a significant layer of their political-
criminal nexus emerged. A significant part of the origin of the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus is found in the Soviet era.
365
 All of the Soviet states shared (albeit in 
an imposed fashion) important structural commonalities (i.e. economic cultural, 
political). 
 The Communist economy and product scarcity institutionalized the black 
market. After the system‘s demise, the devaluation of the ruble exacerbated the 
problem, driving the citizenry towards crime. Simultaneously, the privatization of state 
                                               
362  Shelly (2004:199) and Perepelytsia, personal communication, Kyiv. 
363 Schulte-Bockholt, 164. 
364 McCauley M. (2001). Bandits Gangsters and the Mafia: Russia, the Baltic States and the Mafia. London: Pearson. p 75. 
365 Godson, 11. see also  Shelly L. (2004). Russia and Ukraine: Transition or Tragedy? In Menace to Society Political-Criminal Collaboration 
around the World, Godson R. (ed.). London:Transaction Publishers. p 200. 
 - 109 - 
property, which immediately followed the collapse, stimulated the political-criminal 
nexus into what has been named earlier as ―buccaneer capitalism‖.  
 Although the Soviet Empire collapsed, the states inherited the remnants of 
the Kremlin‘s centralized networks. Among the remnants of the centralized Soviet 
machine, the ―ties among members of successor governments that give the 
government in Moscow strong influence over most of the former Soviet Union‖ have 
remained.
366
 From a cultural perspective, state organized famines, the extermination 
of tens of millions of intelligentsia, obligatory institutionalization, imposed 
collectivization, centralized Russification, forced deportations, and institutionalized 
corruption are stark indicators of the Soviet value system from which the post-Soviet 
states and their ―elites‖ have emerged. Criminologist Louise Shelly described their 
common legacy as one ―of a lack of respect for the rule of law, absence of civil 
society, a large criminal underworld and shadow economy, endemic corruption and a 
demoralized law enforcement and legal apparatus‖ which  ―established the necessary 




In the previous chapters it was noted that elites often give up power to 
maintain their societal status. The Soviet elite, nomenklatura and -notably- 
intelligence networks, were all partially preserved, and, it is they who snatched up 
much of the formerly state-owned property through unregulated and illegal 
privatization.
368
 This must be kept in mind, particularly in light of comments which 
assert ―the influence of organized crime in Russia has waned when compared to that 
of rent-seeking oligarchs, large corporations, and the state security services.‖
369
 




 At times, the hungry grab for power that started after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union resulted in the betrayal of the state itself. The focus here is on the upper 
crust of organized criminals, ‖the political and financial power of organized criminals 
of the Soviet establishment‖ that ―strongly influenced the economic and political 
structures that emerged in the Commonwealth of Independent States since 1991‖.
371
 
The creation of these structures supported the maintenance of power by the power 
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keepers, particularly the communist elite and the Russian Federation. Philip Roeder 
noted the paradox: ―contrary to a common neorealist assumption that states jealously 




 Institutionally, this ―rush‖ is exemplified by the brisk creation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Common Security Treaty Organization and 
the Single Economic Space. Combined with Russia‘s historically-imperial mindset, 
this hurried creation of post-Soviet intergovernmental structures is indicative of the 
power of pro-Russian political-criminal networks inside the post-Soviet states. The 
network clearly stands in opposition to democratic reform and Euro-Atlantic 
integration of the post-Soviet states.  
 Roeder also reiterates that weak states and states in transition are particularly 
vulnerable to the intensified development of the political-criminal nexus. From a 
political perspective, this group of states finds itself somewhere between transition 
and consolidation. Their ―fluid and complex conditions‖ and ―lack of functioning state 
structures‖ were conducive to the battle over the redistribution of power.
373
 And, 
since the time of their very independence, their transitional condition made them 




 Geopolitically, the fact that they emerged from the dominance of the Russian 
empire is important. The colored revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia were welcomed 
by some as a revelation of independence and democratic change in the region. Yet, 
according to Colonel Albert Zaccor (ret.) formerly at Office of the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense, the West may have over emphasized the importance of democratic election 
processes and colored revolutions rather than focusing on assisting the development 
of well-functioning state institutions.
375
  
 Conversely, Russia‘s foreign policy of interference has been (and continues 
to be) identified as being ―related to the export of the Russian model of governance, 
characterized by a symbiosis of neo-KGB structures, organized crime, state 
bureaucracy, and government connected big business."
376
 It is also indicative of the 
Russia-centered nature of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. It is no secret that 
Russia overtly sought to influence elections in post-Soviet states by promoting 
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candidates allied with the Kremlin. This policy is perhaps best depicted by its staunch 
support of the current President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, a twice convicted 
criminal, and his Party of Regions received in 2004.  
 Furthermore, the ongoing governmental crises and/or frozen conflicts in 
Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan are examples of how self-serving officials 
and the lack of well-functioning public and private institutions continue to either lead 
these countries into a political abyss, authoritarianism, and/or Russia‘s ―sphere of 
influence‖. Clearly, it is in the sovereign interests of these states not to maintain 
chaotic, weak and corrupt state institutions. By doing so, they offer a wide scope for 
foreign penetration. Particularly, their internal weaknesses have been exploited by 
companies which took over strategic assets in an attempt to tie their economies and 




 Today, part of the ‗old network‘ has converted itself into an international 
security problem. The networks, or sviaszi, transgress international borders, forming 
the region‘s post-Soviet ―contemporary political-criminal nexus‖.
378 
Moreover, and in 
accordance with the stage-evolutionary model, some of these actors never lost the 
appearance of legitimacy, while others have now become ―legitimized‖.  
2.3.3 The Post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus in Foreign Affairs 
It is interesting to consider some of the ways this political-criminal nexus, made up of 
the ―unholy troika‖ of the mafia, nomenklatura and current and former members of 
the government, military and security services, rears its head in international 
relations.  This will be done by turning attention to two major security interests 
namely, energy security and ―frozen‖ separatist conflicts.    
 
Energy Security  
In the spring of 2008, US Attorney General Michael Mukasey identified the global 
energy sector as penetrated by transnational organized criminals who not only 
negatively impact the energy market, but destabilize US geopolitical interests.
379
 He 
concluded that corrupt business leaders, government officials and organized 
criminals form ―iron triangles" capable of influencing the economies of many 
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countries, including the US.
380
 Recognizing the very serious threat posed by these 
―iron triangles‖, the US Department of Justice identified organized criminal 
penetration of the energy and other strategic sectors as the number one threat in its 
Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime.
381
 
 In light of this criminal penetration of the global energy sector, it is important 
to note that unlike the West (formally), the Russian Federation does not separate its 
energy market from politics. In fact, the link between the two has intensified in recent 
years and Russia openly uses its Gazprom monopoly as a strategic geopolitical 
instrument. This game of Russian monopoly, which is played with Europe and the 
United States, is most obvious in the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region. 
Notably, it has been identified as one of the main impediments to their prosperity and 
democratic future.
382
   
 Energy security became a particularly burning issue after the Russian move 
to shut off the Ukrainian spigot on New Year‘s Day 2006.
383
 It was the first winter 
after the Ukraine‘s Orange Revolution which was widely supported by the U.S. and 
European states. Russia‘s strategic energy policy was illustrated by the chill felt in 
Europe from the public display of EU dependence on Russian energy supplies. 
Russian efforts to monopolize access to energy continue to be detrimental to regional 
stability and should be opposed.
384
 Nevertheless, the expected rise in demand for 
energy supplies - within Russia‘s own borders and internationally - indicates that it 
will be unable to fill all of its pipelines or satisfy demand.   
 This reality exposes Moscow‘s reliance on dwindling resources and Central 
Asian gas. Middlemen, secretive consortia and the mixing of ―cheap‖ Central Asian 
gas with more expensive Russian gas enable Moscow to profit generously from the 
―energy-hungry economies‖ in the West.
385
 However, the Russian economy depends 
on the export of raw materials and energy. This weakness, combined with the will to 
reinforce influence, has led Moscow to actively resist the development of new routes 
from the Caspian fields, deny non-Russian firms access to its excess pipeline 
capacity promoting impetus to the West‘s policy of diversification.
386
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 Ukraine is the most important transit country for Russian gas. In the early 
history of the Soviet gas industry, it was a key energy producer and remains a 
significant gas producer with the potential to increase it.
387
 Its unproven oil and gas 
reserves lie mainly in the Poltava region and in the Black Sea. There is real 
possibility in Ukraine for resource drilling; the main ―problem‖  is sanctity of 
contract.
388
 To the detriment of the state, Ukraine‘s energy sector is infiltrated by self-
serving officials from both sides of the political spectrum.
389
 For example, the former 
chairman of Ukraine‘s Naftogaz, Ihor Bakai, was wanted in Ukraine on charges of 
money laundering and embezzlement. He received safe-haven in the Russian 
Federation despite being wanted for involvement in shadow energy deals between 
Ukraine, Russia and Turkmenistan.
390
 Ukraine‘s Former Prime Minister and Head of 
United Energy Systems Pavlo Lazarenko
391
, was convicted for embezzlement and 
shady gas deals in the United States.
392
 He was accused of embezzling $200 million 
by importing natural gas and oil and receiving kick-backs for providing private 
companies the right to exploit Ukraine‘s natural gas market.
393
  
 The gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo, partially owned by Gazprom, is an 
example of how malfunctioning institutions open a wide scope for hostile penetration 
in Ukraine.
394
 During her election campaigns, and first time in office as Prime 
Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko waged an aggressive campaign against the Russian-
Ukrainian intermediary. Under her Premiership, the Ukrainian security service (SBU) 
headed by Oleksandr Turchynov, opened an investigation of the company and its 
business partners.
395 
Turchynov openly stated that international mafia boss Semyon 
Mogilevich was linked to illegal activities including money laundering through 
RosUkrEnergo.
396
 Mogilevich, a longtime FBI fugitive was arrested by Russian forces 
in Moscow is also connected to the Solntsevo crime syndicate. Solntsevo is one of 
Moscow‘s dominant crime families. Some analysts have linked his arrest to the 
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power struggle between influential Kremlin clans preceding the 2008 presidential 
change in Russia.
397
  It is noteworthy that Madame Tymoshenko is also known as 
the ―Gas Princess‖ for her alleged role in United Energy Systems and cooperation 
with Lazerenko. 
 Here it is clear that the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is a complicating 
factor through which both natural and legal persons continue to benefit from non-
transparent energy deals and mixed middleman consortiums. They have little 
legitimate incentive to change their colors.
398
  This negatively impacts the peaceful 
transition and democratization of post-Soviet states. And, according to Stephen 
Blank, it is a result of Russia‘s foreign policy, ―Russia‘s efforts at blackmail and 
intimidation by using the energy card, along with its energy firms‘ government 
connections and known association with intelligence and criminal organizations raise 
the specter of an orchestrated campaign to corrupt and undermine the foundations of 




 The negation of democratic processes in the Black Sea Region is perhaps 
most clearly, and disturbingly, realized through the political mayhem and uncertainty 
caused by the region‘s many separatist conflicts. In this regard it is important to note 
that the Russian Federation has made preferential energy deals with the breakaway 
territories within the post-Soviet states who have expressed their intention to 
democratize and join NATO.   
 
“Frozen” Separatist Conflicts 
The ancient Greek name for the Black Sea, Pontos Axeninos, means ‗dark or 
somber sea‘.
400
 Nomen est omen; today, the naturally beautiful Black Sea Region 
hosts a number of frozen conflicts and breakaway territories. There are four pro-
Russian separatist territories inside the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region. 
These are Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in 
Azerbaijan
401
 and Transdniestria. A fifth locus of separatist tension is found in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine. The conflicts, although different, do 
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share significant commonalities which point to a Russian-centered character of the 
post-Soviet political-criminal nexus:  
 They are all strategically located around the Black Sea; they are located in 
states foraging new relations with Western institutions; the Russian Federation 
openly supports the separatists; the breakaway territories are Russian enclaves 
hosting Russian military forces (albeit under the guise of CIS peacekeepers or 
military bases); while weakening the state in which they are found, the breakaway 
regions provide Russia with a stronger presence in the Black Sea Region, and; the 
territories are reputed to be criminal black holes comprised of foreign military 
presence, corruption and transnational organized crime requiring a systematic 
approach.
402
 In fact, The Center of European Policy Studies has concluded that 
ethnic conflict and separatism in the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region have 
a symbiotic relationship with transnational organized crime and terrorism.
403
  
  Importantly, Russia‘s chain of leverage determining the fate of the 
successor states and their break-away territories has been identified as being linked 
by former Soviet networks, self-serving officials and a significant military presence 
within their territories.
404
 The aforementioned territories, de facto states, exercise 
internal sovereignty without external legitimization. Thus, it stands to reason that the 
form of government of these separatist regions is illegitimate and their sources of 
revenue illegal.
405
 In this regatrd, it is important to note that it has been numerously 
asserted that Moscow not only backs separatism and breakaway territories but that 
they are even ―orchestrated, and are being maintained, by Moscow's policies‖.
406
  
 The US and EU have expressed that Russia‘s step of opening administrative 
offices in conflict zones, specifically in Georgia, is wrong and violates state 
sovereignty. According to the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and 
Eurasian Affairs, David Merkel, the separatist institution-building within the 
breakaway territories must be offset so that those populations will learn that 
democratic freedom has more to offer than the current status quo.
407
  
 In light of their policies and commitments, the United States and EU must not 
downplay the negative impact the frozen conflicts have on regional economic 
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development and the domestic politics. Nor can the West downplay the added power 
these conflicts provide the Russian Federation. Apart from economics, ―it has 
achieved the territorial gains which were never reversed and in some cases 
accompanied by massive ethnic cleansing that was never even addressed‖.
408
 A 
prime example of such a territorial gain is the sealing of the border between South 
Ossetia and the rest of Georgia. 
 According to Tamas Landesz, a former observer for the Organization for 
Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Georgia, the separatist 
movements have been supported by informal channels which facilitate the projection 
of Russia‘s power beyond its lawful borders.
409
 Russian requests for exclusive 
peacekeeping power in the region, with no ―external‖ oversight, no limits on unilateral 
actions, and no provision for timely withdrawal have been repeatedly denied by the 
UN and OSCE.
410
 Despite the lack of such endorsement, gross violations of UN 
peacekeeping standards and the lack of interest in resolving the conflicts, Russia has 
successfully resisted the introduction of ―external‖ peacekeeping forces to the 
territories of the region‘s frozen conflicts.
411
  
 The blocking of OSCE peacekeeping support in South Ossetia and Border 
Monitoring Operations along Georgia‘s northern border with Ingushetia, Dagestan 
and Chechnya has also been associated with Russia‘s stake in the illegal arms 
trade.
412
 In fact, these enclaves have become known havens for illegal arms 
trafficking, drugs, prostitution, and illegal migration protected by a state.
413
 Notably, 
the cause of the OSCE‘s adoption of a complacent approach and the allowance of 
heavy weaponry, designated as ―unaccounted-for treaty-limited equipment‖, to be 
transferred from Russia‘s arsenals to separatist enclaves has been identified as the 
result of   ―verification loopholes‖.
414
  
 From the above, it is possible to deduce that from the geopolitical 
perspective, the post-Soviet political criminal nexus is Moscow-centered and plays a 
key role in the geopolitical dynamics of the post-Soviet states, particularly in the 
Black Sea Region. 
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2.3.4 Conclusion 
In this section the theoretical constructs developed in the previous chapters were 
used to create a profile of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. It is possible to 
conclude that the international security problems related to transnational crime in 
post-Soviet States in the Black Sea Region have a specific character. The stage 
evolutionary approach to organized crime shows how the formally Moscow-centered 
political-criminal relations of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union have transformed 
into a modern day, Russia-centered political-criminal nexus. It is a local, cross border 
externality.  
 The development of this nexus has been greatly shaped by their structural 
(i.e. economic, cultural and political) commonalities as well as their common fate, and 
histories. The post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is a combination of criminals, 
corrupt politicians, former nomenklatura and intelligence agents. Its actors are 
motivated by both material and political gains. This political-criminal nexus advances 
Russia‘s geopolitical interests and its character is inherently anti-democratic.   
 This political-criminal nexus is embedded in the energy sector which the 
Russian Federation uses as a foreign policy instrument. It also figures in another 
geopolitical dilemma of the post-Soviet states namely, separatist conflicts. These 
―frozen conflicts‖ simultaneously violate the territorial integrity and democratic 
development of sovereign states. Importantly, these areas not only cause the spread 
of organized criminal activity, they depend on it. Thus, it is possible to assert that the 
future strength of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus, its effect on the region, and 
impact on international security not only depends on the domestic environments in 
which it operates but on the manner in which security organizations and Western 
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2. 4 Conclusion Part 
Transnational organized crime was recognized as an international security threat 
after the Soviet Union collapsed. Ten years later, in 2001, the United Nations codified 
the first convention governing transnational organized crime. Corruption, money 
laundering and the obstruction of justice are the key elements of transnational 
organized crime.  
 Importantly, the dominant perception of transnational organized crime as an 
activity separate from the state is misconceived. Rather, the cooperative relationship 
between states and organized crime is a long standing one. The state itself has its 
origins in organized crime. Tilly argues that organized violence and crime is a part of 
the state making process. Horkheimer likens the behavior of states to organized 
criminal protection rackets. Importantly, Max Weber‘s concept of the state monopoly 
over the use of force does not preclude the state‘s use of transnational organized 
crime in the pursuit of its interests. Rather, he argues that the state itself can 
legitimize such activity as it deems necessary. A historical example of this sort of 
activity is the power of the Lettre du Marque that transformed pirates into privateers; 
when it was in the interest of the state. 
 
The nature of the political-criminal relationship is dynamic. Organized crime 
can and does infiltrate state structures. The stage-evolutionary model describes how 
organized crime penetrates formal society eventually forming a symbiotic 
relationship. It is within this symbiotic relationship that the political-criminal nexus 
exists. An additional stage, the symbiotic-tilt has been added to this model. It has 
been named the symbiotic tilt because when the balance between the formal and 
informal structures tilts and the formal societal structures become more dependent 
on the informal ones, a transfer of loyalties from the state to criminal or insurgent 
structures occurs leading to an eventual loss of power and territorial control.  
 Some criminologists argue the non-ideological and apolitical nature of 
transnational organized crime, and it may only be on the fringes of the criminological 
discipline where authors are likely to accept its ideological nature.
416
 However, by 
adjusting one‘s view of the state‘s arsenal to include transnational organized crime, a 
level of it that is political and ideologically driven is exposed. It is the political-criminal 
nexus.  
 Importantly, the political-criminal nexus is a social structure within the state. 
Every state has one, although states that are authoritarian, over-bureaucratized, 
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small, weak, or in transition are more vulnerable to national and transnational 
political-criminal penetration. The evolutionary nature of political-criminal relations, 
combined with its structural and motivational causes, makes it possible to profile the 
character of a given state‘s political-criminal nexus. In so doing, it is possible to 
examine its role in international relations and geopolitics.  
 Since the political-criminal nexus is a social structure of the state, it also 
influences its identity and the manner in which states perceive one another. The 
evolutionary nature of political criminal relations, combined with its structural and 
motivational causes makes it possible to profile the character of a given state‘s 
political-criminal nexus. Doing so facilitates the assessment of its role and influence 
on international relations and geopolitics.  
 The post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region share a common layer within 
their political-criminal nexuses. This layer has been identified here as the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus. It origins are rooted in Russia‘s Empirical and Soviet 
histories. Its actors include former nomenklatura, corrupt politicians, security 
agencies, and basic criminals. Importantly, these factors make it is a trans-state 
political-criminal nexus operating in the geopolitical interests of the Russian 
Federation. The number pro-Russian separatist conflicts and unrecognized 
breakaway territories in the region indicate a connection between the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus and Russia‘s interest in preventing the spread of democracy 
in the region.  
 Paradoxically, transnational organized crime is an international security threat 
and, simultaneously, a pivotal part of a state‘s identity; a weapon used in the state‘s 
quest for power. It has been noted that ―Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing 
and war making all belong on the same continuum….‖
 417 
However, the interplay 
between corruption, organized criminal activity and geopolitics remains a delicately 
silent policy area. The political-criminal nexus deserves particular attention and its 
activities are not limited to the corruption of a state‘s tangible power. It has been 
noted here that the political-criminal nexus is able to stimulate an underground 
economy, its societal structures are able to promote institutions that reflect the 
ideology and interests of the power to which it belongs. Significantly, insurgent 
groups use propaganda in the form of newspapers, magazines, radio, and television 
services to attract the loyalties of the population away from formal state structures. 
These are clear indicators that the political-criminal nexus uses soft power to gain 
geopolitical strength. Thus, albeit under the guise of promoting democracy or fighting 
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it, it is foreseeable that this ―social‖ promotion of insurgency benefits the separatist 
group as well as the foreign governments, corporations and other transnational 
networks which may be backing them.  
 It is therefore particularly interesting to consider how the political-criminal 
nexus is used by states to gain geopolitical power by promoting insurgency and 
separatism with soft power. 
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Part Three: A Dark Side to Soft Power in the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea? 
 
 
May we never confuse honest dissent with disloyal subversion. 
      - D.D. Eisenhower 
3. Introduction 
The third, and final, part of this research contains the case study. Here, the linkages 
between national security, soft power, separatism and the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus are examined. This part is divided into two chapters. The first sets the 
perspective; Ukraine‘s geopolitical position and the manner in which the post-Soviet 
political criminal nexus figures inside Ukraine are presented. To connect these 
linkages to the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, particular attention is given 
to the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) and pro-Russian separatism in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Special consideration is given to the city of 
Sevastopol where the fleet‘s main base is located. In the second chapter, a 
presentation and analysis are made of those Russian institutions which are linked to 
soft power operations aimed at trust-building between the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine‘s population in Crimea. In the end of this part, the framework for soft power 
security analysis is used to determine the relationship between soft power, the 
political criminal nexus and the promotion of separatism in the Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea in Ukraine. 
 To be able to consider the manner the interplay between soft power, the post-
Soviet political nexus and separatism in Crimea, it is necessary to understand certain 
dynamics as they pertain to Ukraine. It is expected that this chapter will provide 
insight into the geopolitical situation as it has been shaped by geography, politics and 
military interests. First, a perspective of Ukraine‘s geopolitical position will be set. 
Second, a presentation will be made of Ukraine‘s post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
Third, building on the previous sections a bried history of The Autonomous Republic 
of Crimea and problems related to the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet are 
presented.   
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3.1 Ukraine: Its Post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus, Crimea 
and the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
Ukraine is the largest state in the post-Soviet security subcomplex in the Black Sea 
Region. Balancing between the West and East, its unique ―borderland‖ position 
makes pro-Russian separatism in Crimea a particularly interesting case to study.  
Few will dispute Brzezinski‘s assertion that without Ukraine, Russia can never be a 
superpower.
418
 With a territory of 603,700 sq km (579,330 sq km land and 24, 220 sq 
km water), and over 2,700 km of coastline (Black Sea over 1,500 km, Azov Sea over 
1,200 km), Ukraine has more territory than any other European state. It has a 
population of over 45 million and is administratively divided into 24 provinces 
(oblasts), two cities with oblast status (Kyiv and Sevastopol), and one autonomous 
republic (Autonomous Republic of Crimea). Its territory contains the largest stretch of 
fertile black soil (chornozem) in Europe and is also rich in natural resources including 
gas, oil, ferrous and non ferrous metals.
419
  
 To indicate Ukraine‘s geopolitical character, it is useful to recall a statement 
made by Ukraine‘s former president Leonid Kuchma, "Ukraine is a football field on 
which Russia is playing against the West."
420
 The Russian-Ukrainian relationship is 
still dominated by the fact that Kyiv is ―the center of the first Slavic state, the Kyivan 
Rus, which during the 10th and 11th centuries, was the largest and most powerful 
state in Europe―.
421
 Kyiv is the geographic heart of the ancient Rus, the mother-city 
of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. And, although many of its ancient artifacts have 
either been destroyed or transported to Russia, Kyiv remains the heart and capitol of 
Ukraine.  
 In 1654, Ukraine was arguably subjugated to Russia by the signing of the 
Treaty of Pereyaslav.
422
 Until gaining independence in 1991, it knew only a few short 
and partial years of freedom in the period 1917-1920. Ukraine‘s Russian subjugation 
includes a long, ominous history and black Communist past. Due to its geopolitical 
significance to Russia, it is asserted that Ukraine suffered the main brunt of the 
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Kremlin‘s Twentieth Century atrocities.
423
 It includes two artificial, Kremlin-run 
famines (1921-1922, 1932-1933) in which over 8 million Ukrainians were murdered 
by forced starvation, enforced collectivization, mass deportations/relocations, mass 
killings, mass Russification and other forms of social and political suppression. 
Although, to date, it is the only post-Soviet state in the Black Sea Region to maintain 
its territorial integrity, Russia continues to covet its territory and history.  
 The 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine threatened to empower Western-
friendly, democracy-oriented forces. An effective pro-Western president would 
permanently reduce the Federation‘s power over Ukraine and the entire Black Sea 
Region. Thus, one year before the eventful elections, in August 2003, Russia‘s 
foreign policy toward Ukraine intensified. For the first time since Ukraine‘s 
independence, Russia blatantly, and formally, violated its territorial integrity by 
attempting to connect its mainland to Ukraine‘s Tuzla Island.  
 The Russian Federation attempted to lay claim to the tiny island and thereby 
dominate the Kerch straight, a strategic passageway connecting the Sea of Azov to 
the Black Sea.  It is a strategic body of water way because it connects the Black Sea 
to the carbon rich Caspian area through the Azov and Volga-Don canal.  As a result 
of the construction, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense charged the military to defend 
Ukraine‘s territorial integrity, and, it did.
424
 Remarkably, allegations that of a policy of 
dispersing Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in the Black Sea Region, (which 
would be heard after the Russo-Georgian war of 2008), were already voiced. It was 
alleged that ―certain Russian people‖ had been offering Ukrainian fishermen on the 
island, and in Kerch, Russian passports and the possibility of relocation.
425
  
 The Tuzla affaire marks the start of a new era of geopolitical games between 
the two Black Sea states. The attempted construction of the causeway violated 
Ukraine‘s sovereignty and international law. It also affected Ukraine‘s claim to 
territoriality and rights in the region by helping Russia secure a favorable deal, with 
Ukraine‘s outgoing President Kuchma, on the delimitation of the usage of the Kerch 
Straight. Russia‘s move sent a strong warning to Ukraine and should have been 
registered as a wake-up call by the West. It was only a harbinger of things to come. 
 The following year, in 2004, a civil uprising known as the Orange Revolution 
started after Viktor Yanukovich allegedly won the elections and was prematurely 
greeted as the victor by Russia‘s President Vladimir Putin. As the Orange Revolution 
gained momentum, it became clear the Ukrainian populace would not accept the 
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manufactured election results. Rumors started to emanate from pro-Russian circles 
that the ―revolution‖ was organized and directed by the CIA and NGOs (covertly) 
funded by Western powers. However, another more worrisome set of rumors also 




 Word of looming separatism drifted down the hallways, through information 
channels and onto the street. On 28 November 2004 (one week after the presidential 
runoff), a meeting was held in the Ukrainian city of Severodonetsk in which Moscow‘s 
Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov (albeit not in his formal capacity) conspired with pro-Russian 
Party of Regions deputies of Ukraine‘s indispensable economic regions (Donetsk, 
Luhansk and Kharkiv)  to break away from Ukraine. Nonetheless the separatists‘ 
attempt failed. For the first time in Ukraine‘s modern history, over a million citizens 
demonstrated to secure a Western-friendly, pro-democratic president, Viktor 
Yushchenko.  
 Recognizing the Russian supported East-West divide as a serious threat to 
Ukraine‘s national security, members of Ukraine‘s nascent civil society spoke of yet 
another worrisome case. This time, it was in Ukraine‘s Autonomous Region of 
Crimea (ARC). The conversations circled around Russian-Ukrainian tensions, 
occupied land, dubious unofficial state visits, business deals and the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Markedly, the name of Moscow‘s Mayor Luzhkov was 
mentioned, once again, among the instigators of separatism. 
 The events that followed Yushchenko‘s inauguration exposed the extent to 
which Ukraine‘s politics were riddled with the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus and 
problems of compulsive hedonism, inherent corruption, energy scams, debts, and 
issues related to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 
 It was a chill fall day in 2006 when Oleksandr Sushko, a prominent Ukrainian 
political scientist, was interviewed in a café next to the ancient Golden Gates in 
Kyiv‘s city center. The planned subject matter for that afternoon was the threat posed 
to Ukraine by the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus and transnational organized 
crime. The expert conceded that an effective post-Soviet political criminal network 
loyal to the Kremlin existed. However, he indicated that the real threat facing 
Ukraine‘s democratic administration and national security did not emanate from 
traditional forms of organized crime (i.e. drugs, weapons, human trade). Rather, it 
was the fomenting of pro-Russian separatist sentiment in Crimea by non-
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governmental organizations operating on Moscow‘s behalf using support from 
Russian intelligence services and shadow economy funds.
427
  
 Consequently, the question of how soft power was used to promote 
subversive powers in Crimea and support the Russian Federation‘s military and 
political interests in Ukraine arose. However, more knowledge was needed to 
ascertain the veracity of claims pertaining to Kremlin oriented, anti-democratic and 
corrupt powers operating against Ukraine‘s national interests in Crimea.  
 Later that year, in a lavish room inside Ukraine‘s Foreign Ministry, Boris 
Tarasyuk the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, was interviewed. The minister 
confirmed that subversive, Russian-backed forces were operating inside Ukraine. 
Particular mention was made of the promotion of separatism in Crimea through the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet.
428
 This assertion was later confirmed by Vice Admiral 
Bezkorovayniy and representatives of Ukraine‘s pro-democratic civil society.
429
  
 Very serious Ukrainians had already affirmed the existence of pro-Russian 
forces working against the Ukrainian nation and its democratic reform. Then, in 
January 2007, in an offhand conversation with President Viktor Yushchenko, the 
president, whose severely disfigured face retold the story of his alleged assassination 
by dioxide poisoning in the months preceding the 2004 elections, confirmed that 
Russian-backed separatism associated with the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 
Sevastopol was a ―major threat to Ukraine‘s territorial sovereignty‖.
430
 Of all 
allegations, his confirmed that research into how the post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus promotes separatism in Crimea was warranted.  
3.1.1 The Post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus in Ukraine 
In this section, post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is going to be linked to practice in 
Ukraine.  Let us be reminded that this nexus is a local, cross border externality in the 
post-Soviet states in the Black Sea region. The stage evolutionary theory of 
organized crime has shown how the formally Kremlin-centered political-criminal 
relations of the Soviet Union transformed into a security threat within post-Soviet 
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states. This political-criminal nexus has been shaped by their common fate and 
Soviet Moscow-centered history.  
 The anti-democratic nature of the political-criminal nexus oftentimes makes its 
activities indiscernible from Russia‘s intelligence agencies. This aspect of its nature 
appears to be exemplified by Russia‘s support of frozen conflicts and breakaway 
territories in the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region. This foreign policy of 
interference has been identified as something ―related to the export of the Russian 
model of governance, characterized by a symbiosis of neo-KGB structures, 
organized crime, state bureaucracy, and government connected big business."
431
  
 Importantly, separatist territories not only cause the spread of organized 
criminal activity, they depend on it. However, the extent to which the political-criminal 
nexus is linked to the promotion of separatism through the use of soft power remains 
unclear. Thus, it is interesting to consider the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in this 
regard. The threat of pro-Russian separatism appears to have been used there to 
deter and obstruct Ukraine‘s transformation into mature democracy and Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  
 Despite optimism and support for national revival, cultural freedom and 
democratic reform, anti-Western forces - both inside and outside Ukraine - appear 
willing to break the state apart to prevent it. The fact that Russia‘s Black Sea Fleet is 
based on Ukrainian territory in direct violation of its laws, including its own 
Constitution, its provisional transitional articles, and an entire slew of administrative 
laws are major indications of corrupt and organized post-Soviet political criminal 
forces operating against Ukraine from within.
432
 It points to the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus in so far as its activities transgress the law, are organized in the upper 
echelons of society and promote separatism in the interest of the foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation. 
 Those familiar with Soviet Communism, and the relationship between the 
Russian Federation and the former Soviet states, should not be surprised with the 
existence of subversive, Russian-friendly forces operating inside Ukraine‘s 
government, organized crime groups, security services, economic structures and civil 
society. A concise description of them and some of the ways they relate to organized 
crime has been presented in a book written by Dr. Ivan Diak, the former Lead 
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Consultant to the Director of Ukraine‘s energy company ―NaftoGas Ukrayiny,‖ the 
Secretary General of Ukraine‘s National Gas Union and Presidential Adviser.
433
  
 Diak asserts experts must be keenly aware of the major role corruption plays 
in influencing Ukraine‘s upper echelons. Markedly, western powers are not innocent 
of such behavior in Ukraine and, in the long run, the sorry state of affairs in Ukraine is 
first, and foremost, the responsibility and fault of Ukrainians themselves.
434
 
 In his book, ―P‘yata kolona v Ukrayini: zagroza derzhavnosti‖ (The Fifth 
Column in Ukraine: a threat to statehood) Diak describes how nine basic categories 
of Russia‘s social network impacts Ukraine‘s perceived power potential by giving 
effect to Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. These categories consist of: the 
bureaucratic, commercial, ethno-political, Slavic, former nomenklatura, religious-
political (Russian Orthodox Church), military and renegade powers.
435
 Another 
author identifies the political actors of this ―fifth column‖ as falling into one of the 
following categories:  
 1) The Indushky which are directed by Moscow, i.e. representatives of 
designated political powers which exist solely for their support from Moscow. The 
identified danger of these powers is that they are run exclusively by the Kremlin and, 
at the first sign that they will not follow orders of the Kremlin; they are converted into 
―political corpses‖.
436
 Clearly, not all members of this group belong to the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus. However, since their political life ―depends on Russian 
support‖, it is possible to assert that their actions are not purely political. Thus, any 
crimes or grave, transgressions of the law are not restricted to purely political 
objectives. If they were, they would fall outside the realm of the Palermo Treaty 
against Transnational Organized Crime.  
 2) The Trojan-Russian Trinity which consists of politicians that temporarily 
side with the Kremlin, who, in exchange for supporting any given Russian interest 
over a national Ukrainian interest, receive dividends from Russia albeit political or 
economic in nature. The danger associated with this group is that its members do not 
associate themselves with social circles that are openly known as ―friends of Russia‖. 
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They carry an image of acting in the interest of Ukraine, but give effect to orders 
received from Moscow.
437
  Once again, because the actors within this group operate 
in Russia‘s favor to receive some sort of material benefit or advantage from the 
Russian Federation their acts are not purely political.  Although as members of 
parliament, they may carry the advantage of immunity; their acts may nonetheless 
fall within the realm of the Palermo Convention. 
 3) The Victims of Tradition is, reportedly, the largest group of the ―fifth 
column‖. Its members come from various layers of society. Reportedly, still 
―zombified‖ by Soviet stereotypes in relation to the West, they habitually ―view Russia 
as their only feeder, and promote Ukraine‘s political, economic and cultural 
dependence on Russia‖, and, ―their only ambition in keeping Ukraine sovereign is to 
be able to take advantage of the nation to satisfy their material needs‖.
438
 Thus, 
Russia‘s penetration is far reaching. However, the legitimacy and legality of the 
behavior of these actors working on Russia‘s behalf from within is unclear. 
 Democratic proliferation, particularly in Ukraine, not only inspired fear in 
Moscow, it did so within certain criminal clans, some of which dominated its ―grey 
economy‖ predating independence.
439
 This fear is depicted by the fact that after the 
Orange Revolution and instatement of a democratic president and government in 
Ukraine, a number of these suspected criminals fled to the Russian Federation.  
 These personages include the Former Head of the State Management of 
Affairs Department, an institution that manages properties on behalf of the president 
and cabinet, Igor Bakai,. Bakai was appointed in 2003 and fled to Moscow in 
December 2004. He was suspected of numerous transnational crimes and was 
charged with the illegal privatization of prime, state-owned properties (i.e. Dnipro 
Hotel, Ukraina Hotel and the Ukraina exhibition complex in Kyiv). The Mayor of 
Odessa, Ruslan Bodelan (1998 to 2005) was also charged with abuse of office and 
fled to Russia.  Former Interior Minister Mykola Bilokon was wanted for suspicion of 
abuse of office, including financial abuses and orchestrating a clampdown on human 
rights and media freedoms, he too moved to Russia.
440
  
 It is noteworthy that when in Moscow, Bilokon was reportedly frequently 
visited by Igor Bakai and Maksim Kurochkin. Kurochkin, accused of extortion (Hotel 
Dnipro, an outdoor market, illegal acquisition of property and 3 sanatoriums in 
Crimea) was Russian business man the Head, and official founder, of the Russia 
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Club in Kyiv.
441
 It is of utmost importance to note here that the club was linked 
through business, suspected organized criminals and, the promotion of Russia‘s 
image and political culture in Ukraine. 
 It is associated with prominent Russian "political technologists" who are linked 
to economic takeovers and the promotion of separatism in Ukraine. These gentlemen 
include Gleb Pavlovsky and Kremlin aide Igor Shuvalov who worked on the 
promotion of Russia and its pro-Russian presidential candidate (now president) 
Viktor Yanukovich. The Russia Club enjoyed active support from Russia‘s former 
Prime Minister and Ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin as well as other 
prominent supporters of Ukraine‘s former authoritarian president Leonid Kuchma.
442
  
 When Viktor Yanukovich became Prime Minister and the pro-Russian parties 
gained power, Kurochkin returned to Ukraine. However, he was assassinated in an 
apparent reprisal killing while awaiting trial. Another prominent figure to return to 
Ukraine is the Former Deputy Head of the State Secret Service (SBU) Volodymyr 
Satsyuk.  Satsyuk was wanted by the pro-Democratic Ukrainian authorities in 
connection with abuse of office, forgery and the attempted assassination through 
poisoning of the 2004 Presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko. 
 This short list of men who were either accused of or charged with organized 
criminal activity held top positions during the corrupt and authoritarian rule of ex-
President Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005), The fact that they were granted protection by 
Moscow after Ukraine‘s Orange Revolution exemplifies why the Russian centered 
post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is considered part of a Russian fifth column in 
Ukraine. Russia was not only their safe haven it has even awarded some of them 
with Russian citizenship.  
 Five years later, after the inauguration of pro-Russian President Yanukovich, 
these formerly wanted criminals, enemies of the state, returned to Ukraine. Thus, 
Ukraine serves as an example of how the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is 
linked to geopolitics. It also shows that when a political-criminal nexus has a 
centralized, transborder character like the post-Soviet one, states remain particularly 
vulnerable to external political and economic penetration.  
 To learn more about Russia‘s power in Ukraine, post-Soviet political criminal 
relations, and the dynamics of Ukraine‘s national struggle, over 100 citizens including 
executives and government officials were interviewed over a three-year period. 
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Repeatedly, a social structure operating from within the Kremlin‘s old social network 
against Ukraine‘s democratic transition was spoken of. A picture was painted of a 
vibrant force with an inimical distaste for Western democratization, driven by 
corruption, exclusivity, and money laundering through offshore bank accounts.  
 The narratives of organized criminals, secret agents, and politicians working 
to realize Russia‘s interests inside Ukraine meshed into a hybrid political-criminal 
network. Disturbing claims that this network was prepared to deter Ukraine‘s 
democratic transformation and western integration to the extent of sacrificing the 
most important part of its tangible power, namely, its territory called particular 
attention to activities related to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. However, the extent to 
which one could assert a post-Soviet political-criminal nexus was an instrument of an 
anti-democratic, Russian foreign policy of promoting separatism in the Black Sea 
Region and Crimea in particular remained unclear.
443
  
3.1.2 Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet 
The history of Crimea is very long and fascinating. Formerly named Taurida, the land 
includes legends of pyramids, Noah‘s Ark and fierce warrior women; the Amazons. It 
includes the histories of the ancient Cimmerians, Scythians, Greeks, Romans, Goths, 
Khazars and the Ottomans.  
 It was the year 1783 when Crimea was annexed by the Russian Empire. That 
same year, Prince Potemkin, acting under the orders of Empress Catherine the 
Great, established the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. The Black Sea, a former 
Ottoman lake, provides the Russian Fleet the fastest outlet to the warm seas, and, 
naval power in the region. Since its establishment, the fleet has been of pivotal 
strategic importance to a virtually land-locked Russia.  
 The Black Sea Fleet is strongly tied to Russia‘s imperialist history and culture. 
Sailors from the entire empire and former republics have served on it for centuries. In 
Soviet times, Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet had a special status among naval men. 
They would normally first serve on the Baltic Sea, then the Pacific and in the final 
phase of their military careers, they would serve on the Black Sea Fleet. They would 
eventually have the opportunity to retire on the tropically weathered peninsula.
444
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Today its ethnic population of nearly 2 million mainly consists of approximately 12% 
Tatars, 24% Ukrainians and 58% Russians.
445
  
 Since the proclamation of Ukraine‘s independence in 1991, the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet in Sevastopol - and its forces stationed elsewhere on Ukrainian territory - 
has been the cause of serious contention in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Throughout 
the years, using the Russian Black Sea Fleet‘s naval stronghold in Crimea, Moscow, 
and pro-Russian parties have continued to openly promote the reabsorption of 




 In 1991, when the Soviet Union fell apart, the sensitive question of ownership 
of the Black Sea Fleet arose. Despite the recognition of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States that the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union 
would inherit the military bases located on their territory, as well as the territorial 
sovereignty and the inviolability of their existing boarders, the Russians were not 
prepared to give up its Russian Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine.
447
 Thus, in Sevastopol 
and Crimea, the year 1991 also marked the start of political chaos and separatism 
directly connected to the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine.  
 In 1992, the first legislative connection was laid between the Black Sea Fleet 
and Ukraine‘s sovereignty over Crimea. That January, the Head of Russia‘s 
Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs and Economy, Vladimir Lukin, extended 
a resolution to the Russian parliament which pronounced the 1954 Supreme Soviet 
decision (under leadership of Khrushchev) to transfer ownership of Crimea to 
Ukraine null and void. To it, he added an appeal to the Ukrainian Parliament to speed 
up the negotiation process regarding the division of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
448
 
In his letter to the Speaker of Russia‘s Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Lukin openly 
recommended that Russia use Crimea as an instrument in Black Sea Fleet 
negotiations, ―…after proclaiming the 1954 decision invalid, the Ukrainian leadership 
will face a dilemma: it will either agree to transfer the fleet (and its bases) to the 
Russian Federation, or the status of Crimea will be placed under question‖.
449
 Lukin‘s 
recommendation appeared to be heeded. 
 On 6 April 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk sent a telegram to all 
CIS states. In it, he noted a sharp degradation of the socio-political situation in 
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Crimea as well as the Black Sea Fleet. The president declared the problems a direct 
result of Russia‘s continuous interference in Ukraine‘s internal affairs using the main 
command of the CIS joint forces and certain leaders of the Russian Federation. He 
identified the visits of Admirals Chernavin and Kapitanets as well as the Vice 
President of Russia, Rutskoy to Crimea as anti-Ukrainian acts directed against 
Ukraine‘s sovereignty and violations of Ukrainian law. Then, in accordance with an 
earlier decree (decree No. 209 on the immediate moves to building the armed forces 
of Ukraine dated 5 April, 1992), Kravchuk ordered the immediate transfer of Black 
Sea Fleet ownership to Ukraine.    
 The Russian Federation responded to this presidential decree with one of 
their own. On 7 April, 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued decree No. 375 
and ordered: (1) the jurisdiction over the Black Sea Fleet to be transferred to the 
Russian Federation and subjugated to the Lead Commander of the joint CIS forces; 
(2) the confirmation that the Black Sea Fleet shall be financed by the budget of the 
Russian Federation, and; (3) the ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs to 
immediately commence negotiations on the conditions for basing the Black Sea Fleet 
in Ukraine‘s ports and the transfer of a part of the Fleet to the Ukrainians.   
 The standoff created by these two Presidential Decrees, led the two sides to 
agree to the creation of delegations to negotiate the Black Sea Fleet. As a result, the 
Russian President cancelled his aforementioned decree and his Ukrainian 
counterpart cancelled his order to form the Ukrainian Navy on the base of the Black 
Sea Fleet.  However, just over one month later, on 23 May 1992 at the Ukharniya 
Balta, in Sevastopol, where Ukraine‘s battalion ―national gvardia‖ was located, a 
group of Black Sea Fleet intelligence under leadership of a reserve officer who 
served in Black Sea Fleet intelligence, was apprehended for placing explosives in 
two areas near the entrance of the Ukrainian base.
450
 The years that followed were 
marred with diplomatic wars and violence. 
  When the Soviet Union fell apart, a significant number of service men pledged 
their allegiance to Ukraine, not Russia.
451
 In his book, ―Anatomy of an Undeclared 
War (Anatomiya Neobyavlennoy Voiny)‖, Nikolai Savchenko describes how Russian 
intelligence agencies provoked socio-political harms on the fleet and on Crimean 
territory. Savchenko, a former Black Sea Fleet press officer, served on the fleet for 
24 years, 10 of which as correspondent and editor of the Black Sea Fleet‘s 
newspaper. He gave an eyewitness account of the policy of maltreatment, ridicule 
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and violence ordered by the Russian commanders of the Black Sea Fleet against 
sailors who did not pledge allegiance to the Russian Federation.
452
  
 Savchenko also provided an account of how the GRU (Russian military 
intelligence) and FSB (Russian internal intelligence) services, attached to the fleet, 
played the ―first violin‖ in creating socio-political tensions in Crimea. They infiltrated 
the media, government institutions and promoted anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian and 
anti-Tatar sentiment in the Crimean Peninsula.
453
 Simultaneously, the Kremlin-run 
communist party of Crimea was directed to ―work very hard to discredit the push 




 The fact that over 20,000 Crimean‘s were in someway connected to the Black 
Sea Fleet in Crimea made their perceived dependence stronger.
455
 In 2010 the 
number decreased to approximately 12,000. However, this population continues to 
be used promote the perception that, since the livelihood of 1 in 4 Ukrainian citizens 
in Sevastopol depends on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, it is in the ―common interest‖ 
for the fleet to remain in Crimea, and removal of the fleet will result in an 
unemployment crisis.
456
 The common interest is a crucial element of a state‘s 
national Strategic Purpose and soft power. Importantly, in 2006, Ukrainian services 
estimated the stationing of the fleet was draining the city budget by multimillions of 
dollars and even billions, if they were to include the lost potential of commercializing 
the port through demilitarization.
457
 However, whereas the Russian side maintained a 
strong media campaign to promote their cause, the Ukrainian side did not. 
 Back in the 1990‘s, Russia‘s frail international status prevented it from overt 
actions. It understood very well that, lacking juridical foundations to claim Crimea, 
raising the question of Crimea‘s status in the international arena would further 
damage its already weak image.
458
 However, according to Vice Admiral 
Bezkorovainiy, although the status of Crimea was not addressed on the official, 
international level, it did remain an instrument of political blackmail between Russia 
                                               
452 Savchenko, N. (2007) Navy Captain 2nd Rank, Former Editor of the Black Sea Fleet newspaper, Ukraine Black Sea Naval Forces 
Spokesman, personal communication, Sevastopol.  
See also Savchenko, N. (Савченко Н.). (1997). Anatomy of an Undeclared War (Анатомия необъявленной войны). Kyiv: Taki Cправи. pp 
254-260.  
453 Ibid. 
454 Bezkorovainiy (2011). 
455 Ibid.  
456 Ukrainian Intelligence Agency (SBU) Information (Службa безпеки України (СБУ) Довідка (2006). Dated 17 December. p 4.. 
457 Ibid., p 6. 
458 Bezkorovainiy (2011). 
 - 134 - 
and Ukraine.
459
 An example of this blackmailing is depicted by the actions of Igor 
Kasatonov, the fleet‘s Admiral at the time. Admiral Kasatonov offered to hand the 
fleet over to Ukraine in exchange for the post of Minister of Defense. Kyiv‘s 
administration, under President Kravchuk, denied his request. And, as a result, 
Kasatonov retracted his offer and made his deals with Moscow.
460
  
 Kasatonov was not unique. In fact, it was part of Russia‘s foreign policy to use 
the GRU and FSB in order to promote anti-democratic sentiment in Crimea and 
recruit service men that were returning to, or serving, Ukraine. The policy was to 
bribe them to work against Ukraine, ―Officers and Generals who agreed to serve 
Russia against Ukraine, were promised high ranking posts in the Russian army, 
financial rewards, apartments in any given region of the Russian Federation and 
other material incentives.‖
461
 Thus, they were offered undue material advantages to 
desert or spy on Ukraine. This practice is indicative of how corruption was used by 
the Russian Federation to gain military power in Crimea, and other parts of Ukraine, 
furthering the development of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
 In the meanwhile, over a thousand kilometers away in Moscow, Russian 
Parliamentary forces continued to work toward invalidating the 1954 transfer of 
Crimea. On 21 May 1992, in a closed session of the Russian Parliament, a decree 
declaring the transfer of Crimea juridically invalid was adopted; it called upon 
Ukraine, Russia and Crimea to negotiate the peninsula‘s fate.
462
 As tension and 
conflicts continued to surround the problem of the division of the Black Sea Fleet, the 
situation bounced from the fleet belonging to the Russian Federation, the CIS, 




 At the time, Russia‘s position to get control over the fleet and Sevastopol was 
still relatively frail. Thus, Russia turned to make yet another claim. While the fate of 
the Black Sea Fleet was being negotiated and Ukraine‘s sovereignty over Crimea 
threatened, the Russian Parliament made a distinctive move against Ukraine‘s 
territorial sovereignty. This time, it pertained to the city of Sevastopol. It was mid-July 
1993 when the Russian parliament instructed the preparation of the draft law 
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―enshrining the federal status of the town of Sevastopol in the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation‖; the vote was passed with 166 for and 1 against.
464
  
 In Russia, the year 1993 marked a turning point away from Andrei Kozyrev‘s 
[Yeltsin‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs] pro-western so-called atlanticist orientation to a 
more nationalistic ‗Russia first‘ approach that mirrored the position of supporters of 
Crimean separatism.‖
465
 That September was a harbinger of things to come. An 
unprinted, secret protocol, named the Massandra Protocol, tied a knot which married 
democracy in the Black Sea Region to the Black Sea Fleet and Russian energy. Ever 
since, this important, triangular linkage exists between Ukraine‘s sovereignty, 
Russian gas, and the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine. 
 The Black Sea Fleet negotiations commenced in the town famous for 
Crimean wines Massandra. Not far away, the Presidents of the two countries were 
discussing the fate of democracy in both their countries. President Boris Yeltsin, 
facing increased political pressure from Communists at home, was loosing support 
for his democratization policies. This made the manner in which Yeltsin handled the 
Black Sea Fleet pivotal to Russia‘s own democratic transformation. Yeltsin needed 
help to show himself to his parliament as a defender of the interests of the Russian 
state. The Massandra Protocol, which was the outcome of the negotiations, has been 
noted as a concession made by Ukrainian President Kravchuk to protect his Russian 
counterpart from disaster at home led by Rutskoy and Khasbulatov.
466
 
 On 3 September, the Ukrainian delegation was side-swiped by an unexpected 
move by the Russians. According to the Russian Diplomat and former Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dubinin, the situation was somewhat different. He asserts 
the presidential decision to link the negotiations to Ukraine‘s gas debt (at the end of 
1993 it was estimated at 600 million dollars and 2500 million combined debt) was 
made by the presidents and then immediately announced.
467
 Yet, according to Vice 
Admiral Bezkorovainiy, the Russian delegation, led by Russian Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin, refused to discuss the fleet before the Ukrainian delegation accepted 
the issue of energy debt.
468
 This move was entirely unexpected and the Ukrainians 
were unprepared to deal with this issue.
469
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 That evening, a rather extraordinary thing occurred. The two presidents 
announced at a press conference that the fleet and its entire infrastructure would be 
handed over to Russia and Russian symbols would be used in exchange for 
Ukraine‘s 2 billion dollar energy debt and all of its nuclear warheads.
470
 Curiously, 
that same evening, upon his return to Borispyl Airport in Kyiv, and, in the absence of 
Russian Press, President Leonid Kravchuk informed Ukrainian journalists that no 
decisions had been made regarding the division or sale of the fleet to Russia. The 
unpublished protocol caused a stir in the upper echelons and, although it closely 
mirrors the situation that followed, the Massandra Protocol never had any formal or 
legal effect.  
 The political tug of war over the fleet and peninsula continued. In 1993 (then 
again in October 1996), Russia‘s pursuit for power in the Black Sea region acquired a 
new dimension. The Russian Federation ‗produced‘ a decree from 1948 which 
provided Sevastopol with a particularly special status. It asserted that Sevastopol 
was never an administrative part of Crimea. Based on this document the Russian 
side argued that the 1954 transfer of Crimea did not include Sevastopol and the city 
thereby always remained an integral part of Russia directly subordinated to 
Moscow.
471
   
 During an interview with a member of Ukraine‘s sub-committee regarding 
problems arising from the Russian Black Sea Fleet stationing on Ukrainian Territory, 
the functionary (who requested to remain anonymous) alleged his first hand 
knowledge that the Russian side, feeling that it was loosing its juridical fight for 
Crimea, falsified the 1948 document behind closed doors in the Kremlin. His 
assertion is confirmed by political scientist B. Gorin who describes the manner in 
which pro-Russian forces, particularly through A. Kruglov (a Crimean parliamentary 
deputy, founder of the Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia party for the reunification of 
Crimea with the Russian Federation) falsified and suppressed documents to make 
the 1948 document appear juridically valid.
472
 Once again, these allegations point to 
a post-Soviet political-criminal nexus which promotes Russia‘s foreign policy 
interests. Despite this, the document continues to be used in negotiations between 
the two states. 
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In the end, it took 4 years for the matter of the Russian Black Sea Fleet to be partially 
and temporarily resolved. The Black Sea Fleet Accords were signed in May 1997. 
Ukraine received 18.3% of the ships and the Russian Federation 81.7%.
473
  The 20-
year rental agreement stipulated that rather than paying Ukraine in kind market 
prices for the rental of the base and its infrastructure, the Russian Federation was to 
deduct an annual amount of $97.75 million from and (alleged) gas debt Ukraine had 
incurred since its independence.
474
 There are very many controversial aspects to the 
agreements. They include the unequal division and exceptionally low amount paid for 
the ships, the rental of the base and its infrastructure and, moreover, the reality that 
the entire agreement violates Ukraine‘s constitution, and arguably its transitional 
articles as well.  A number of sub-commissions have been created to address at 
least some of the problems which have arisen as a result. 
 
Sub-commissions for the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
The main hard power problems emanating from the presence of the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet are dealt with by the special sub-commissions for the stationing of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet. There four key areas: 1) questions related to navigation 
hydrographic support systems (NHS); 2) inventory; 3) environmental damage caused 
by the Black Sea Fleet and; 4) Russian intelligence services.  In regard to point 4, it 
has been noted that Russian secret services give effect to of Moscow‘s policies 
which transform the rather peaceful city of Sevastopol into a territory of social 
upheaval which receives international media attention.
475
 Thus, the role played by 
Russia‘s intelligence services in causing socio-political havoc in Crimea is of 
paramount importance for the research at hand. It points to strategic use of soft 
power by the Russian Federation inside Ukraine. Thus, it is considered in detail in the 
following chapter.  
 The other three areas of contention relate (mainly) to Ukraine‘s tangible 
power potential in serious ways. It is not the purpose of this study to provide a 
detailed account of the problems associated with inventory, hydrographic 
navigational systems or the environment - although the issues are worthy of 
attention, and are not without impact on Ukraine‘s soft power security. Thus, it is is 
necessary to present them, at the very least, briefly.  
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Inventory 
One of the largest problems regarding the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet is the fact 
that Ukraine has been unable to inventorize the lands, buildings or technical 
materials in use by the fleet. This is because the Russian forces would not allow 
Ukraine to take inventory of these properties. Importantly, according to Ukrainian law, 
inventory is a crucial element of a rental agreement without which a rental agreement 
cannot exist.
476
 Thus, some Ukrainian experts have argued that there is no rental 
agreement at all between the Russians and Ukrainians because the necessary 
inventorisation has never taken place.  
 Virtually no inventory has been made of the majority of technical materials. 
The exact number of technical instruments and other materials in use by the Russian 
Federation - as well as the profit earned by their (illegal) sale or sub-rental by the 
Russians to third parties is likely never to be known. Another scandal refers to the 
sale by Russia of Ukrainian property, including the Sevastopol ship repair yard of the 
BSF (known as 13th ship repair factory BSF).
477
 Furthermore, it is estimated that only 
1/3 of the wharves are used by the RBSF in the designated manner,  the fleet ―has 
not yet returned to the local authorities a large amount of land and objects including 
18 parcels of land (totaling over 23 hectares) on the territories of the cities of 
Feodosia, Yalta, Evpatoria, Saki and areas of the Black Sea. For some ―unknown 
reason‖ these territories are not included in the appendix to the 1997 agreement.‖
478
  
According to the Main Department of Land Resources of the City of Sevastopol, the 
Russian side unlawfully exploits 121 parcels of land (total about 37 hectares) with 
over 160 objects of real-estate, 10 marinas and 42 shore reinforcements 6.2 
thousand meters in length.
479
 
 The Ukrainian side purports that thousands of hectares of Ukrainian land and 
at least one public road are illegally occupied by the Russian forces in Crimea. The 
assertion regarding the road was verified in 2007. Armed Russian officers stood at a 
barrier in the middle of the road leading up to a radio center and dolphinarium. The 
soldiers refused the car entry and ordered it to turn around. It was only after the 
driver insisted to be permitted to pass, stating it was a Ukrainian road and we were 
wished to visit the dolphinarium, did the Russian officer permit access to the road.
480
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The reason for this continued situation may be that there are official and unofficial 
appendixes. According to two sources, the formally accepted appendixes which list 
the objects and territories rented to the Russian Black Sea Fleet are not the active 
ones, particularly a secret map apparently exists in which the territories currently 
occupied are identified and agreed upon. To date however, it has not been possible 
to verify the veracity of these claims.  
 
Navigation Hydrographic Support (NHS) Systems 
A number of Hydro-navigational systems belonging to Ukraine have been allegedly 
occupied by the Russian forces. This includes lighthouses and the Mars-75 station 
which transmits exact navigational information to ships, also known as ―the sailor‘s 
eyes‖.
481
 The occupation of these systems is particularly problematic because it 
violates an integral part of its sovereignty as it prevents Ukraine from fulfilling its 
international obligation of securing the safety of its territorial waters (in accordance 
with the UN Convention on Law of the Sea). Ukraine, as well as other maritime 
states, is legally responsible for the navigational hydrographic support for the 
navigation in their territorial waters before other states. Therefore, according to 
Ukraine‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ―undisguised unwillingness of Russia to 
convey to the Ukrainian party its pertinent entities of infrastructure of the navigational 
hydrographic support (hereinafter referred to as ―NHS‖) of navigation security located 
at the coast of the Crimean peninsula from the Tarhankut cape to the Ayu-Dag cape 
disenables Ukraine to fulfill its international obligations in the sphere of ensuring 
navigation security and may result in unforeseen consequences‖  furthermore, ―… 
The NHS located in the territory of Ukraine and kept by the Black Sea Fleet of the 
Russian Federation are not included in the said Annexes. Moreover, pursuant to the 
article 17 of the Act of Ukraine of the Admission Procedures and Disposition 
Conditions for Elements of Armed Forces of Foreign States in the Territory of Ukraine 
of March 19, 2003, the said entities are not subject to lease.
482
  
Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly called upon the Russian 
Federation to return immediately the navigational-hydrographic properties which are 
unlawfully used by the RBSF these calls have not been heeded. Moreover, on 16 
June 2009, the RBSF ignored yet another order, this time from the Kherson Oblast 
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court, thereby breaking international norms and laws as well as Ukrainian national 
laws and the 1997 treaty.
483
  
 The decisions of Ukrainian courts and functionaries are regularly blatantly 
disregarded, ―When court bailiffs tried to serve papers at a lighthouse here in August, 
they found themselves surrounded by armed troops from Russia‘s Black Sea Fleet 
who delivered them to police as if they were trespassing teenagers.‖
484
 Although 
such acts are apparently not new, a spokesman from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
expressed surprise at the behavior, ―The Ukrainian party does not accept and is 
amazed at the statements of the Russian party on non-recognition of the court 
decrees of Ukraine in the NHS entities as such position contradicts the international 





The RBSF allegedly causes serious and repeated environmental damage to the 
aquatic life in the Black Sea. This includes chemical waste, exhaust materials related 
to the war machinery as well as the pollution of Sevastopol‘s bays with oil spills.
486
 
However, as is the case with other Ukrainian authorities, the environmental 
protection agency has struggled to gain access to affected areas. Moreover, the 
damage to the water and sea life by the Fleet‘s operations occurs without any sort of 
notification or reparations. 
 
Linkages to informal gas deals 
Some may argue that the division of the fleet and the manner in which it was done 
belongs to the realm of normal interstate relations. However, it is important to bear in 
mind that, at the time, most of the functionaries were former higher communist party 
members, who for many years served their republics under the direct orders of the 
Kremlin. One must also be reminded that the former nomenklatura has been 
identified as one of the social-networks belonging to the post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus. Of course, not all former higher communist party members belong to Russia‘s 
political-criminal nexus. However, as it pertains to the uneven division of the Black 
Sea Fleet and the violation of Ukraine‘s constitution in regard, it is necessary to 
consider a number of actors involved, particularly, Pavlo Lazarenko, the Ukrainian 
Prime Minister who signed the Black Sea Fleet Accords. Important links appear to 
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exist between the Russian Black Sea Fleet, his business dealings as they pertain to 
natural gas, Ukraine‘s gas debt and Yulia Tymoshenko.  
 Pavlo Lazarenko was Prime Minister for a short period between 28 May 1996 
and 2 July 1997. According to UN estimates, during this period he embezzled 
approximately $200 million USD through shady natural gas and oil deals and kick-
backs from private companies given the ―right‖ to exploit Ukraine‘s natural gas.
487
 In 
Ukraine, the charges against him are more serious. The prosecutor general has 
accused him of murder, money laundering and the embezzlement of approximately 
800 million USD.
488  
 According to the Lead Prosecutor at Lazarenko‘s trial Martha Boersch, at the 
time Lazarenko was in power: ―If you wanted to do business in Ukraine at the time, 
you had to go through Lazarenko fifty-fifty: 50% of your profit and 50% of your 
business‖.
489
 At this time Yulia Tymoshenko, one of the leaders of the 2004-2005 
Orange Revolution, was a business woman in Ukraine, and, involved with 
Lazarenko‘s dealings. In fact, in the early 1990‘s when Lazarenko became the first 
Vice-Prime Minister for Energy, she and her husband Alexander Tymoshenko and 
Alexander Gravitz formed an energy company called United Energy Systems of 
Ukraine (UESU). According to former Federal Prosecutor Jonathan Howden, that 
company received the right to distribute natural gas in Ukraine and, ―a 
disproportionate number of state contracts in the form of gas were directed from 
Russia to UESU causing ―a tremendous transfer of wealth to this company at the 
expense of the public purse‖.
490
 Howden asserts that ―UESU was supposed to 
distribute Russian natural gas in Ukraine, get the money for it and then, as it turned 
out, they ultimately would share half of their profits with Lazarenko. That was the 
deal: in exchange for the right to distribute, he would get half of their profits. What 
actually happened is UESU would have another off-shore shell company called UEIL 
receive the money rather than UESU so that the money was taken out of Ukraine, 




 According to Boersch, the Lazarenko-Tymoshenko tandem is at the root of 
many Ukrainian-Russian crises. ―Because the money was being siphoned off by 
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Lazarenko and Tymoshenko, Ukraine at the time, as they have today, ran up a huge 
gas debt to Gazprom and by the end of 1996 they owed RAO-Gazprom, which was 
the primary Russian supplier of natural gas about 200 million dollars. And so they 
went through the whole crisis with Russia… with respect to Ukraine‘s debt to Russia 
for the natural gas. Had the money not gone into Lazarenko‘s pockets perhaps they 
may not have had the debt that they have.‖
492
 Coincidentally, less than two months 
before Lazarenko was dismissed in 1997, he signed the anti-constitutional Black Sea 
Fleet Accords based on Ukraine‘s gas debt.  
 The following year Lazarenko and Tymoshenko ran from the same party 
ticket in Ukraine‘s 1998 Parliamentary election. However, Lazarenko was destined to 
stand trial in the United States. Yulia Tymoshenko‘s status in the case remained – 
interestingly - an ―unindicted co-conspirator‖. Most of the counts against her relating 
to UESU were dismissed for lack of direct evidence. According to Jason Felch, an 
investigative reporter for the L.A. Times, the reason Tymoshenko remained an 
―unindicted co-conspirator‖ was closely related to US interests and geopolitics than 
one may initially expect. Felch asserts Tymoshenko was not indicted because ―the 
political interests of the United States government, at the highest level, probably 
didn‘t want Yulia Tymoshenko drawn into the Lazarenko case. Less than one year 
after Lazarenko was convicted, Ms. Tymoshenko became the first female and pro-
democratic Prime Minister in Ukraine‘s history.‖
493
 
In Ukraine, the authorities charged Lazarenko with organizing the murder of 
Ukrainian MP Yevhen Shcherban and his wife, the former President of Ukraine‘s 
national bank, Vadym Hetman and others.
494
 Based on these charges, Ukraine 
requested his extradition from the United States. However, he remained in the US 
and was convicted for embezzlement in 2006. Paradoxically, and indicative of how 
deeply embedded the political-criminal nexus in Ukraine is, the convicted criminal 
promised to return to Ukrainian politics. In 2006, he won a seat in absentia in the 
Dnipropetrovsk‘s Oblast. To date, he remains in prison in the United States. 
However, a most curious controversy, which has received very little attention, 
requires consideration here. It pertains to the aforementioned gas debt which played 
a key role in Black Sea Fleet negotiations between the Ukrainians and Russians.  
 In 2006, during an interview with a top level executive at Ukraine‘s Foreign 
Ministry it was mentioned that the Ukrainian state did not have gas debt for the 
period 1991-1997. Moreover, it was asserted that the amount set in the Black Sea 
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Fleet accord was, in fact, made up by those with a vested personal interest in money 
and keeping Ukraine dependent on the Russian Federation. This is a very serious 
allegation. If true, it points to high-level transnational organized criminal activity as 
well as the subversive nature of the political-criminal nexus within Ukraine. 
Unfortunately, the executive did not offer any more details.  
 However, more than 3 years later, in 2008, a similar (this time public) 
allegation was made. The Chief of Ukraine‘s intelligence (SBU), Valentin 
Nalyvaichenko stated, ―I know for sure that the sum of the debt allegedly 
accumulated between 1991 and 1997 was actually spun out of thin air…‖
 495
 
Curiously, if both Nalyvaichenko and the top Ukrainian official both have knowledge 
and proof that the debt has been ―spun out of thin air‖, and since Ukraine‘s 
democratic government  did nothing about it, such allegations  indicate the corrupt 
nature of certain post-Soviet government officials in the upper political echelons of 
Ukraine and Russia. They are also indicative of how the political-criminal nexus 
embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars from Ukraine‘s citizens and simultaneously 
lowered the capacity of Ukraine‘s own institutions and perhaps even made the state 
pay for it by allowing a foreign military presence on their territory.   
 After the 2004 election of Victor Yushchenko, Ukraine‘s first pro-Western 
president, the Russian Federation intensified its aggressive foreign policy towards 
Ukraine. Preceding Ukraine‘s vote for democratic leadership, an agreement was 
signed by the two states. It stipulated the price Ukraine would pay Russia‘s energy 
monopoly Gazprom was fixed at $50/1000m3 for the period 2004 - 2009.
496
 Then, in 
the dead of winter on 1 January 2006, amid accusations that Ukraine was stealing 
gas designated for the European market, the Russian Federation shut down its gas 
supplies to Ukraine. In violation of the aforementioned agreement, the Russian 
Federation demanded Ukraine pay market prices for the gas and insisted the price 
increase was not connected to Ukraine‘s democratic choice. Rather, it simply 
proclaimed its lost desire to subsidize post-Soviet states and Ukraine was ordered to 
pay $130/m3 which was closer to market prices for the gas.
497
  
 Gas and talk of market prices brought the issue of the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet to surface again in the news. It also called Ukraine‘s territorial sovereignty into 
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question.  In response to the price hikes for Russian gas, the Ministry of Defense of 
Ukraine stated that Russia should prepare to start paying market prices for its 
stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea and, what is more, to prepare to leave 
Ukrainian territory in 2017.
498
 The Russian Minister of Defense, Sergei Ivanov, 
responded, with a thinly disguised threat of taking Crimea away from Ukraine.  
 He stated that a revision of the rent contract might lead to the renunciation of 
the 1997 Friendship Treaty.
 499
 This was an outright threat because this is the treaty 
in which Russia recognizes the 1954 borders of Ukraine. And, 1954 is the year 
Crimea was transferred to Ukraine.
500
 Several Russian legislators chimed in. Unlike 
Ivanov however, they were explicit. For instance, Duma MP Faction LLPR A. 
Savelyev asserted: ―The return of entire Ukraine to Russia is more realistic than just 
the return of Crimea…. The country is on the brink of federalization, and this is why it 
will enter the Russian Federation gradually, with individual subjects signing 
agreements regarding entry into the Russian Federation‖.
501
 Other Duma members 
exclaimed, "Sooner or later the Crimea will be reclaimed," and, "To make the Crimea 
again part of Russia will be an absolutely right decision."
502
  
 As chaotic and self-loathing as the Orange Coalition was, its Presidential 
Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense were consistent 
with notifications pertaining to the fleet. In accordance with Article 25 of the 1997 
Agreement governing the status and stationing of the RBSF, the Russian Federation 
had been informed the treaty would terminate in 2017 and Russian forces were 
requested to prepare departure accordingly.
503
  
 The Russians appeared to ignore such notifications and requests. However, 
their soft power approach toward the Crimean peninsula intensified. An internal, 
document from Ukraine‘s intelligence in Crimea noted that Russian and Crimean 
mass media organized a large PR-campaign to spread commentaries of Russian 
military-political experts accentuating the unacceptability of the removal of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet from Crimea after 2017. One of the ways this was done was 
by increasing the number of local pro-Russian publications (e.g. Russkaya 
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Obshchyna Sevastopolya, Ruskiy Sevastopol, Ruskiy Blok Sevastopolya and 
Rusychi). These papers are printed under preferential conditions ―pilhovykh 
umovakh‖ by the Russian Black Sea Fleet‘s typography of Flag Rodyny (owned by 
the Russian Ministry of Defense).
504
  
 That year in Sevastopol alone, the average monthly circulation of pro-Russian 
press (25,000) was proven to have doubled from the preceding year.
505
 The same 
internal document also identified the use of Russian owned media including ―NTB‖ 
and information agencies (New Region-Crimea, REGNUM-Krym) as instrumental in 
dispersing provocative claims and comments by Russian functionaries regarding the 
Ukrainian status of Sevastopol and Crimea. Moreover, direct comparisons were 
made with Transdniestria, Ossetia and Kosovo.
506
  Such articles clearly aimed at 
influencing the perceptions of the Crimean population and targeted Ukraine‘s soft 
power, particularly, the perceived relevance of the Orange Coalition‘s national 
security strategy.   
 Ukraine‘s selected path to democracy and Euro-Atlantic integration was 
perceived by Moscow as particularly threatening to its power in the Black Sea 
Region. Moscow did not appreciate the presence of Western powers, particularly 
NATO, in states it perceives as belonging to its ―exclusive sphere of influence‖.
507
 
Ukraine‘s intelligence services identified interference in the development of Ukraine-
NATO relations and promotion of a reorientation of interests towards Russia as the 
main assignment of Russian secret services in Ukraine.
508
 Numerous anti-NATO 
demonstrations were indeed organized throughout Ukraine, particularly in Crimea. 
One particular demonstration impacted Ukraine‘s foreign policy in a hitherto unseen 
fashion. It deserves special attention.   
 
Operation Sea Breeze 
In 2006, accession to NATO was still a part of its foreign and defense policy. That 
year, the Sea Breeze exercise involved personnel from 17 NATO member states and 
partners and was to be held (mainly) in Crimea. The NATO countries participated in 
the joint Ukraine-US cooperative undertaking, under US leadership and within the 
framework of NATO‘s Partnership for Peace. It had been held in Crimea almost every 
year since 1997 and was crucial to achieving interoperability with allied forces. At the 
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time, failure to hold such exercises would have negatively impacted the perception of 
Ukraine as well as its chances of receiving a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). 
 The exercise was aborted as a result of well-organized demonstrations. The 
rallies and demonstrations were organized by the Russian Crimean Community 
under the official leadership of the Party of Regions, the Natalia Vitrenko Bloc 
Progressive Socialist Party, which supports the unification of Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, and the Communists. Together with pro-Russian NGOs, the protesters 
claimed that the preparations for the exercises were unlawful due to the absence of 
parliamentary approval for the exercise.
509
 With support from the Party of Region 
deputies,  anti-Western, mainly Russian protesters interdicted the movement of U.S. 
military personnel and equipment in Crimea‘s Feodosiya. According to Eurasia expert 
Vladimir Socor: 
 
―Some 250 marine reservists, who had landed on May 27-28 to 
prepare the Sea Breeze exercise, left aboard two U.S. military 
transport planes from Simferopol on June 11-12. Originally tasked 
to upgrade the Staryy Krym training range near Feodosiya, the 
American group was stopped en route by protesters, was then 
denied hotel accommodation, and had to spend two weeks under 
military protection in a Ukrainian naval hotel. They faced 
vociferous round-the-clock pickets recruited from the usual mix of 
Sovietophile pensioners and young Russian nationalists, with a 
sprinkling of pseudo-Cossacks (this organization is not indigenous 
to the Crimea), all mobilized by loyal chapters of pro-Russian 
parties in Ukraine. Similar groups blocked the U.S. military 
equipment in the port of Feodosiya‘s customs area after the ship 




It has been reported that the pro-Russian group allied itself with Russian Federal 
Intelligence (FSB), the Russian military intelligence (GRU) and military officers to 
incite anti-US and anti-NATO demonstrations, pickets and rallies in the Crimea. 
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Moreover, it is asserted that Russia not only supplied intelligence on the location and 
plans for military exercises, it sent its own personnel to increase attendance at the 
rallies and demonstrations.
511
 An additional example of their activity is the 
publication of a series of articles on 3, 7, and 14, June 2006 in the newspaper 
―Krymskaya Pravda‖, an anti-Ukrainian publication promoting Russian unity.
512
  
 In these articles the scenario for the planned Breeze exercise was exposed 
and analyzed as clearly hostile to Russia. Ukraine‘s Intelligence services identified 
these articles as a ―provocative interpretation‖ of the NATO command post exercise 
cooperative Marlin – 2006 which was planned to take place in September in Crimea. 
Their contents ―contain anti-NATO sentiment and are aimed at creating a negative 
opinion within the Crimean population towards the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and 
the [Western] politico-military block.‖
513
 This set of articles was, of course, not the 
only news coverage. In fact, the protests against NATO and the pro-Russia rallies 
made headlines around the world.  
 The majority of local pro-Russian, leftist and Cossak organizations, which 
carried out anti-NATO actions in Feodosiya, were also widely reported and shown by 
Russian mass media.
514
 Yet, these the rallies, and the coverage they received are 
claimed to have been strategically deceptive. According to J. Marson, despite being 
relatively small, they were well coordinated and set-up precisely to use pro-Russian 
media to spread around the image of anti-Western sentiment in Ukraine.
515
  
The Ukrainian authorities showed themselves uncoordinated. Their lack of 
unity resulted in a Kyiv editorialist of Zerkalo Nedeli, one of Ukraine‘s most influential 
newspapers, to observe that the area had become not only ―NATO-free‖ but also 
―government-free‖.
516
 The analysts of this newspaper pointed to the presence of the 
RBSF as an instrument used by the Russian Federation to influence Ukraine‘s 
political course.
517
 It would be an exaggeration to assert that these operations 
subverted the external legitimacy of Ukraine. However, Kyiv‘s lack of reaction did 
indicate the weakness of its national leadership. 
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 The anti-NATO and anti-US rallies of June 2006 in Crimea reinforced the 
concerns of those NATO members who deemed Kiev‘s membership aspiration as 
impracticable in the near future.
518
 Although in the following years the exercises did 
take place according to schedule, the impact the thwarted exercises had on 
Ukraine‘s reputation became clear during the NATO Budapest Summit in early 2008, 
when the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was not granted.   
  That same year, at a collegial meeting of the FSB, Russian President 
Medvedev also made direct reference to the use of its intelligence service to prevent 
the NATO accession of both Georgia and Ukraine. He stated, ―An unstable social-
political situation has come to pass in our neighboring countries, attempts to expand 
NATO were not stopped, particularly the attempt to speed up the process of Georgia 
and Ukraine‘s NATO membership. All this understandably required efficient and 
effective work of all structures of the special services, and law enforcement agencies 
and finally, a very high lever of coordination of their activities.
519
  
 Accordingly, Russia‘s representative to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, attempted to 
block Ukraine‘s drive to join NATO by openly connected Ukraine‘s NATO 
membership to its sovereignty over Crimea. He suggested that the only way Ukraine 
would be able to join the alliance would be if it were to give up Crimea.
520
 Also, 
Ukraine‘s staunch support of Georpgia and offer to discuss the integration of its 
early-warning missile systems with the West also apparently angered Moscow.
521
  
 A sharp rise in protest against Ukrainian government policies among the 
peoples of the peninsula also reflected Russia‘s intensified policy in Crimea.
522
 
Russia used its ―soft power‖ through pro-Russian organizations and media to attack 
Ukraine‘s soft power security, particularly its effective policy capability. And, although 
Ukraine‘s intelligence services regoconized this, the Ukrainian government continued 
not to address the issues effectively. According to Marla Maigre, a prominent 
Estonian expert on Euro-Atlantic integration, while Russia was ―holding all the cards 
to destabilize Crimea, the political forces in Kyiv lacked the ability to reach a 
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 Already before the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008, western analysts 
noted the phenomenon of Russian backed separatism in the other pro-Western 
states in the post-Soviet Black Sea Region. Observing Russian activities in Crimea 
Vladimir Socor, a leading Eurasia expert at the Jamestown Foundation in 
Washington, foreshadowed that these activities ―may be a warning to Ukraine that 
Russia might orchestrate something.‖
524
 Other experts asserted the possibility of pro-
Russian separatism infecting Crimea was ―a matter of deep concern‖.
525
 These 
―warnings‖ may have been directed towards Ukraine, the other post-Soviet States in 
the Black Sea Region or the transatlantic community. Most likely, in one way or 
another, it was a warning to all three.  
 When the Russian-Georgian war broke out in August 2008, the Russian 
Federation used Ukraine‘s constitutionally neutral territory to launch Black Sea Fleet 
operations against Ukraine‘s (democratizing) ally.
526
 The weakness of Ukraine‘s 
policy toward Crimea, combined with its support of Georgia, led to an illegitimate 
move in Sevastopol. First, President Yushchenko passed two decrees to restrict the 
ability of the fleet to move in and out of Sevastopol without Ukrainian authorization. 
Yet, when the Black Sea Fleet ignored these decrees, the Ukrainian president did not 
seek to enforce the.
527
  
 Then the Crimean Parliament called for the recognition of South Ossetia as 
an independent state. Despite its lack of any mandate or mechanisms to do so, it 
planned to adopt a similar resolution on the situation in Georgia. Rumblings of pro-
Russian separatism were also heard. At the time, SBU Chief Valentin Nalyvaichenko 
expressed astonishment at the move. He asked: ―What do the authorities of 
Sevastopol have to do with this issue of interstate relations?
 
 How can any city 
council raise the issue without taking into consideration the position of the Foreign 
Ministry, the President, and the Parliament?‖
528
  
 Once again, security analysts shifted their focus to Sevastopol and the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. However, in the face of all this, Nalyvaichenko 
moved to discredit the separatist sentiment by asserting it was manufactured and 
that there were no real social or economic reasons for the increasing political tension 
                                               
524 Socor, personal communication. 
525 Cohen 2008, Blank 2007. 
526 The Russian Black Sea Fleet also used Ukrainian territory to train and launch operations in Chechenya.   
527 Kuzio T. (2009 b). SBU Challenges the FSB in Crimea, in Eurasia Daily Monitor , Jamestown Foundation, Volume: 6 Issue: 134, posted 14 
July. Available at: 
<http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35261&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=485&no_cache=1> 
528 Mostovaya.  
 - 150 - 
in Crimea.
529
 And, indeed, nothing happened… at least not on the local level. Rather, 
a remarkable turn of events followed the November 2008 election of a Democratic 
Party President Barrack Hussein Obama in the United States.  
 
The US and Russia 
The United States, ―overloaded‖ by the rising tensions faced by the Allied Forces in 
the Middle East, required more Russian support in Afghanistan as well as in its 
dealings in Iraq and against Iran in the United Nations Security Council.
530
 This 
resulted in the US Administration‘s 2009 presentation to the Russians, in Geneva, of 
a ―Reset Button‖. According to US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, the bright 
yellow plastic box centered with a large red button symbolized America‘s desire to 
reset its relations with the Russian Federation. Russia‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Sergei Lavrov accepted the little yellow box, but how far back in time the reset would 
reach, remained uncertain.  
 In August of 2009, Medvedev issued a letter to Ukraine demanding policy 
reversals from its new government, including an end to its bid to join NATO.  He also 
introduced a bill which was interpreted by some experts as targeting Crimea namely, 
the authorization to use Russian troops to protect Russian citizens and speakers 
abroad.
531
 Less than one year after the US proposed to ―reset‖ US-Russia relations, 
a ―Russia-friendly‖ president and government came to power in Ukraine and 
discussions of separatism in Crimea silenced.  
Markedly, in this regard, just a few months after taking office, on 22 April 
2010, and in contradiction to Ukraine‘s former administration‘s five-year-long policy, 
President Yanukovich and his Russian counterpart Dmitri Medvedev signed the 
Kharkiv Accords. The two presidents extended the Russian Federation‘s Black Sea 
Fleet rental agreement to the year 2042. A mere 4 days later, in the midst of protests 
and an embarrassing outbreak of egg-throwing and smoke-bomb hooliganism in 
Ukraine‘s Verkhovna Rada (the High Council), Ukraine‘s government ratified the 
agreement, regardless its unconstitutional nature. They secured the Russian 
Federation with a presence in Crimea and naval control over the post-Soviet security 
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subcomplex in the Black Sea Region. Once again, gas deals were connected to the 
stationing of the fleet. In exchange for a 30 percent cut in the price of its supplies of 
natural gas to Ukraine, Russia received unconstitutional permission to base its fleet 
in Ukraine. The West remained still. 
 Not everyone was happy with the deal. In Crimea, the agreement unsettled 
Crimean Tatars. Mustafa Jemilev, the leader of the Majilis of Crimean Tatars noted 
that the Black Sea Fleet in Crimea inspires pro-Russian separatists to commit anti-
Ukrainian actions, constituting a threat to Ukraine‘s territorial integrity. He stated: ―To 
us, there should be no foreign military bases in the territory of Ukraine, especially of 
those countries which political force lays territorial claims to Ukraine. Taking into 
account participation of the Black Sea Fleet in [the] Russian-Georgian conflict of 
2008, we think this fleet menaces Ukraine to be drawn into other‘s wars.‖
532
  
 Back in Kyiv, the ratification of the Kharkiv Agreement caused an outcry from 
Ukraine‘s pro-democratic elite. Maintaining his position, former President 
Yushchenko asserted: ―If society today turns a blind eye to the Kharkiv agreement, it 
is possible that it will be the biggest loss to our sovereignty and independence.‖
533
 
The Our Ukraine party called for the impeachment of President Yanukovich for 
violating the norms of the Ukrainian Constitution which forbid foreign military bases 
on Ukrainian territory.
534
 Noting the illegitimate and coup-like behavior of President 
Yanukovich, Yulia Tymoshenko exclaimed: ―Everything that happened today is 
unconstitutional, just like everything that Yanukovich has done since coming to 
power.‖
535
 Former Head of the Presidential Secretariat, Viktor Baloha, also criticized 
the deal: ―The Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol is an ideological 
headquarters for feeding separatist movements in Crimea.‖
536
 Parliamentary deputy 
and former Minister of Defense, Anatoly Hrytsenko, expressed his dismay with the 
unconstitutional situation noting the Russians should be charged closer to $1 billion 
for renting the Sevastopol base and schemes linking natural gas prices to the rental 
agreement for the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, although nothing new, should be 
stopped.
537
 Yuriy Scherbak, Ukraine‘s former Ambassador to the United States 
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Back in Moscow, Russia‘s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin applauded the signing of the 
Kharkiv Accords and alluded to the Russo-Ukrainian friendship: ―The most important 
aspect of the deal is not gas or stationing of the fleet, no matter how important these 
are to Ukraine. He continued: ―The most important aspect of the deal is relations 





Before considering the role played by by the political-criminal nexus in Sevastopol 
and the rest of Crimea, it is important to underline t that Ukraine‘s law and legal 
institutions have had little effect in its relations with  the Russian Black Sea Fleet. 
According to the Ukrainian constitution, Ukrainian Courts have jurisdiction over all 
legal relations arising upon the territory of Ukraine.
540
 However, the main reason that 
the problems surrounding the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet remain unresolved is 
because the Russian Federation refuses to accept the jurisdiction of Ukraine‘s law or 
courts over these issues.  
 The Russian side relies on an article contained in the 1997 Agreement on the 
mutual settlements between Russia and Ukraine related to the division of the Black 
Sea Fleet and its stationing on Ukrainian Territory.
541
 Article 6 stipulates that any 
conflicts or disagreements in interpretation shall be resolved by a mixed commission. 
In case that commission is unable to settle the matter, Article 6 provides the dispute 
shall be resolved through diplomatic channels in the shortest period possible. Thus, 
despite Ukraine‘s calls for the recognition and abidance of its laws and court 
decisions this article has rendered Ukrainian institutions virtually helpless against 
matters affecting its power and national security in the Black Sea Region. The use of 
diplomatic channels appears to have done more to preserve the stalemate than 
resolve it.  
 Unfortunately, Article 6 is not the only cause for this. Internal divisions and a 
general lack of rule of law in Ukraine exacerbate the problem. Even the president of 
the country himself was unable to get legal recourse when he asked the court to rule 
                                               
538 Ibid.  
539 Ibid.  
540 Logvinets, V. (Логвинец, В.),  (2009). A Trouble-maker named The Russian Black Sea Fleet: about the Mars-75 station and more 
(―Беспредельщик‖ по имени ЧФ РФ: о станции «Марс-75» и не только), written for ФЛОТ2017,  posted 03 July. Available at: 
<http://flot2017.com/show/opinions/8305> 
541 Semenov, V. (2007, 2008). Ambassador Plenipotentiary, Head of Russian Black Sea Fleet Negotiations Subcommittee, personal 
communications, Kyiv. 
 - 153 - 
on the legality of the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet, ―The court refused to rule on 




 The lack of rule of law in Ukraine is a major impediment to its national security 
and political-institutional strength, particularly in regard to Crimea. There, the 
situation is reportedly worse because the government in Kyiv could neither manage 
to integrate Crimea in Ukraine political and social context nor resist the growing 
influence from Russia.
543
 The former Representative of the President of Ukraine in 
Crimea has been quoted as saying that every Ukrainian National Security and 
Defense Council meeting can only state the fact that its previous decisions on 
Crimea have not been implemented, ―Crimean authorities throw these decisions 
away and they have never been punished‖.
544
 The national government lacks 




 Another unusual and detrimental fact, as it pertains to the rule of law in 
Crimea, is that the Russian Federation has set up its own Persecutor General‘s office 
and courts in Sevastopol. Thus, it not only disregards Ukrainian judicial rulings, it has 
created its own effective judicial system on Ukrainian territory. Its presence is the 
result of a mixture of being a remnant of Soviet times and a ―Friendship Treaty‖ 
between Ukraine and Russia. This situation however is rarely spoken of, but the 
former Minister Boris Tarasyuk did ask, ―How can it be explained that there are acting 
Prosecutor Offices and courts of another state on the territory of Ukraine?‖
546
 The 
question appears to remain a rhetorical one although it is indicative of how deeply 
embedded Russia‘s institutional power is in Crimea.  
 It is in this light that one should consider the fact that it was during years of 
Ukraine‘s pro-democratic administration that pro-Russian sentiment in Crimea 
continued to rise. In 2008, Vasyl Ovcharuk, a Ukrainian Crimean political activist 
forewarned: ―Moscow has laid the foundation for the occupation of Crimea with years 
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of careful propaganda.‖
547
 Was it true? Did Ukraine really run the risk of loosing 
Sevastopol and Crimea and if so, how? 
3.1.3 Sevastopol: an eyewitness account 
The Crimean question seemed intimately linked to Sevastopol and the Black Sea 
Fleet. Thus, I expressed an interest to learn more about the linkages between 
alleged subversion, transgressions of the law and the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 
Crimea to the then Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Boris Tarasyuk. And, he 
recommended a meeting with the Head of the Ukrainian part of the sub-commission 
for the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine.  
 My first meeting with Ambassador Extraordinary Viktor Semenov took place in 
the early winter of 2007. In an office overlooking Kyiv‘s snow covered cliffs and trees, 
the robust man in his sixties, with dark, thick eyebrows and a large frame towered 
over his desk. Another striking view was revealed when he stood up to shake hands. 
Viktor Semenov was missing one leg and more than one half of his ring finger. 
Despite (or perhaps because of) his older age and disfigurements, Semenov 
possessed an impressive physical stature; a posture and physique that demanded 
reverence.   
The welcoming gentleman kindly introduced himself an ethnic Russian, a 
doctor (kandidat) of technical engineering and a former Soviet basketball star. He 
then asked how he could be of help. After being  informed of the interest to learn 
more about the how the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea 
deteriorated Ukraine‘s power potential and the possibility of connecting the fleet to 
pro-Russian separatist sentiment and transnational organized crime, Semenov, 




 The time of Semenov‘s reign (early 1990s) was the period of ―buccaneer 
capitalism‖ and privatization in the former Soviet Union. It was a period when the 
―ultra-bureaucratized administrative system, its lack of adequate laws, and its lawless 
Sovietized culture combined to merge rampant government corruption not only with 
organized fringe criminal groups, but with highly organized, regimented, and 
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disciplined structures at the core of the system. The individuals who headed and ran 




 In Sevastopol, the situation was particularly acute as the threat of looming 
separatism and the Russian Black Sea Fleet transformed the city and the rest of the 
Crimean peninsula into a security hot spot. This combination was particularly volatile 
as, ―In essence, the highest echelons of Russian post-Soviet power wanted to put 
pressure on Ukraine via the threat of a civil conflict in Crimea (and Russia‘s direct 
military interference in it) in order to secure its access to Sevastopol – the 
headquarters of Russia‘s Black Sea Fleet.‖
550
 
Semenov came to power in the Sevastopol city council in 1992 after the 
acting mayor, Ivan Yermakov, had been appointed Representative of the Ukrainian 
President and Head of the City Administration (gorgosadministratsia). It was not long 
before Semenov‘s city council clashed with Yermakov‘s city administration. The clash 
concerned the city‘s communal property fund. In December 1992, under Semenov‘s 
leadership, the city council moved to create its own inventory of Sevastopol‘s 
communal property. This spurred a negative reaction from Yermakov who considered 
the move an unacceptable creation of parallel structures that would complicate 
oversight and control of the city‘s property and ownership thereof.
551
 Nonetheless, 
the work of the city council continued.  
 Then in 1993, while Russia moved to break Sevastopol away from Ukraine, 
both Yermakov and Semenov found themselves in the center of another immense 
conflict. It pertained to the Black Sea Fleet. This time, both functionaries were faced 
with the construction of yet another parallel structure. This time, the Sevastopol 
Veche (popular assembly) had created its own Russian National Council of the City 
of Sevastopol. Both Yeremenko and Semenov recognized a substantial number of 
their citizens held a pro-Russian position but criticized the creation of the illegitimate 
entity. 
 In the elections which took place later in 1993, Semenov played the Russian 
card by appealing to pro-Russian groupings and won the mayoral race. On 10 July 
1993, the Russian Duma, without the participation of a majority of Yeltsin‘s 
supporters, declared Sevastopol a Federal Russian city. Just over one year later, on 
23 August 1994, Semenov signed a decree of the Sevastopol City Council which 
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proclaimed the city an integral part of the Russian Federation, confirmed Sevastopol 
as the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and appealed to the Presidents of 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Yeltsin and Kuchma respectively, to accept the 
decision and resolve the Black Sea Fleet problems accordingly and without delay.
552
  
 Semenov recalled the extremely angry telephone call he received from a 
―hollering‖ President Kuchma after the president received word of the renegade 
decision taken by Semenov‘s Sevastopol city council. One might think that a mayor 
who not only allowed his council to supersede all of its mandate but also signed a 
decision subjugating a strategic city and navy base to a third state would be 
immediately relieved of his duties, if not prosecuted for treason. Remarkably 
however, Kyiv disregarded the council‘s decision and chose not to interfere with 
Semenov‘s status in Sevastopol. In fact, Semenov not only managed to hold his 
office, on 19 July 1995, President Kuchma appointed him Head of the City 
Administration (gorhosadministratsia). Replacing Yermakov, he became the 
President‘s representative in in Sevastopol.  
 This displeased the pro-Russian population in Sevastopol. And, after 
Semenov acquired this position, a split occurred between him the pro-Russian 
forces. This split was perhaps most publicly marked by protests against him that took 
place on 24 July 1995. Pro-Russian forces gathered in front of his offices and 
chanted anti-Semenov slogans such as, ―Прочь наместника президента Украины 
(Away with the Deputy of the President of Ukraine)", "Семенов - гауляйтер 
украинских оккупантов (Semenov is a representative of the Ukrainian occupiers)", 
"Семенов предал российскую идею (Semenov betrayed the Russian idea)", 




 On 11 October 1996, a remarkably terrifying thing happened to the man. 
Viktor Semenov was the target of an assassination attempt. Upon returning home for 
lunch, a car bomb exploded ripping off half his leg and causing other grave bodily 
harm to him and his driver.
554
 Back in Moscow, less than 2 weeks after the 
assassination attempt, the Duma moved, once again, to use the construed 1948 
document to assert Sevastopol was not a part of the 1954 Crimean handover to 
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Ukraine.
555
 No direct link has been established between Semenov‘s attempted 
assassination, Ukraine‘s intelligence services and the decree which he signed 
pledging Sevastopol as an integral part of the Russian Federation.  
 However, Semenov was linked to the political-criminal nexus in another way. 
Sergei Kondratevsky is an ethnic Ukrainian business man and former Deputy of 
Ukrainian Parliament. On 4 September 1994 he also became a victim of an 
assassination attempt.
556
 The period of Semenov‘s reign was a dangerous one for 
business and entrepreneurs. Interestingly, a private conflict existed between 
Semenov, his real-estate policies and Kondratevsky‘s business dealings in 
Sevastopol, i.e. The Financial Industrial House of the Kondratevsky‘s. In 1996, public 
attacks started to be published against Semenov in a newspaper under 
Kondratevsky‘s apparent order; газеты ―Вечерний Севастополь‖. In July 1996, 
Semenov sued the newspaper ―Вечерний Севастополь‖ for publishing the article 
―It‘s good to be Mayor (―Хорошо быть мэром‖).
557
 Eventually, ―at the request of 
Ukrainian law makers‖ Moscow lawmakers arrested the Sevastopol banker and 
entrepreneur Serhiy Kondratevsky for suspicion of embezzling 14 million.
558
 
 Whatever the true reasons are for his assassination attempt, Ambassador 
Semenov did not go into detail and simply concluded: ―They wanted me out of 
there.‖
559
 Later, it was decided in Kyiv to place Semenov safely outside of Ukraine for 
a number of years. In 1998, he was sent to Russia as Councilor General of Ukraine 
in St. Petersburg; a coveted diplomatic post. Semenov remained there for five years, 
and, according to him, when things ―ospokoyalys (calmed down)‖, he returned to 
Ukraine to serve as Ambassador Extraordinary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
continuing to maintain his Membership in the Ukrainian sub-commission for problems 
arising from the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.  
 Semenov relayed how a number of problems connected to the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet were intricately intertwined with Russia‘s struggle for power in Crimea. He 
described how Russian sailors penetrated the city by, for instance, patrolling the 
central train station of Sevastopol and the entire city center.  Ukrainian law prohibits 
the carrying of arms by representatives of the Russian Black Sea Fleet beyond the 
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fleet‘s bases and particulary in inhabited areas.
560
 Thus, the fact that armed Russian 
sailors are ordered to patrol the streets of Sevastopol, beyond the military bases to 
which they belong can be linked to the soft power component of the perception of 
territorial integrity. The fact that the Ukrainian government was unable to restrict the 
armed patrols lends to the perception of inaptitude of Ukraine‘s policies and 
institutions.  
 It is paramount that Russian Black Sea Fleet sailors have also been noted for 
regularly violating Ukraine‘s immigration laws. In 2009, Ukraine's Interior Ministry 
indicated that they account for 10% of the illegal immigrants in Sevastopol; in the first 
5 months of 2009 there were over 135 cases of sailors from Russia's Black Sea Fleet 
violating Ukrainian immigration laws.
561
 
 In the same vein, Semenov described Russian forces influencing the societal-
political mindset in Sevastopol by hanging Russian flags and plaques on city 
infrastructure, well beyond the military base parameters. The ―plaque and flag war‖ 
intensified particularly with the introduction of a pro-democratic administration in Kyiv. 
Already in 2005, Boris Tarasyuk commented on these issues: ―There are inscriptions 
Russian State Territory on objects which are situated on the territory of Ukraine. 
Russian flags wave everywhere. Russian patrols walk with personal weapons and 
block the whole street. It is abnormal‖.
562
 Later in 2006, Volodymyr Ohryzko, who 
eventually replaced Tarasyuk as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2007 commented: ―The 
use of posts and signs which state ―territory of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian 
Federation‖ is unlawful. There are no reasons for these signs to be there, it is not the 
territory of Russian Federation it is Ukrainian territory‖.
563
 Although the hanging of 
flags may not be a criminal offence, it is indicative of soft power operations aimed at 
influencing the perceptions of local civilians in systematic violation of Ukrainian laws.  
 Such behavior clearly impacts all categories of soft power security, i.e. the 
levels of cultural and territorial integration, collective memory and the strength of 
national leadership. In fact, in Sevastopol, an array of cultural-educative institutions 
aimed at promoting Russian politics and culture and influencing its socio-cultural 
environment are connected to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. They include, but are not 
limited to, the Officer‘s of the Fleet Building, the Theater of Lavrenov, the Moscow 
gallery and library, 8 structural subchapters of higher education institutions including 
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the Black Sea Branch of the Moscow State University named for Lomonosov with its 
own television studio (in which up to 4000 students study). There is also entire range 
of non-governmental organizations, i.e. Sevastopol branch of the Institute for CIS 
states and the Baltics, directed by Konstantin Zatulin, the ―Moscow-Sevastopol 




 Semenov spoke for some time about anti-Ukrainian organizations and a 
growing hate of all things Ukrainian in Crimea. It is likely that he recognized an 
astonished reaction to his accounts because at a given moment, the Ambassador 
said, ―Yes, it is all true, but you should not take my word for it.  I encourage you to go 
there and see it all for yourself, once the weather improves, in May perhaps.‖ This is 
how the first meeting with Ambassador Extraordinary Victor Semenov drew to a 
close. As I got up to leave, Ambassador Semenov handed me a notepad upon which 
he had jotted some notes during the conversation. Ironically, the note pad came from 
the Kremlin. The upper left hand corner of every sheet was imprinted with an image 
of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. When asked how it was 
possible that an Ambassador of Ukraine, particularly of his magnitude, was giving a 
foreigner a block note with the emblem of a third (and at that time almost Hobbesian 
state), the gentleman simply replied, ―Because our ministry cannot find the funds to 
provide me with such a block note. If it did, I would be handing you a different one.‖ A 
handshake and a shared but cynical chuckle ended the conversation as the escort 
arrived to see me out of the building.  
3.1.4 Conclusion 
In the previous sections, Ukraine was presented as the most important state to 
Russia‘s geopolitical interests. The post-Soviet political-criminal nexus penetrates 
Ukraine‘s societal, political and religious fabric. Its actors work against the revival of 
Ukrainian nationhood as well as its democratization. The actors of this ―fifth column‖ 
have been linked to the receipt of sort of material benefit (albeit professional or 
financial) from the Russian Federation.  
 One of the places its activities are most evident is in the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea. The stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet there has been 
cloaked in controversy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The controversial 
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treaties and gas deals linked to them are also directly linked to members of the 
political-criminal nexus.  
 The Russian Black Sea Fleet has been an instrumental, hard military 
presence for the Russian Federation. It has been used by the Russian Federation as 
an instrument through which to openly and consistently support pro-Russian 
separatism in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This foreign policy is also linked 
to global politics insofar as it is linked to thwarting the democratic development of 
Ukraine. From the perspective of tangible power, the fleet has influenced Ukraine‘s 
power by affecting its military, occupying territory not stipulated in any of the 
Annexes, not paying for the rented military bases, disregarding Ukraine‘s inventory 
requirements and by causing environmental harm.  
 It was shown in Part One that by promoting vertical competition, soft power 
be used by Hobbesian actors to promote separatism. Thus, it is not sufficient to focus 
on the hard power manners in which the fleet was used as an instrument to promote 
separatism there. To understand the security dynamics between Ukraine and Russia 
as well as their regional and global effects, it is necessary to consider the less overt 
ways the Russian Federation and the political criminal nexus may have used the 
power of attraction to gain support for pro-Russian separatism in Crimea.  
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3.2 Trust Builders or the Post-Soviet Political-Criminal Nexus? 
 
Like any form of power, soft power can be wielded for good or bad purposes, and these often 
vary according to the eye of the beholder. 
    - J. Nye 
 
Throughout the post-Soviet years, the Russian Federation found itself in many 
predicaments and was loosing an immense amount of geopolitical power at a fast 
pace. The situation it faced in Crimea was particularly dire. Not only did it stand to 
loose the entire Black Sea Fleet, Ukraine was also threatening to become a strong 
naval player, drastically diminishing Russia‘s access to and power over the entire 
Black Sea region. Something had to be done, and an outright Russian military 
invasion of Ukraine was unthinkable.  
 Russia needed to build trust, nurture pro-Russian forces there, increase their 
numbers and publicize them as friends and allies against pro-Western 
democratization and its ―evil‖ North-Atlantic Treaty Organization.
565 
Of particular 
interest to this study is how, over time, Russia built a perception of trust among 
Crimea‘s population to the point of the peninsula becoming a potential separatist 
flashpoint. Its trust-building mechanisms are of particular interest here as appears 
that the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus played a role in advancing Russia‘s 
geopolitical interests in this regard. Let us be reminded that after the Ukrainian 
government ratified the controversially anti-constitutional Kharkiv Accords in 2010, 
which once again bound the fleet to questionable gas deals, Vladimir Putin stated: 
―The most important aspect of the deal is not gas or stationing of the fleet, no matter 
how important these are to Ukraine… …The most important aspect of the deal is 
relations between our two peoples, trust in one another and mutual support.‖
566  
 It is also important to bear a number of factors in mind.  First, there are very 
many good aspects to soft power and genuine soft power actors; arguably, many of 
the activities related to soft power are covered by so-called Friendship Treaties. 
Second, Crimea‘s population and particularly that of Sevastopol shares a long 
common history with Russian and Soviet (naval) power. Third, it would be ludicrous 
to ignore that ethnic-Russians are in the majority on the peninsula. Their rights and 
interests are of import and must not be overlooked.  
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However, it would be just as ludicrous to ignore the assertion of pro-democracy 
experts in Ukraine that the separatist and anti-Ukrainian sentiment there is the 
product of a covert Russian foreign policy without which, the ethnic communities in 
Crimea would peacefully coexist. Also, some may argue that the soft power 
operations presented below simply belong to normal foreign policies and there is 
nothing informal or criminal about them. It may indeed be so, however, two facts are 
of import in this regard, namely: 1) the Russia-centered character of the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus and; 2) vertical competition is strategically planned by states 
and promotes separatism and conflict using soft power.  
 Thus, to determine if the Russian Federation built trust between Russia and 
the Crimean population by targeting Ukraine‘s soft power security and the extent to 
which the political-criminal nexus played a role in this regard, a number of steps must 
be taken. The main institutionalized actors, their activities and some (allegedly) 
informal ways these soft power operations have been funded must be considered. 
First, insight into the role of Russian Intelligence services is offered. Second, some of 
the ways Moscow has provided support to pro-Russian organizations in Crimea are 
examined. Third, the main institutions linked to the promotion of separatism in 
Crimea are presented. Fourth, the position of the Crimean Tatars (the second largest 
population in Crimea) and manner in which they have been affected in this regard are 
also considered. Fifth, interties between Russia‘s foreign policy of passportization, 
NGOs and separatism are provided. It is expected that linkages will be found 
between the Russian Federation‘s foreign policy toward Ukraine‘s Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea, soft power operations that affect its national security and the 
post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
 
3.2.1 Russian Intelligence Services 
The journalist D. Ivanov of the investigative magazine Glavred provides one of the 
clearest open-source publications on the role of Russia‘s secret services inside The 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Ivanov concludes that due to the stationing of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet on formally lawful grounds, representatives of practically 
every Russian intelligence agency are working there. Based on his research into the 
matter he even asserts ―it is possible to call Sevastopol the capitol of Russian special 
services‖.
567
 In this regard, the the fact that the actual legality of their presence in 
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Crimea is debatable is particularly significant. Generally, pro-Russian forces assert it 
is legal, pro-democratic forces assert it is not.  
 One thing that is not debatable is its relation to the stationing of the fleet in 
Crimea. On 11 October 2006, President Viktor Yushchenko called attention to the 
relation between the Russian secret services and the political-criminal nexus. He 
ordered the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) to upgrade its operational activities in 
Crimea. Specifically, The SBU was given two months to ―look into the efficiency of 
intelligence, counterintelligence, subversive and other illegal activities in the Crimea 
by foreign secret services and NGOs‖ and to ―develop a plan of action to ‗neutralize‘ 
activities in the Crimea, ‗which harm Ukraine‘s sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
pose security threats and incite ethnic, racial and religious tension.‘‖
568
 
 The SBU established a link between Russian intelligence and subversion in 
Crimea. They identified the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (the largest 
foreign military presence of Russia) as ―the determining criteria for the presence and 
activity in the region of its intelligence agencies‖ and, moreover, ―an instrument of 
securing Russian national interests and securing control over the direction of political 
and military developments of Ukraine (first and foremost, its relations with NATO).‖
569
 
More ominously, the SBU warned 38 Ukrainian citizens that they were targets of 




 Apparently, the FSB had been ―recruiting Ukrainians and providing logistical 
support to separatists and pro-Russian organizations in Sevastopol and the wider 
Crimea.‖
571
 Not only is the promotion of separatism a crime and prohibited by the 
Ukrainian criminal codex, such a recruitment policy clearly targets Ukraine‘s soft 
power, in terms of its level or degree of national territorial integration. Clearly, the 
feeling of belonging to one‘s state or nation is affected when citizens of one state 
begin to work for the intelligence services of another. The following is an example of 
how, if indeed occurring, such recruitment also targets the strength of the national 
leadership.  
 It has been reported that ―in 2008, using Ukrainian citizen Dmytro Kosylov, 
the FSB organized a gathering of information on those inhabitants of Sevastopol who 
would be persons of interest for Russian intelligence, particularly employees of the 
                                               
568 Kuzio, (2006). 
569 Ukrainian Intelligence Agency (SBU) Information (Службa безпеки України (СБУ) Довідка (2006). Dated 17 December.p 1. 
570 Kupchynsky R. (2008). Sub-Rosa Warfare in the Crimea, in Eurasian Daily Monitor, posted 25 June, Vol: 5 issue: 142. Available at: 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=33833>  
571 Kuzio, (2009 b).   
 - 164 - 
Sevastopol city council. After being caught for participating in real-estate scams 
(once again linking intelligence agencies with organized criminals), Kosylov declared 
that the information was collected on behalf of the FSB‘s Black Sea Chapter 
employee Segei Kistenev with whom he became acquainted in 2007 in the building 
leased to the RBSF for organs of the Prosecutor General for South –Caucasus 
military division. Understandably, when the FSB was apprehended in relation to 
Kosylov, they denied any contact with him claiming his was mentally ill.‖
572
  
 It is noteworthy to mention that the aforementioned prosecutor‘s office is the 
same one the MFA of Ukraine has numerously demanded from Moscow to shut it 
down. The fact that the prosecutor‘s office of a third state operates on the territory of 
another, and the host state is incapable of shutting it down again highlights the 
weakness of the nation‘s institutions and government policy capability to the 
Ukrainian population.   
 Then, in 2009, the SBU concluded that foreign special services operate in the 
city of Sevastopol in violation of Ukrainian law.
573
 It ordered the FSB to vacate the 
Black Sea Fleet‘s base in Sevastopol by December 2009 and actions were taken in 
this direction.
574
 As soon as pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich came into 
power in 2010, Moscow insisted the new administration cease cooperation with the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and, re-admit the Federal Security Service to the Black 
Sea Fleet.
575
 The Yanukovich administration has agreed to most of these demands. 
According to one Ukraine expert Taras Kuzio, the ramifications of tying Ukraine and 
Russia‘s security policies closer will be threefold: ―It will reduce the level of Ukraine‘s 
cooperation within PfP [NATO‘S Partnership for Peace Program] and increase joint 
Ukrainian-Russian military programs. The surrounding states will regard Ukraine as 
facilitating Russian espionage from its territory. Finally, it will end Ukraine‘s two 
decade long close friendship with Georgia.‖
576
 Surprisingly, Kuzio did not comment 
on violations of Ukrainian laws or sovereignty in this regard. 
 In May 2010, indirect reference was again made to the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus by the former SBU Chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko: 
 
―Russian counter-intelligence have undertaken on our territory 
unfriendly actions, including the covert collection of, and steps 
towards, collecting secret information and thereby infringing the 
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Criminal Codex of Ukraine… …The protocol signed in 2000 
whereby FSB units were stationed in the Crimea never was in 
conformity with Ukrainian legislation, […] meaning that President 





The unlawful signing of documents and orders by former President Leonid Kuchma 
was not unusual during his autocratic rule.
578
 
 The fact that the Ukrainian president himself signed laws that violate the law 
of his own state and foreseeably harm its national security to the advantage of a 
state with overt territorial claims, is a paramount indication of how deeply penetrated 
the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is. It has been asserted that ―Kyiv‘s ability to 
launch countermeasures are hampered by two factors: Lack of political will of the 
president and the National Security and Defense Council, and the divided loyalties 
between Kiev and Moscow within the SBU and Interior Ministry (MVS)‖
579
  
 The aforementioned also exemplifies how Ukraine‘s common Soviet history, 
weak institutions and rule of law have provided fertile ground for a foreign power to 
gain strength within the Crimean territory. But what role did Russian intelligence 
officers play in helping Russia gain power in Crimea? 
 
Foreign Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 
In interviews with Vice-Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovainiy and the Director of NOMOS 
Center in Sevastopol, Sergei Kulyk it was confirmed that, in accordance with the 
1997 Black Sea Fleet Treaty, Sevastopol officially received 5 structural sub-chapters 
of the GRU. And, that unofficially, Russia maintained an additional organ of the GRU, 
namely, the GRU-642 Group on Informational-Psychological Warfare.
580
 This 
information is also provided in Ivanov‘s 2009 article. Yet, already in 2006, a report 
made my Ukraine‘s Intelligence service in Crimea identified this group‘s functioning 
as ―creating the necessary Russian Federation influence on the socio-political 
situation in AR Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. …The aforementioned structures 
conduct exercises by securing the information of special propagandist actions.‖
581
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 The GRU-642 group is identified as an instrument through which the 
publication of ordered materials and prejudiced results of sociological polls in left and 
pro-Russian sources take place.
582
 The social and political security sectors and the 
intangible components of state power constitute the most important part of state 
security. The GRU was identified as targeting Ukraine‘s (what has been identified in 
this study as) soft power security from within its own territory: ―this sub-division 
continues to work successfully, despite the fact its presence is not regulated by any 
treaty or agreement between the two states‖.
583
 However, its policies remained 
seemingly inert. Once again, this points to the weakness of Ukraine‘s institutions and 
the power and presence of an informal, Russia-centered network targeting Ukraine‘s 
soft power. 
 Since most of Moscow‘s propaganda campaigns in Crimea were directed 
from the Black Sea Fleet Press Centre which was headed by a former graduate of 
the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations.
584
 The fact that its head was a 
graduate of Moscow State University (MSU) is significant, and the role of the MSU in 
this regard must be considered. 
 The Moscow State University has a Black Sea Fleet Branch in Sevastopol. It 
is a beautiful and modern university which the Russian Federation built on one of the 
military bases it uses in Sevastopol. Entrance to the university it is strictly guarded 
with officers armed with automatic machine guns. Sources both Kyiv and Sevastopol 
have confirmed that the MSU BSF branch is a main sociological instrument of 
Russia‘s subversive politics toward Ukraine in Crimea. Its students have the 
opportunity to be taught by Russian experts including former Russian military and 
intelligence officers.
585
 The Ministry of Education in Kyiv has minimal access to 
information on what exactly is being taught there.
586
 The allegations that former 
officers of the fleet as well as intelligence agents are teaching subversion and anti-
Ukrainian policies to students are particularly disturbing to Ukraine‘s territorial 
sovereignty because the majority of its graduates return to take on administrative 
positions on the Crimean peninsula.
587
 Moreover, since MSU graduates take on 
                                               
582 Ibid., 7. (e.g. Printing of a series of anti-Ukrainian materials in Sevastopol newspaper ―Rusychi‖ (founder and editor P. Butsai leader of the 
Center of protection of family and children ―Rusychi‖, CMO ―Rus Sviata‖) which contain elements of separatism and spurring of interethnic 
tensions: article No6  28.03-10.04, ―Ausweiss dlya ‗shcyrykh patritotiv‘‖ A. Sydorov and ―Movchannyam bdayetsia Bog‖d. Solovyav; No10 23.05-
12.06  ―Viynu mizh Ukrainoyu I Rosiyeyu pochnut u 20,,, potsi‖ (reprinted from RIA ―KM.ru‖). 
583 Ivanov. 
584 Maigre, 6.  
585 Ibid, 16.  
586 Kulyk, personal communication.  
587 Personal communications with Semenov, Tarasiuk, Bezkorovainiy and Kulyk. See also Maigre. 
 - 167 - 
administrative positions in Crimea, their knowledge, networks and schooling further 
affects Kyiv‘s government policy capability in its Autonomous Crimean Peninsula.  
 The faculty of journalism at the Sevastopol branch of the MSU is the only one 
in the region. Intelligence sources consider it as the origin of workers in the mass 
media sectors which will serve in the editorial boards of local pro-Russian 
publications and television studios. The students generally follow an internship at the 
youth studio and production center ―Devkom‖ and newspapers ―Slava Sevastopolya‖, 
―Sevastopolska Gazeta‖, and even the newspaper of the Russian Black Sea Fleet 
―Flag Rodyny‖.
588
 Thus, the links between the Black Sea Fleet, the GRU, Moscow 
State University and mass media in Crimea affect Ukraine‘s soft power security 
insofar as they tie its youth to the interests and ideologies of a third state. In this 
regard, it is worthy to consider how the presence of the GRU has been linked to 
affecting another component of Ukraine‘s soft power, namely, the perceived 
relevance of Kyiv‘s national strategy by the Crimean population.  
 A specific GRU mission in Sevastopol has been identified as the creation of 
anti-NATO sentiment in the region.
589
 The 642nd grouping was supported by special 
officers from Moscow who ―assisted in arranging the channels of distribution‖ and 
―utilization of loyal Crimean mass media‖ and ―their men in the journalist sector‖.
590
 
For many years, the printing press of the Russian Black Sea Fleet has been used to 
print anti-Ukrainian, anti-Western and anti-NATO publications which were dispersed 




 It is clear that media publications and reports are some of the most effective 
ways of influencing opinions and perceptions among people. Less clear is the 
legitimacy of the psychological warfare unit activities. It uses the Russian Ministry of 
Defense printing press to target Ukraine‘s soft power security. It does so by 
dispersing information which directly targets the perceived relevance of Ukraine‘s 
national strategy from within its own territory. Also, the source and legitimacy of 
funding the GRU-642nd unit recieves to target Ukraine‘s soft power is also unclear. It 
has, however, been linked to money laundering operations of Black Sea Fleet 
construction projects both inside and outside the military bases.
592
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 In 2006, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was to dedicate over 24 million rubles 
(approx. 935,672 USD) for the purchase of printing materials for its Crimean group, 
eight times more than the previous year.
593
 At the same time, the command of the 
Russian Black Sea Fleet prohibited the printing of spetz-propaganda
594
 materials in 
the fleet‘s own newspaper ―Flag Rodyny‖. The decision was taken by the need to 
avoid official accusations from the Ukrainian side of provocative acts from the 
fleet.
595
 As a result of this change in tactics, there can no longer be direct charges of 
anti-Ukrainian activities against the Black Sea Fleet.
596
 
 The move of the GRU to prohibit the printing of spetz-propaganda does not 
necessarily mean that the 642nd group stopped functioning. Rather, some experts 
suggest that it continues to work closely with pro-Russian NGOs in Crimea, after the 
Orange Revolution in 2004, the Press Centre cut back on its overt propaganda 
activities and has since channeled resources for propaganda through NGOs, mainly 
the Russian Community of Crimea (RCC) a pro-Russian NGO (considered below). 
 These tactics have been identified in the previous part as belonging to the 
realm of political-criminal insurgent activity.
597
 Particularly, R. Naylor warned NGOs 
and elaborate propaganda apparatus in the form of newspapers and magazines, 
radio and television services and transportation systems play a major role in shifting 




 In this regard, the Russian Community of Sevastopol has been linked to the 
642nd psychological operations group:   
 
Coincidentally, the Black Sea Fleet gave the editorial department 
of this organization‘s newspaper (made of 1 person) an office in a 
Black Sea Fleet building located on Ryadanska 4, office 19 in 
Sevastopol. Curiously, the neighbors of this newspaper are the 
642nd group of informational-psychological warfare. The 
newspaper is regularly printed by the Black Sea Fleet‘s printing 
resources which have become an instrument of this sort of 
warfare. For work with the local public, the Black Sea Fleet has 
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given the organization additional space, this time in its Officers 
Building.599  
 
 The NGO activities notwithstanding, this form of cooperation influences how 
Ukraine‘s citizenry perceives the strength of its national leadership and Ukraine‘s 
internal state legitimacy.   
 In 2009, it was claimed that the GRU in Crimea was particularly interested in 
the representations of 10 publications, 4 TV channels, 2 internet projects, as well as 
regional representatives of the all-Ukrainian Information Agency.
600
 This is not an 
insignificant number considering the aforementioned cut back on its overt 
propaganda activities. The SBU identified the Russian Federation‘s strategy of using 
mass media, the media resources of the Black Sea Fleet, pro-Russian organizations 
and internet sites for the organization of informational expansion and conducting 
spetz-operations as the ―key foreign threat to informational security‖ in the region: 
 
These actions are openly and covertly aimed at discrediting 
Ukrainian independence, ‗pro-Western‘ foreign policy and internal 
politics of the state (including its relations to the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet, propaganda of various forms of international 
integration, particularly in the framework of the Single Economic 
Space), the formation of pro-Russian civil thought, and the spread 
of nostalgic feelings of the local population.‖601  
 
All this shows how Russian-led operations target the Crimean population‘s collective 
memory, particularly its former territorial integration, to discredit the legitimacy of 
Ukraine‘s pro-Western forces and foreign policies. And, in turn, forging a disconnect 
between the state and its nation i.e. the population of Crimea and its relationship with 
Kyiv, thereby impacting Kyiv‘s strength of national leadership.  
 The Director of NOMOS, Sergei Kulyk, was asked about the legality of the 
anti-Ukrainian and anti-Euro-Atlantic newspapers printed by the Russian Ministry of 
Defense on Ukrainian territory.
602
 He informed that, although the newspapers 
regularly contained anti-state, separatist content and that the funds used for their 
publishing were not transparent and likely funded, at least partially, by laundered 
monies, each paper was operating under a Ukrainian license. When questioned 
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about the validity of such a license he informed that even if it were a problem, the 
problem was not so grand as not to be resolved with a bribe and then stated ―that is 
how a lot of things work around here‖.
603
  
 This time a link was made between corruption, alleged money laundering, 
Ukraine‘s weak institutions and pro-Russian separatist activity. The fact that 
corruption is rampant in Ukraine is indicative of how members of the political-criminal 
nexus, in this case state authorities, are willing to overlook the law, and promote the 
interests of the Russian Federation to the detriment of their own state. 
 
The Federal Security Services of the Russian Federation (FSB)  
The GRU is not the only Russian intelligence agency operating in Ukraine. The 
Federal Security Services of the Russian Federation (FSB), formerly KGB, is well 
known for its heavy-handed antidemocratic politics. It is also present in Crimea. Its 
official mission is to provide counterintelligence for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In 
fact, a number of GRU officers at the Black Sea Fleet are also ‗converted‘ FSB 
officers. ―Currently the FSB works in Sevastopol under the cover of the aid to the 
Commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Regime and Security. Upon orders of 
the Head of the FSB, the officers transfer to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian 
Federation, where they are ‗transformed‘ into GRU officers and, upon their return to 
Russia, they return to the FSB.―
604
  
 Unlike the GRU or Russia‘s Foreign Intelligence Service (SRV), the FSB is 
officially Russia‘s internal intelligence agency. In accordance with the Russian law 
―on the organs of the FSB in the Russian Federation‖ dated 3 April 1995, the main 
functions of the FSB are counterintelligence and war on crime. Simultaneously, ―with 
the objective of receiving information about possible threats to the security of the 
Russian Federation‖ the FSB is also mandated to conduct intelligence.
605
 There are 
two documents that have regulated the relations of the SBU and FSB:  document on 
cooperation between the SBU and MB of the Russian Federation dated 20 July 1992 
and the protocol signed in June 2000 by Kuchma.
606
 Neither agreement provides 
legal grounds to utilize the FSB for intelligence operations against Ukraine. 
Moreover, the CIS Agreement prohibits such use of intelligence services within the 
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former Soviet Union, doing so is equivalent of the FBI rather than the CIA operating 
in Central and Latin America.
607
  
 The FSB presence and operations on Ukrainian territory were not welcome by 
the pro-democratic government. In 2009 and 2010, arguing that the SBU had 
sufficient resources to provide full security and counter threats to the Black Sea 
Fleet, Ukraine‘s Intelligence Chief Nalyvaichenko asserted: ―…we do not need 
assistance or the physical presence of foreign secret services‖.
608
  
 This notwithstanding, in 2009 there were 19 confirmed FSB officers working 
in the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Russia asserted they were there to ensure the 
fleet‘s security. Their function has been described as, ―counterintelligence to secure 
the RBSF on Ukrainian territory, control and analysis of the development of the 
military-political and economic situation in the region, work with local pro-Russian 
forces to influence the situation in Crimea and Sevastopol, gathering information with 
aid from agents and special technical machinery.‖
609
 The true number, origin and 
mission of the agents remains unclear and some of them have been linked to 
activities that fall beyond what could be reasonably understood as counter 
intelligence for the Russian Black Sea Fleet.  
 For instance, a number of high-level government sources both inside and 
outside Ukraine have confirmed that the fleet was involved in gunrunning as well as 
the illegal import and export of goods in Ukraine.
610
  In 2007, it was confirmed that 
the fleet was known to occasionally traffics in illicit goods. At the time, the latest such 
incident pertained to the illegal import of butter.
611
 Thus, merchants at the main 
Sevastopol market were questioned in this regard. Although a number of them chose 
not to respond, two senior persons, one woman selling butter and a man selling eggs 
and cheese confirmed that on occasion low cost products from the unofficial market 
were delivered by men from the Russian Black Sea Fleet as well as other local 
traders.
612
 Next to the hesitation they felt in talking about the subject no animosity 
was expressed toward the men who allegedly delivered illegitimate products. In fact, 
the lady thanked God for them asserting that since the demise of the Soviet Union, 
the standard of living in Sevastopol had come down to one of bare survival. She 
exclaimed, ―The boys make our lives easier‖.
613
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 Of course, the fact that illegal cargo is imported into Ukraine using a third 
state‘s fleet is in itself an indication of the political-criminal nexus at work. Moreover, 
this perhaps simple example is critical. It shows how the illegal import of food 
positively influences the perceptions of the local population, forming a relationship of 
perceived common interests between the fleet, those who illegally import (food) 
products and the local population.   
 Another example of illegitimate products imported and being sold in 
Sevastopol pertains to energy resources. FSB officer identified as Kysetenev has 
been linked to operations whereby large-scale amounts of fuel products are 
unlawfully transported and stored in the rear sections of the BSF and are later sold at 
commercial gas stations in Sevastopol.
614
 Furthermore, Kysetenev allegedly secures 
shadow fuel operations from the scrutiny of Ukraine‘s tax offices.
615
 Another, more 
formal link has been made to the Russian Black Sea Fleet and tax evasion. In 2008, 
Ukraine‘s State Tax Service was investigating two tax evasion cases in which BSF 
officials are involved. It was estimated that direct losses sustained by the Sevastopol 
city authorities as a result of unpaid taxes exceeded $1.3 million.
616
 The trafficking in 
energy resources and tax evasion practices directly links the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus in Crimea to a parallel economy and operations targeting Ukraine‘s 
economic power.  
 Another example of how FSB officers have become integrated in the social 
fabric of Sevastopol through the Black Sea Fleet is also found in a 2007 example of 
Officer Gennadiy Sydchnenko. Sydchenko opened a beer and non-alcoholic 
beverage business and later a hair salon in the name of his wife on the territory of the 
military dormitory located at General Ostyakov Avenue 61 in Sevastopol.
617
 It should 
not be forgotten that this is an operative from a third state who although running 
businesses is a spy working for the interests of the Russian Federation. The opening 
the aforementioned shop and salon clearly promotes the integration of the officer and 
his family into Ukraine‘s society. Inevitably, it also influences the ―we‖ perceptions of 
the local populations. These perceptions are a pivotal part of soft power security. 
Thus, when local populations not only cohabitate with secret agents of a third state 
but also make use of their commercial services 
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 A more disconcerting case is found in the allegation that a Black Sea Fleet 
FSB officer, Sergei Zharkov, is known to train private security officers, Ukrainian 
citizens, for the company ―Force Majeure‖.
618
 The role of private security companies, 
particularly those in post-Soviet states with direct links to Russia‘s FSB, is worthy of 
scrutiny. Due to the weak rule of law within these states many businesses and 
entrepreneurs must operate with a ―krysha‖ (or cover) to protect them from outside 
raiders and governmental intrusion by way of force or bribery. The ―krysha‖ is 
perhaps one of the clearest examples of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
From this example, the extent to which the FSB is involved in training private security 
officers on Ukrainian territory is not clear, nor is the purpose. However, the fact that 
foreign intelligence officers are training private security officers in Crimea is 
noteworthy. Whereas the aforementioned examples showed how Russian officers 
connected to the Russian Black Sea Fleet function to create a parallel economy, this 
example is indicative of how a potentially rogue network of fighters may be created. 
 The type of surveillance being conducted by the FSB on Ukrainian territory is 
also unclear. For instance, in Feodosiya, FSB officer, Sergei Lyashchenko, caught 
the attention of Ukrainian secret services because he was trying to create channels 
of influence within the Tatar population. The objective was to replace the 
management of the Medjelis with persons with pro-Russian sentiment.
619
 It was 
further planned to use this information under the discretion of the higher 
management of the intelligence service, particularly to discredit the pro-Ukraine, pro-
democratic Medjilis. The operation was supervised by the FSB‘s Navy Department 
Head, Colonel Valery Shalakhin.
620
  
 In 2009, a RBSF officer was apprehended at the Ukrainian-Russian border 
with surveillance equipment. The SBU established the equipment was used to 
eavesdrop and interdict mobile communications. The officer identified himself as a 
service man from the 810th section of the RBSF Marine Corps stationed in 
Sevastopol. The SBU investigation revealed that this was a false identification.  The 
seized surveillance recordings proved that he was conducting activity that was 




 These activities of certain FSB officers indicate the intelligence agencies of 
the Russian Federation are embedded in the social and political fabric of Crimea and 
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some even linked to organized illegal activity of a Russian-centered post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus. However, the extent to which this is so must also be 
considered from another angle.  
 In the preceding paragraphs five examples where given of how the FSB in 
Crimea has been linked to either criminal behavior such as illegal trafficking of goods, 
and tax evasion or social networks such as private security organizations who by 
their very nature in post-Soviet states tend to fall into the realm of the political-
criminal nexus. Unauthorized interference with the political-ethnic Tatar group as well 
as unlawful surveillance are also indicative of informal activities taking place within 
Ukraine‘s territory that are directly linked to the Russian Federation and its Black Sea 
Fleet. It is possible then to conclude that since there were only 19 FSB officers 
formally on mission in Crimea, it would mean that 5 of the 19 officers have been 
identified as partaking in activity harmful to Ukraine‘s national security.  
 It has also been asserted that by using the Russian Black Sea Fleet as 
pretence for sending FSB officers to Ukraine, the Russian Federation employs forces 
to coordinate local pro-Russian separatists. ―This group works closely with the 
leaders of these organizations and consults them on when and where 
demonstrations and protests should be carried out.‖
622
 Disregarding the legal 
justification or status of the FSB presence in Ukraine, the allegations of orchestrating 
separatism are serious.  
 The SBU concluded that assignments carried out by the Russian secret 
services in Crimea depart from collecting national secrets, and include active actions 
aimed at creating a position of influence within the regional organs of the 
government, administration, societal-political spheres and in the mass media 
sector.
623
 Both, politicians and academics have argued that ―there is no viable 
separatist or irredentist threat in Crimea‖ and that the small groups that support 
Crimean separatism are in fact ―marginal specks on the Crimean political radar‖ used 
by the Russian Federation to ―hinder or just plainly sabotage Ukraine‘s admission to 
NATO and to extend the lease of the military base located in Sevastopol (Crimea) 
where the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) is anchored‖.
624
 However, should their 
conclusions be valid, it would mean that the threat of separatism in Crimea had been 
overemphasized and informally orchestrated to serve the interests of the Russian 
Federation. It is therefore necessary to consider how Ukraine‘s soft power security 
has been influenced on the peninsula further.  
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3.2.2 Intelligence and other support  
Ivanov claims that socio-political influencing in Crimea has its origins in the Kremlin, 
which not only gathers information about events in Ukraine but actually organizes 
them, particularly, in Sevastopol.
625
 One of the alleged manners in which it does so is 
through NGOs.
626
 There are a number of pro-Russian non-governmental 
organizations in Crimea.
627
 And, it is necessary to consider some of the kinds of 
support pro-Russian NGOs in Crimea reportedly receive from the Russian 
Federation.   
 According to Kulyk, none of these organizations have an ideational section, 
as this function falls within the realm of responsibility of covert Russian informational-
psychological structures in Crimea.
628
 Moreover, actors linked to the Russian Black 
Sea Fleet and nationalist youth groups from Russia such as Nashi and Eurasian 




 Remarkably, these youth group organizations also operate to support 
breakaway regions in Georgia and Moldova and promote Slavic union with the 
Russian Federation. In fact, it has been claimed that pro-Russian groups advocating 
separatism or union with Russia have ―been able to bloom almost exclusively with 
the material support and rhetorical assistance from the Russian Federation.‖
630
  
 The true nature and source of the funding provided for the promotion of 
Russia‘s culture and friendship with Crimea is disputed. The ―lavish‖ funding pro-
Russian NGOs receive from the Kremlin has been noted as Russia‘s response to 
―their interpretation of the Orange Revolution as an American funded, NGO-
organized event‖ thus, the use of soft power here reveals that the ―the line between 
promoting Russian culture and promoting separatism is a fine one.‖
631
 
 In 2006, Ukraine‘s presidential secretariat confirmed Ukraine‘s secret services 
had linked the Russian Federation to illegitimate funding of pro-Russian NGOs in 
Crimea.
632
 Kuzio reports that part of the funding for Russian nationalist-separatists is 
transferred through covert Russian assistance using grants from rhw government 
foundation Rusky Mir (Russian World). Moreover; Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov‘s 
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influence over the Moscow city council has led the city to openly donate at least $20 
million to Crimean projects.
633
 Whereas Mizrokhi notes the funds are also derived 
from legitimate sources including the Moskva-Krym Foundation and various other 
expatriate funds, there appears to be a consensus that a large segment of the funds 
is derived from illegal and even transnational organized criminal activities.
634
 These 
allegations point to the operation of a post-Soviet political-criminal nexus in Crimea 
and funds used to promote separatism in Ukraine.  
 The formal allegations in this regard pertain to three informal money sources; 
kickbacks and money laundering from construction projects including those on the 
territories of ―leased‖ military bases; the illegal sub-rental and sale of Ukrainian 
territories and objects ‖leased‖ by the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and; Yuri Luzhkov, in 
his capacity of businessman.  
 Together with his wife, Yelena Baturina Moscow‘s former mayor is part of the 
political-criminal nexus.
635
 Hundreds of millions of dollars from Russia‘s coffers have 
allegedly been funneled through illegal privatization and corrupt construction 
practices.
636
 In 2010 Luzhkov was also linked to the attempted murder of a journalist 
who led the fight against the construction of the Khimki road construction, which 
allegedly was designed to cut through Moscow‘s protected nature reserves so as not 
to disturb the serenity of Luzhkov‘s private multi-million dollar compound.
637
  
 Yuri Luzhkov is a major real estate investor in the Crimea.
638
 He has also 
been linked to corrupt construction business practices there, including the 
construction directorate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. His support of newspapers 
and cultural projects in Sevastopol is well known, but he also has several business 
interests in the city that conspicuously pick up a number of local tenders.
639
 The 
practice has been described as follows: ―a tender is announced in one small 
newspaper and the next morning a Moscow company controlled by Moscow Mayor 
Luzhkov turns out to be the winner… Such shadow tactics do a lot of harm to 
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Crimea!‖
640
 The preferential position Luzhkov has in picking up tenders suggests his 
interests there are more than political; they are material. This differentiation makes 
the Palermo Treaty against Transnational Organized Crime applicable to this sort of 
transgressions of criminal law.   
 If the allegations against him were proven, his activities would eloquently 
depict the level at which the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus functions in Crimea. 
This is particularly true as the Russian Black Sea Fleet‘s construction directorate 
figures at the center of some scandals.  
 According to V. Logvinets, the directorate has built apartment buildings for the 
fleet‘s service men, on rented territory and has then resold them to lay Russian 
and/or citizens of Crimea. Also, ―The structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense 
continue to sell property they have rented from Ukraine, particularly in Sevastopol – 
e.g. the sale of Sevastopol military Gorodok No 289
641
 to a limited liability company 
registered in Kyiv. The property was then sold to the construction directorate of the 
RBSF at Russian the Ministry of Defence.‖
642
 Thus, Ukrainian territory which has 
been rented out to the Russian military under questionable circumstances is used to 
construct dwellings that are later sold to Russian and Crimean citizens. The 
legitimacy of this notwithstanding, it clearly targets all of Ukraine‘s power potential 
and security sectors.  
 The construction directorate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet is connected to 
another apartment scandal. This time, with a $40 million investment by Yuri Luzhkov, 
a private entity of the RBSF construction directorate was created. Among its projects 
was the construction of 4 apartment buildings on military section # 53074 on Astana 
Kasayeva Street in Sevastopol. The firm did not realize the project and although 197 
Crimean families paid, in full, for their part of the investment, they received nothing in 
return. Once again, construction fraud and embezzlement were linked to the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet and Luzhkov. Fifty two of these persons have appealed, by letter, to 
President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin to intervene and bring the situation to 
justice. It is noteworthy that in their appeal, the citizens of Crimea noting the political 
tensions between Russia and Ukraine‘s the democratic coalition asked the president 
not to victimize Crimean citizens as a result of their power struggle. The Russian 
                                               
640 Mostovaya. 
641 More than 3000 m2 of storage, workshops, studios which are found on territory exceeding 4 hectares in the center of Sevastopol. 
642 Logvinets. 
 - 178 - 
leaders did not acknowledge their appeal and the scam left all the citizens with 
hundreds of thousands of private dollars in lost funds and no new homes to live in.
643
  
 Luzhkov‘s investments in Sevastopol also include the commercial center 
―Moscow‖ as well as the Moscow State University – Sevastopol Branch.
644
 His formal 
support of development in Crimea and Sevastopol is mainly based on friendship 
treaties signed between the Russian Federation and Ukraine to promote economic 
and cultural cooperation between the two states.  
 Paradoxically, while speaking at a press conference in Moscow in 2008, 
Luzhkov proclaimed his campaign to save ethnic Russian Ukrainian citizens in 
Crimea from the terrible fate of learning the language of the country they live in.
645
 
Then, on 23 July 2008, he announced that Moscow  would send $34 million from its 
own budget to Crimea to ―promote the teaching of the Russian language‖ and to 
support the ―Diaspora abroad‖ for the period 2009-2011, and a total of $47.65 million 
toward ―direct support for the united Russian Diaspora abroad, $2.76 million for 
―information cooperation‖ with this Diaspora and $14.2 million to support the Russian 




 The manner in which this money will be spent is open to interpretation: ―direct 
support for Russians abroad could well mean financing various separatist groups 
who could arguably engage in terrorist acts against Ukrainian authorities in Crimea. 
Luzhkov‘s ‗cultural‘ money could also be a means of channeling funds for Russian 
covert intelligence operations in the region.‖
647
 Even to the untrained eye, the 
connections between covert separatist operations, funding from the city of Moscow, 
construction scams including embezzlement, tax evasion, insider trading and 
business tenders are indicative of how of transnational political criminal activity in 
Crimea strengthens Russia‘s influence over in the Peninsula.  
As Luzhkov, with support and coordination from the Russian Federation and 
its Fleet, injected multi-millions of dollars (albeit illegitimately at times) into the 
poverty stricken peninsula, Ukraine‘s government did virtually nothing. What Ukraine 
did do is declare Luzhkov persona non grata numerous times. For example, in May 
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2008 Luzhkov was prohibited from entering Ukraine for publicly calling for the return 
of Sevastopol to Russia and suggesting Sevastopol was not transferred to Ukraine in 
1954.
648
  When the SBU announced Luzhkov would be denied entrance to Ukraine, it 
―underscored that the mayor of Moscow was suspected of money laundering via the 




 Remarkably, almost immediately after Luzhkov was dismissed from his 18 
year-long Mayoral position amidst rumors of criminal activity and corruption, on 30 
September 2010, Vladimir Tyunin, a Ukrainian Deputy from the pro-Russian party, 
―For a United Russia‖, which is linked to Luzhkov funds, called upon him to consider 
a run for mayor of Sevastopol.
650
 
 Luzhkov‘s other compatriots have also been declared persona non grata. For 
instance, Konstantin Zatulin the Head of the Commonwealth of Independent States  
Institute (CIS Institute), was accused of promoting hatred and separatism; the 
security services of Ukraine also demanded that the Sevastopol branch of Zatulin‘s 
CIS Institute be shut down for targeting Ukraine‘s national security and integrity in 
Crimea.
651
 The former Chef Counselor at the Russian Embassy in Ukraine Vladymyr 
Lysenko has also been (repeatedly) declared personae non grata for promoting 
separatism and unfriendly acts against the Ukrainian state. Also noteworthy here is 
that some employees of Russia‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs work for Russia‘s foreign 
intelligence service (SVR). Particularly, it has been alleged that Lysenko, working for 
the SVR and as a functionary of the RBSF, organized and financially sponsored of 
one of Sevastopol‘s pro-Russian Organizations ―Russkiy Bloc‖. The results of that 
diplomat‘s work are said to include logistical support of numerous anti-NATO protest 
actions, counteractions against the Ukrainian government and NGOs particularly in 
actions connected to the stationing of the RBSF.
652
 Thus, there is a link between 
Russian diplomats in Ukraine, shady money trails and the promotion of separatism in 
Crimea. It points to the instrumentalization of the political-criminal nexus. 
3.2.3 Pro-Russian Institutions  
The CIS Institute (opened in Sevastopol in 2006 and ordered to shut down) and the 
Moscow House in the Center of Sevastopol serves as centers for pro-Russian 
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cultural and business. However, there are numerous pro-Russian organizations in 
Crimea.
653
 Many of them have been investigated by Ukraine‘s intelligence services 
for spurring separatism, their connection to the Russian security services and 
organized crime.  
 These include 3 pro-Russian Youth movements i.e. Proryv, the Eurasian 
Youth Union movement and Nashi. All of these have been termed radical for inciting 
separatism, being extremely anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian and were banned by 
Ukraine‘s pro-democratic government..
654
 These youth organizations also operate to 
support other separatist areas in the Black Sea Region. For instance, Proryv had/has 
branches in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea. In Ukraine, Proryv 
together with the Eurasian Youth Union were banned by the Orange Coalition as a 
result of their radical, almost ―terrorist-like‖ activities.
655
  
An extremely ominous link has been made between one of these organizations and 
the post-Soviet political criminal nexus in this regard. The makers of the 2005 French 
documentary ―Trafficking Arms on Europe‘s Doorstep‖ linked Dmitri Soin, the 
president of the youth organization Proryv in Transdniestria, to the trafficking of arms. 
Particularly, Soin, who is also an official in the Transdniestrian secret service, was 
linked to the attempted sale of a radioactive bomb.656 He is also wanted by Interpol 
for ―Crimes against Life and Health‖.657 Thus, once again it is possible to link pro-
Russian separatism to pro-Russian NGOs in post-Soviet states to the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus. 
 It is pertinent to note here that the pro-Russian paramilitary Crimean Cossak 
Union also supports relations with parallel organizations in the frozen conflict 
territories of Transdniestria, Abkhazia and Ossetia, and, it is closely related to the 
Russian Community in Crimea (RCC)
658
 It is noteworthy that the Cossaks share the 
Russian Orthodox position and are poised against pro-Western democratization and 
Euro-Atlantic integration. Both of these organizations maintain the spiritual notion that 
Russian orthodoxy holds the seat of the ―Third Rome‖ as an instrument against the 
Ukrainian Orthodox church (Kyiv patriarchate), Ukrainian Catholicism and Islam. In 
this regard, the soft power security component of national integration is affected by 
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way of causing religious tensions. The role of the Russian Orthodox Church is 
considered in further detail in the following section. 
 Together with the remaining, smaller organizations, the aforementioned 
organizations and institutes are interconnected by social networks which include 
political and financial support from Russia.
659 
 It should be noted however that with 
the exception of the two umbrella NGOs (i.e. the Russian Community of Crimea and 
the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖) the pro-Russian organizations and 
movements are claimed to be rather marginal on the political map of Crimea. 
However, this marginality does not prevent them from being instrumental in 
pressuring Kyiv not to take decisions which are displeasing to the Russian 
Federation i.e. NATO exercises, promotion of Ukrainian culture, history and language 
and Black Sea Fleet issues. 
 
  
Ruskaya Obshina Kryma (Russian Community of Crimea) 
The Ruskaya Obshina Kryma or, the Russian Community of Crimea (RCC) is the 
follow-up organization to the former Crimean Republican Movement and the 
Republican Party of Crimea. In the 1990s the Republican Party of Crimea was 
considered as nothing more than a front for organized crime on the peninsula.
660
 
Since the mid- 1990s, the RCC has been financed by Yuri Luzhkov (i.e. Moscow 
Mayor‘s Foundation ―Moscow-Crimea‖), the Russian Duma member and Head of the 
CIS institute, Konstantin Zatulin, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Presidential Administration.
661
 Every year the amount of financing the RCC receives 
from the Russian Federation is growing and lacks transparency.
662
 
 Today, the RCC is a pro-Russian political player in Crimea; an umbrella NGO 
made up of at least 25 regional organizations and 15,000 members.
663
 Its leader, 
Sergei Tsekov, is not only the First Deputy Speaker of the Crimean Verkhovna Rada, 
he is a member of the Presidium of the International Council of Russian Compatriots 
established in 2002 by the Moscow administration as well as a member of the 
Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots established in 2006 by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Russia.
664
  
 Although there are a rather large number of pro-Russian NGOs in Crimea, the 
RCC is the largest and most politically penetrated. The level of penetration and 
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governmental connection with the Kremlin is perhaps best depicted by the fact that 
by joining the Party of Regions in Crimea in 2005, the leaders of the Russian 
Community of Crimea were able to enter the Crimean Parliament in 2006 and 
participate in public policy making.
665
 Importantly, the majority of RCC members are 
associated with the Russian Bloc, the Party of Regions of Ukraine, the Communist 
Party and the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine.
666
 In 2009, thirteen of the 76 
deputies of the Simferopol City Council were members of the RCC.
667
 According to 
Tsekov, the Russian Community of Crimea is involved in numerous charity and social 
projects and owns more facilities than any public organization or any active party in 
Crimea.
 668
 The RCC also cooperates closely with the Russian Cultural and 
Educational Centre providing assistance to Crimeans in obtaining higher education in 
the Russian Federation. This is particularly important in light of the fact that citizens 
of former soviet states are able to gain Russian citizenship if ―the person is a citizen 
of a former Soviet state which received middle professional or higher professional 
education in an educative facility of the Russian Federation after July 2002‖.
669
 This 
regulation should draw attention to the fact that the Moscow State University has a 
branch located on a rented military base in Crimea which is marked as territory of 
Russia. 
 The RCC has been identified as a major cultural and political player that 
―fights fiercely against the ―Ukrainianization‖ of Crimea and aims to integrate Ukraine 
with Russia‖ and a major cultural and socio-political player.
670
 It is affiliated with the 
Institute of the CIS States.
671
 In Ukraine, the Crimean office of the CIS Institute, led 
by Admiral Vladimir Illyich Solovyov, a former Head of the Intelligence Division of the 
Black Sea Fleet had been shut down by the SBU for inciting interethnic tensions, 
separatism and anti-Ukrainianism. Thus, it is necessary to take note of the linkages 
existing between the RCC, organized crime (by way of its predecessor the republican 
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The People’s Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia” (SCR)
672
 
The people‘s front Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia is a RCC related organization. The 
SCR has been under criminal investigation for destabilizing the situation in Crimea 
through illegal activities including the deliberate discreditation of Ukrainian 
authorities.
673
 This is a direct targeting of Ukraine‘s soft power security, namely, the 
strength of national leadership. It was identified by the SBU as an organization which 
receives attentive media attention, ―Because dirty money, including funds from 
construction of objects of the RBSF finance the organization and its PR‖.
674
 The 
above statement from Ukraine‘s security agency links the organization to the post-
Soviet political-criminal nexus. Thus, it is interesting to consider this organization, 
whether it is linked to organized crime and other activities that further target the other 
elements of soft power security. 
 In 2008, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine noted illegal activities of the 
People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ in Crimea and submitted a request to the 
SBU to investigate the organization with the objective of preparing a legal case to 
shut it down.
675
 On July 1, 2008, the SBU reported the arrest of 2 individuals in the 
Crimea, members of the unregistered ―People‘s Front – Sevastopol – Crimea-Russia, 
and charged them with agitation for dismembering the ―territorial integrity of 
Ukraine‖.
676
 and, in accordance with Article 110 of Criminal Codex of Ukraine, 
criminal cases were brought against Valeriy Podiacheg (the leader of the SCR fled in 
the fall of 2009 and his whereabouts are unknown) and Semen Kluyev another SCR 
leader for violating the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine.  
 The SBU petitioned the Ministry of Justice to ban the People‘s Front 
―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia claiming it was inciting socio-political upheaval and was 
―controlled from abroad‖.
677
 Whereas Podiacheg fled from the law, Kluyev was found 
guilty by the court of first instance and was sentenced to 4 years of prison. The Court 
of Appeals upheld the judgment. However, A few months after the instatement of pro-
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Russian Victor Yanukovich to the Ukrainian presidency, the Supreme Court 
overturned his sentence, and he was set free.  
 It is worthwhile considering the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ 
activities as they pertain to Ukraine‘s soft security. A list of their activities on the 
peninsula is provided in Appendix C.  At first sight activities such as the burning of 
Ukrainian books, unlawful hanging of Russian flags on Ukrainian administrative 
buildings, publically equating NATO and Ukrainian patriots with the Nazi regime, the 
hanging of swastikas on the gates of Ukrainian military bases and appeals to the 
Russian President and Duma to annex Crimea may seem rather radical and benign. 
However, when such activities are well organized, recurring and receive much media 
attention they strategically, albeit slowly, deteriorate Ukraine‘s soft power security by 
targeting the perceptions of people in Crimea.
678
 And, in turn, they stimulate 
horizontal competition in the societal security sector (i.e. strategic promotion of ethnic 
conflict and separatism). 
 
The Orthodox Church  
The Russian Orthodox Church is another institution and important player in Crimea 
that must be considered in light of horizontal competition and anti-Euro-Atlantic 
policies in Ukraine. To understand how and why the Russian Orthodox Church can 
be used as a Russian foreign policy instrument it is necessary to briefly consider its 
past.  
 In 988 the Grand Prince of Kyiv, Volodymyr the Great baptized Kyiv and the 
rest of Kyivan Rus. His decision to do so was fueled by the belief that a monotheistic 
religion would consolidate his power, his choice was determined after the Byzantine 
Emperor Basil II turned to him for help in defeating his rival Bardas Phocas. 
Volodymyr agreed to provide military aid under condition that he would marry Basil 
II‘s daughter Anna. The condition was agreed to on the condition that Volodymyr 
converted himself, and all his peoples, to Christianity. On 1 August 988, the Kyivan 
Rus was officially christened. It was marred by mass forced conversions; the rest of 
Kyivan Rus was slowly converted to Byzantine Christianity.  
 The following year, 989, Volodymyr besieged the greatest city in the North 
East of the Black Sea Region, the city of Chersonese Taurica (Crimea). Chersonese 
was an important manufacturing and trade center and lies less than 20km away from 
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what is now Sevastopol. This religious history which unites the current states of the 
former Kyivan Rus continues to be a source of contention and a political instrument 
in Russian foreign policy. In fact, the Russian Federation promotes the notion that it, 
together with the Russian Orthodox Church, holds the position of ―The Third Rome‖. 
It holds that Crimea is the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy and must unite the 
Belorussian, Russian and Ukrainian states.
679
 This notion is publicly supported by 
the RCC as well as the CIS Institute directed by Konstantin Zatulin in Moscow. 
Zatulin, a repeat persona non grata in Ukraine, was declared personal non grata 
(again) in 2008 for attempting to destabilize public order. He, along with other Duma 
deputies, planned to participate in the commemoration of the 1,020th anniversary of 
the conversion to Christianity of Kyivan-Rus.
680
 Zatulin is one of the main supporters 
of the ―Third Rome‖ and is known for inciting animosity between the Russian 
Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox church (Under Kyiv‘s patriarchate) and the 
Crimean Tatar‘s Islamic faith.
681
 Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church, together 
with the Russian Cossak organization in Crimea has been noted for spurring a 
religious ―war of symbols‖ against the Crimean Tatars.
682
 
 It is a well known fact that the priests and patriarchs of the Russian Orthodox 
Church have a special relationship with the KGB.
683
 During the Soviet era, ―the whole 
church was under its control.‖
684
 In fact, even the current Russian Patriarch Kiril I is a 
former KGB officer. This brings to light an even more intimate relationship between 




 Importantly, the separation between the Russian state and the Russian 
Orthodox Church is not a realized fact. In Ukraine, the Orthodox Church under the 
Russian Patriarchate regularly organizes demonstrations and marches against 
NATO, Euro-Atlantic integration and democratization. In Crimea, priests of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in Crimea frequently participate in anti-NATO rallies and in 
anti-Tatar actions. A number of priests currently serving in the Russian Orthodox 
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churches in Crimea are former officers of the Black Sea Fleet.
686
 More over, once a 
week, the Russian Orthodox Church distributes a free pro-Russian propaganda 






Slavic-Tatar hostility is another point of concern in Crimea. There has been a major 
influx of Tatars who are returning to their Crimean homeland after years of 
banishment as a result of Russian annexation of the Crimea under Catherine the 
Great in 1783 and Stalin‘s mass deportation policies in the 1940‘s. Between 1780 
and 1914 hundreds of thousands of Tatars emigrated to Ottoman Turkey, (where 
many remain in modern Turkey with a vocal lobby).
688
 In 1944 Stalin‘s deportation 
policies included the mass deportation of 200,000 Crimean Tatars to Uzbekistan 
where between 25% (Soviet figures) and 46% (Crimean Tatar estimate) died in the 
first year in exile. Leading up to the deportation, the Soviet regime Russified the 
majority of Crimean Tatar place names and expropriated all of their infrastructure, i.e. 




 After Ukraine‘s independence, the Crimean Tatars started to return to their 
homeland. During his presidency, Viktor Yushchenko facilitated their return and 
today, approximately 300,000 Tatars live in Crimea. However, their return has not 
been an easy one. Tensions regarding land started to arise as the returnees were 
demanding to be given the territories which had once belonged to them and not the 
ones they were offered. Many of these areas are prime real-estate lands as opposed 
to the inland territories they have been assigned by the government. Thus, the Tatars 
started occupying these lands on a mass and unlawful scale. Their reintegration has 
been difficult and a main cause has been identified as the fact that ―Local authorities 
dominated by ethnic Russians are hostile to the returnees.‖
 690
 Russia‘s attempts to 
incite inter-ethnic strife in the Crimea by ―fomenting clashes between Tatars and 
Russia-speaking Slavs‖ have been documented.
691
 
 The Crimean Tatars and patriotic Ukrainians share a number of 
commonalities, both have been labeled by Russian nationalists as ―Nazi 
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collaborators‖ and in contrast to the Russian and communist parties and NGO's in 
Crimea, who revere Catherine the Great as a great builder of the Russian empire, 
―Ukrainians and Tatars see her as a destroyer of their autonomy and independence 
in the last two decades of the eighteenth century‖.
692
 Generally speaking, it is 
possible to view the majority of the Crimean Tatar population as anti-Soviet and on 
the same side as those Ukrainians who wish to see the revival of Ukrainian culture, 
language and acknowledgement and rectification of the black deeds of the Kremlin. 
Making up a large part of the Crimean population (up to 15%), they are ―staunchly 
pro-Ukrainian‖.
693
 Politically, the Crimean Tatars also supported the democratic 
development of Ukraine, including Euro-Atlantic integration policies and the removal 
of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from Crimea by the year 2017. Since the 1998 
parliamentary elections in Kyiv, the pro-democracy Rukh party and President 
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine have included Tatar leaders within their party lists.
694
 
 In Crimea, the pro-Russian paramilitary Cossak group is well known in the 
peninsula for its anti-Islamic views and defamatory activities. The body guards of 
Tatar leaders in the unofficial Tatar parliament, the Medjilis, were permitted to carry 
weapons after Gennadiy Moskal (Head of the Crimean Interior Ministry) and the SBU 
received intelligence that Islamic fundamentalists planned to assassinate the 
Medhilis leadership and install radicals in their place. Whereas their leader 
Dzhemilev accused the GRU as devising the assassination attempts as part of a 
wider plan to promote instability in the Crimea, Moskal publicly stated that Russia is 
behind the (al-Takfir) Islamic fundamentalists and believes their funding in Crimea 
comes from the Taliban via Uzbekistan.
695
  
 Spurring conflict between Slavs and Tatars is a double edged sword for the 
Russian Federation, who is currently fighting numerous wars against Islamic Russian 
citizens living in the Caucuses i.e. Chechnya, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, 
Dagestan etc. Inciting such animosity could ignite more ethnic tensions inside Russia 
as well as Ukraine. However, it has been proposed that Moscow may want to use 
increased political volatility in the Crimea as a way to pressure Kyiv to seek its 
assistance which would enhance its leverage, ―In late October [2006], Putin offered 
to provide assistance to Ukraine if Slav-Tatar tension increased in the Crimea.  
According to Kuzio, such protection would be reminiscent of similar tactics in 
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Georgia‘s 2 separatist enclaves where Russia first incited inter-ethnic tension and 
then offered ÇIS (in reality Russian) ―peacekeeping troops‖ who have frozen the 
conflict in Moscow‘s favor.‖
696
 Thus the Crimean Tatar population is an example of a 
group through which horizontal competition and separatism can be incited using 
ethnicity and religion.  
 
Passportization 
The activity of the People‘s Front Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia is not limited to the 
modification of perceptions using identity ideas. Identity ideas are also influenced in a 
more tangible manner through the dispersal of identification documents, namely; 
passports. The SCR openly promotes the procedure for Ukrainian citizens to acquire 
Russian citizenship. This activity affects Ukraine‘s security in three main ways. First, 
dual citizenship is prohibited by Ukrainian law. Thus it promotes the violation of 
Ukrainian law. This disregarding of Ukraine‘s legal institutions also foreseeable 
affects the perceptions held of the strength of Ukraine‘s leadership and policy making 
capabilities. Second, by aiding Ukrainians in unlawfully receiving Russian citizenship, 
Ukraine‘s level of territorial and cultural integration is negatively impacted as well as 
the perceived relevance these citizens will hold of Ukrainian national strategy. Third, 
by systematically increasing the number of Russian passport holders in the Crimean 
peninsula, the potential of armed conflict is increased; particularly as a result of the 
Russian Federation‘s policy to use its military to ―protect Russian citizens and 
speakers abroad‖.  
 The manner in which Russia implements its policy of protecting ―Russian 
citizens‖ abroad has already been exemplified by the Russian military in Georgia. In 
South Ossetia, the Russian Federation distributed passports for over two decades.
697
 
The same occurred in Abkhazia, and, at times, this distribution was forced.
698
 Thus, 
there appears to be a pattern to the technique being used in Crimea. In 2008, Our 
Ukraine-Self Defense Member of Parliament V. Stretovych warned that the 
increasing number of Russian citizens in the Crimea would provide Russia, as in 
Georgia, a pretext to come to the ―defense‖ of its citizens.
699
 It is therefore, important 
to consider how Ukrainian citizens in Crimea are becoming Russian citizens and 
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thereby providing the Russian Federation with additional power on the international 
realm.  
 Already in 2006 the fact that the Russian Federation was dispersing 
passports to Ukrainian citizens in Crimea was well known.
700
 However, it was only 
after the Russian-Georgian war that the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Volodymyr Ohryzko accused Russia of organizing the mass distribution of Russian 
passports in Crimea. This accusation led to a protest from the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. It assessed the accusation as a provocation, ―since after all, dual 
citizenship is prohibited by Ukrainian law‖.
701
 In Ukraine, the Russian Embassy 
denied these accusations and called them a PR stunt, ―totally separated from reality‖ 
and asserted that the Consulate takes the matter of passport dispersal ―very 
seriously‖ and it is done ―under strict legal procedures‖.
702
  
 This response, however, does not exactly correspond with a comment made 
by the Consular General of the Russian Federation in Crimea, Vladimir Pashedko. It 
was noted that although Ukrainian law requires the Russian Consulate to inform 
Ukrainian state institutions about Ukrainians acquiring Russian citizenship, the 
Consular General actively forgets to provide any given Ukrainian authority with 
information regarding the number of  applicants received by the consulate,  Consular 
Pashedko reacted by stating ―It does not fall within the functions of our diplomatic 
office. We are not going to provide anyone with analytical information; it is not a part 




 However, only one week after Ohryzko‘s accusation, 34 inhabitants (in 
Sevastopol alone) with dual citizenship had their Ukrainian citizenship withdrawn.
704
 
After its preliminary investigation, the Simferopol prosecutor‘s office concluded that 
1,595 Sevastopol inhabitants, primarily serving on the Russian Black Sea Fleet, were 
found to be holding dual citizenship.
705
 To exemplify how deeply infiltrated the 
unlawful, dual citizen situation is in Ukraine, one need only to consider that at least 
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one FSB officer, Oleksiy Hamyunov, was one of the Crimean inhabitants found to 
have both a Russian and Ukrainian passport.
706
 
 In accordance with Article 14 of the Law on Citizenship of the Russian 
Federation, foreign citizens are able to receive Russian citizenship in a simplified 
manner if at least one of the following conditions is met: 
 
a) The person has at least one parent with Russian citizenship 
living on  Russian territory. 
b) The person had Soviet citizenship, lived and continues to live 
on the territory of a former Soviet state, which did not acquire 
citizenship of that said state and as a result remains a person 
without citizenship 
c) The person is a citizen of a former Soviet state which received 
middle professional or higher professional education in an 
educative facility of the Russian Federation after July 2002.
707 
 
The aforementioned provisions are some of the ways the people in South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia and other FSU states - which were never part of the Russian Federation – 
are able to ―legally‖ acquire Russian citizenship. The fact that dual citizenship is 
forbidden by both Ukrainian and Georgian law appears notwithstanding.  Notably, 
unlike Crimea, ―the Russian Federation did not have diplomatic relations in South 
Ossetia; there were no diplomatic representations or consular offices there. Thus it 
follows that the way South Ossetians gained these passports was illegal―.
708
 This is 
again indicative of a transnational post-Soviet political criminal network violating the 
laws of a third state in a systematic and transnational manner.  
 However, the fact that there is a Russian Consulate in Simferopol does not in 
any way legalize the dispersal of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens. The activity 
violates the laws of Ukraine.
709
 Dual citizenship is prohibited by Article 4 of the 
Ukrainian Constitution and the prohibition is regulated by the 2001 Law of Ukraine 
―on Ukrainian Citizenship‖. Yet, the rule of law and Ukraine‘s institutions are weak. In 
reaction to these violations, President Viktor Yushchenko called attention to the 
illegitimate activity and pronounced the issuance of Russian passports in Crimea an 
infringement of international law which demonstrates disrespect to sovereign states 
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whose territories do not permit dual citizenship.
710
 This open form of ―disrespect‖ 
foreseeably impacts the manner in which Crimean citizens view themselves in 
relation to the state to which they belong as well as the strength of its leadership.  
 To date, the true number of Ukrainian citizens who have been given Russian 
passports in Crimea, in direct violation of these laws, is unknown. Estimates vary 
from 6000 to 170,000.
711
 Whereas Stepan Havrysh, the Deputy Secretary of the 
National Security and Defense Council claimed there to be around 100,000 Russian 
citizens in Crimea with a dual citizenship, the pro-Russian umbrella NGO, the RCC, 
claimed a much higher figure of 170,000.
712
  
 The dispersal of Russian passports to Ukrainian citizens in Crimea combined 
with the fact that the Russian Black Sea Fleet provides Russia with a strong military 
presence on Ukrainian territory amplified Ukraine‘s concern about Russia‘s policy of 
defending its citizens living abroad.
713
 Thus, political forces in the Orange Coalition 
raised the issue to the level of a national security threat. ―Deputy NUNS faction 
leader B. Tarasyuk described the distribution of passports as Russia‘s ―secret 
aggression against Ukrainian citizens.‖ Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc deputies have drawn 
up a draft law making the obtaining of dual citizenship a criminal offence‖.
714
 The 
Proposed Law of Ukraine ―On bringing in Changes to certain acts (governing the 
declaration of citizenship of a third state No 3102-1 dated 18-11 2008) was to: 
regulate that a citizen having accepted the citizenship of another state shall be 
viewed only as a citizen of Ukraine: to make it a criminal act payable by fine, and to 
criminalize the concealment of a second nationality.
715
 
 As a result of the dispersal of Russian passports in Crimea being named a 
threat to national security, the SBU moved to stop the practice. Yet, such a move 
from the Ukrainian side raised tensions between the two states leading Kyiv to 
believe it ―could provide a pretext for Russia to intervene in defense of Russian 
citizens…‖
716
 This revealed one of the catch-22 situations created by triangle of 
Russia‘s policy to use its troops to protect its citizens and speakers abroad, 
separatism in the Black Sea Region and the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. 
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The situation was further exacerbated for the Orange Coalition by the fact that one of 
the justifications for the dispersal of Russian passports which has been voiced is the 
position that the Russian Federation maintains that Crimea was transferred to 
Ukraine unlawfully and thus is already a constitutive part of Russia.
717
 Once again, 
an example is given of how Ukraine‘s soft power security, this time policy making 
capability, has been impacted by the Russian policy of passport dispersal in the 
Autonomous Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine. 
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter the manner in which the Russian Federation built trust between 
Russia and the Crimean population was examined. The main actors involved in 
giving effect to Russia‘s soft power policy in Crimea include the FSB and GRU as 
well as a special psychological warfare unit. Markedly, their presence on the 
peninsula is directly connected to the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in 
Sevastopol and Feodosia. They, together with the Moscow State University Black 
Sea Branch and pro-Russian NGOs have consistently built trust between the 
Russian federation and the local population. Their activities include the printing of 
anti-state and anti-Euro Atlantic newspapers, the organization of mass protests, one 
of which effectively thwarted a NATO exercise. Their activities propagate unification 
with the Russian Federation and are inherently anti-Ukrainian. The manner in which 
these operations are funded is not yet, is linked to allegedly laundered money and 
illegitimate construction deals. The Crimean Tatar population generally supports 
Ukraine and Euro-Atlanticism. They perceive the Russian Federation as supporting 
and provoking conflict within their community. Poignantly, the religious strife is linked 
to the Cossak paramilitary grouping which is supported by the Russian Orthodox 
church. Russia‘s foreign policy towards Ukraine includes passportization. Dual 
citizenship is prohibited by Ukrainian law. This notwithstanding, the Russian 
consulate and pro-Russian NGOs propagate the acquisition of Russian citizenship in 
Crimea, despite pleas from the Ukrainian government. Linkages have thus been 
found between the Russian Federation‘s foreign policy toward Ukraine‘s Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea, soft power operations that affect its national security and the 
post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
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3.3 Conclusion Part Three 
In this part, a brief overview was given of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus in 
Ukraine. The character of this political-criminal nexus is specific; it was formally 
rooted in a Kremlin oriented Russian Empire and successor, the Soviet Union. In 
Ukraine, the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is a social network of corrupt 
politicians and businessmen, former nomenklatura, and security agents which 
advance Russia‘s foreign policy in Ukraine. This network has been alluded to as a 
fifth column. The network consists of 9 basic categories i.e. bureaucratic, 
commercial, ethnic-political, Slavic, former nomenklatura, religious-political, military 
and renegade powers. Inside Ukraine, the political functionaries of this network fall 
into 3 main groups, namely, those whose political careers depend on and are 
directed by Moscow; those who occasionally side with Moscow in exchange for some 
sort of material benefit from Moscow; and;, those who continue to view Russia as the 
rightful leader and support Ukraine‘s sovereignty simply because of their own 
financial or material interests. 
 A brief presentation was made of Ukraine‘s history, particularly as it pertains 
to post-Soviet separatism. Crimea and Sevastopol have been identified as the major 
territories where separatism has been promoted and supported by Russia‘s foreign 
policy and political-criminal nexus of Russian and Ukrainian citizenship. 
 The Black Sea Fleet has been an important naval power since its 
establishment in 1783. For centuries, men from all nationalities of the Russian 
Empire served on it. Then, in 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
declaration of Ukraine‘s independence and questions related to ownership and 
division of the fleet triggered serious hostility between the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine. This is when pro-Russian separatist activities of the political-criminal nexus 
began to surface. In 1992, Russian promoted separatism in Crimea was formally 
linked to the division of the Black Sea Fleet by the Head of Russia‘s Parliamentary 
Committee for foreign Affairs, Vladimir Lukin. Already in the April 1992, Ukraine‘s 
President at the time, Leonid Kravchuck formally noted that Russia was provoking 
social-political conflict in Crimea.  
 That year, a bomb attack was made by Russian intelligence services on a 
Ukrainian base. Sailors, who pledged their allegiance to Ukraine, rather than the 
Russian Federation, were consistently denigrated and abused. The post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus figured as a corruptive force in this regard by bribing 
Ukrainian service men to either abandon, or spy on, Ukraine. 
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Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet served as an instrument of political black mail. One 
example of this is the offer made by the Fleet‘s Admiral Kasatonov. The Admiral 
offered to hand over the fleet to Ukraine‘s authorities in exchange for the position of 
Minister of Defense. His request was denied by Kyiv and Kasatonov became an 
agent of Russian interests on Ukrainian territory. 
 In 1993, a secret protocol coupled the Black Sea Fleet and Crimea to energy 
security, particularly, gas trade. It has been asserted that the gas debt linked to Black 
Sea Fleet negotiations was a fictitiously produced by the post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus. And that in reality, Ukraine did not have energy debt towards the Russian 
Federation. Eventually, in 1997 the Black Sea Fleet Accords were signed on 
Ukraine‘s behalf by a major actor of Ukraine‘s post-Soviet political-criminal nexus, its 
Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko. The former prime minister is a convicted criminal 
who used the gas trade to embezzle between 200 and 800 million USD. He is also 
wanted for the murder of at least 3 persons including a member of Ukrainian 
parliament and the president of Ukraine‘s national bank.  
 Another part of the political-criminal nexus linked to the fleet is inside the 
Kremlin. It has been linked to corruption through falsification of documents, 
particularly, a 1948 document. The document has been allegedly modified to 
promote separatism in Crimea by claiming the city of Sevastopol was never a formal 
part of Crimea and therefore was not part of the 1954 Crimean transfer to Ukraine.  
 A prime example of Russia‘s overt claims to the peninsula, and Sevastopol in 
particular, is the pressure put on former Sevastopol Mayor Viktor Semenov, including 
an attempted assassination. Semenov committed the crime of treason by signing an 
illegal decree in which his council declared the city of Sevastopol an integral part of 
the Russian state. This act, combined with two assassination attempts, one on his 
life, and one on the life of his public nemesis, Crimean businessman, politician and 
criminal, Kondratevsky, place Semenov within the realm of the political-criminal 
nexus. Semenov later served as counselor general in St. Petersburg and was later 
appointed to head the Black Sea Fleet negotiation committees. The work of the 
committees remained relatively benign as is exemplified by the unresolved, serious 
issues pertaining to inventory, occupied territory, environmental damage and 
activities of Russia‘s secret services in Crimea. 
 To date, Crimea remains host to all of Russia‘s intelligence agencies. 
Importantly, it is alleged that the documents which permit the functioning of the 
foreign intelligence services in Ukraine, were unlawfully signed by President Kuchma 
in 2000. All departments of Russia‘s intelligence services have been directly linked to 
criminal activities or other, systematic, violations of Ukrainian laws. 
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 The political-criminal nexus figures most prominently here in the form of pro-
Russian NGOs, particularly the Russian Crimean Community and the People‘s Front 
Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia. During the time of the Orange Coalition, both umbrella 
organizations had been linked by Ukraine‘s intelligence services to the FSB and 
GRU, particularly to the 642nd psychological warfare grouping and organized crime. 
These major organizations have been accused of being funded by laundered money 
particularly the RCC.  Throughout the 1990‘s the RCC – which is directly linked to the 
Kremlin and the Ukrainian pro-Russian President‘s Party of Regions was labeled a 
front for organized criminals. One of the main patrons of this group is a man who has 
been a prominent supporter of Crimean separatism i.e. former mayor of Moscow, 
Yuri Luzhkov. 
In Ukraine, Yuri Luzhkov has been declared persona non grata numerous 
times for promoting separatism and anti-Ukrainian sentiment. The man has also been 
linked to transnational organized crime related to dirty construction schemes (some 
of which directly related to the Russian Black Sea Fleet), money laundering and 
corruption including insider trading on the peninsula. 
 The FSB has also been connected to attempt to destabilize the Crimean 
Tatar leaders, who have been staunch supporters of Ukraine and Euro-Atlanticism. 
The FSB and GRU are also linked to the Russian Orthodox Church which in turn is 
staunchly anti-NATO and promotes the notion that Russia is the Third Rome and the 
unification of the 3 original Kyivan Rus lands, namely, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. 
 The post-Soviet political-criminal nexus figured as a constant anti-Ukrainian 
actor which promotes the cause of pro-Russian separatism. The separatism has 
been provoked by both advertent and inadvertent acts by Ukrainian and Russian 
political criminal actors that target Ukraine‘s soft power security. One major way 
Ukraine‘s soft power has been targeted is through the dispersal of Russian passports 
throughout the peninsula in direct violation of Ukrainian laws. The People‘s Front 
―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ is an organization that has not only been linked to the 
FSB and laundered money, it also publically promoted the acquisition of Russian 
passports by Ukrainian citizens in Crimea. Selected activities of the People‘s Front 
―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ were presented within the framework of soft power 
security (Appendix C) to show how the organization has been instrumental in building 
trust between the people of the Crimean peninsula by targeting elements of Ukraine‘s 
soft power security namely, ideas pertaining to the 1) Level of  national integration a) 
ethnic b) linguistic c) religious d) territorial e) collective Memory; 2) Strength of 
national leadership a) government policy capability b) state institutions c) level of 
social discipline, and; 3) Perceived relevance of national strategy a) common interest 
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b) ideology. The following chart provides an overview of the manner in which 
Ukraine‘s soft power security has been targeted and how they related to the post-
Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
 
Figure 13 Soft Power PCN Analyses 
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1 = Level of National Integration 1a) cultural (i.e. ethnic, linguistic or religious), 1b) Territorial 1c) 
 
memory 
2 = Strength of national leadership 2a) Government policy capability 2b) Level of social discipline 
3 = Perceived Relevance of national strategy to common interests (common interests and ideology) 
 
Thus, it is possible to conclude that the political-criminal nexus has posed a major 
threat to Ukraine‘s soft power security in Crimea. For almost 20 years, operations 
have consistently and systematically, advertently and inadvertently targeted the 
Crimean population‘s perceptions to view Western democracy and Euro-Atlanticism, 
Ukraine, its culture and language as undesirable. Simultaneously, pro-Russian 
separatism has been promoted.  
 The fact that a separate conflict has not broken out in Crimea may have more 
to do with global East-West politics and the reinstatement of a pro-Russian president 
and government whose own party belongs to the largest political party in the Russian 
federation, ―United Russia‖. Clear links, based on information from members of 
Ukraine‘s former Orange Coalition, have been established between the anti-
Collective
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democratic, anti-Ukrainian, anti-Euro-Atlantic activities that promote separatism by 
targeting Ukraine‘s soft power. Most of these activities are linked to the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet and Russian intelligence services particularly the 642nd Department 
of Psychological Warfare. However, the nature of the post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus is that it includes Ukrainian actors as well. 
 If the allegations made by Ukraine‘s security services, representatives of its 
government, administration, and civil society in the period the Orange Coalition are 
accurate, it is possible to conclude that the Russian Black Sea Fleet has served as 
an anchor for soft power security operations that were aimed at the promotion of trust 
between the Crimean population and the Russian Federation to the extent of 
promoting separatism there. However, Ukrainian citizens, have played a pivotal role 
in harming the soft power and the perception of external and internal legitimacy of 
their very own state. Albeit the President who signed illegal documents permitting 
Russia‘s secret services on its territory, the Prime Minister who embezzled hundreds 
of millions in gas money and signed the Black Sea Fleet Accords, or the Ukrainian 
functionaries in charge of granting licenses to anti-state, separatism provoking news 
papers or even members of pro-Russian NGOs. 
 Thus, the Russian Federation has been served by the political-criminal nexus 
in Crimea. However, it appears that the main actors to blame are the Ukrainian 
members of the political-criminal nexus who rather serve their own pockets than their 
country and its citizens. Unfortunately, because of the nature of the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus, its actors appear to be as untouchable as the intangible 
power and security they destroy.  
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Conclusion 
History books are filled with men who stole, pillaged, raped and murdered to gain 
power. Yet, the manner in which they did so - in the name of a religion or sovereign 
power - converted them into heroes. Their immoral and unethical acts suggest that 
state behavior was not restricted by morality or ethics in international affairs. 
 In the second millennium A.D. very little appears to have changed. At any 
given moment, hundreds of conflicts and wars are either taking place or on the verge 
of erupting. What has changed however, are the technologies, communication 
systems, and information resources available to the warmongers. Particularly, the 
perspective has been advanced that wars can be fought inside the hearts and minds 
of the masses. Yet, the manners in which entire populations are seduced into 
supporting or even starting conflict remain vague. This is because the relationship 
between hearts and minds and national security has remained opaque, and, the 
linkages between the soft power of attraction and national security relatively 
unknown.  
 It was hypothesized here that in order for soft power to promote or 
orchestrate conflict, the hearts and minds of a given population needed to be 
attracted towards believing that going to war is necessary and therefore justified. It is 
obvious that states organize war to gain power. Yet, why should anybody‘s mind be 
manipulated in such a way as to cause support for war where previously there was 
none? It is clear that such policies keep up the warring status quo for power‘s sake 
and that power is dark. For this reason, it was also hypothesized here that states rely 
on covert and informal networks to finance and give effect to such policies. To test 
these hypotheses a region needed to be identified in which a powerful state 
appeared to be orchestrating separatist conflict with soft power. 
 The geopolitical dynamics and clashing great power interests in the Black 
Sea Region made it a fine candidate for such an analysis. The fall of the Soviet 
Union triggered a competition for power between the Russian Federation and the 
Western Allies. Moscow, fearful of losing power, had to prevent the post-Soviet 
states in the Black Sea Region from having the national strategy, will and authority to 
transform, cooperate and integrate with Western institutions. To do this, it appeared 
to instrumentalise separatist conflict as a geopolitical tool.   
 Since the orchestration of conflict and separatism violates national and 
international laws, separatists and insurgent groups depend on informal networks. 
Thus, Russia‘s reputation of being a state whose system relies on provocations and 
coordination between organized crime and the security services suggested that 
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organized political-criminal elements may also serve its foreign policy regarding 
separatism in post-Soviet states. The policy also appeared to rely on a symbiosis of 
formal and informal institutions, big business, NGOs and media. The use of these 
later institutions suggested a Hobbesian use of soft power.  For these reasons, the 
Russian Federations‘ foreign policy towards separatism became doubly interesting.  
 By the end of the first decade of the 21st Century, the scourge of armed 
conflict had broken out in all the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region; all but 
one. Inside Ukraine‘s Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the threat of separatism 
appeared to be directly linked to Ukraine‘s Euro-Atlantic integration, the Western 
Allies‘ global war on terrorism (particularly in Afghanistan) and Ukraine‘s democratic 
transition. Markedly, the Russian Black Sea Fleet seemed to be linked to soft power 
operations aimed at attracting the loyalty of the Crimean population away from Kyiv 
and toward Moscow. However, although it appeared to be so, it was not clear 
whether soft power was related to national security in such a way as to cause 
separatism. And, if it were, it was not clear whether such a Hobbesian use of soft 
power would rely on a political-criminal nexus for funding and logistical support. 
Thus, the following question arose: 
 
What are the linkages between national security, soft power and the political-
criminal nexus, and, to what extent are they a part of the Russian Federation’s 
foreign policy towards Ukraine, particularly, in the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea? 
 
It the case it would be possible to conclude that the promotion of separatism in 
Crimea was linked to soft power operations and a transnational political-criminal 
nexus, the immediate greater implication of such a conclusion would be that the 
Russian Federation has also employed this policy inside the other post-Soviet states 
in the Black Sea Region. More importantly, such a conclusion could theoretically be 
extrapolated to the global level of international relations and thereby shed light on 
how states illegitimately cause or stoke separatist conflicts and war using the soft 
power of attraction. To these ends, and to answer the main research question, the 
following three sub-questions were developed and answered: 
 
1) What is the relationship between soft power, national security and 
separatism? 
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The objective of Part One was to determine how soft power interlinks with national 
security and to identify the components of a state‘s soft power security that would 
need to be targeted to promote separatism. Ray Cline‘s formula of perceived power 
was first used to identify the intangible components of state power and their value as 
it pertains to state power. It was shown that the most important elements of state 
power are intangible. These components are Strategic Purpose and National Will. 
Since power politics and national security are intimately intertwined, a comparative 
analysis of Cine‘s intangible power components and the political and societal security 
sectors as presented by Buzan et al. was made. The results show the relationship 
between intangible power and the soft, political and societal, security sectors is 
correlative.  
 This correlativity forms the realm of what has been identified here as soft 
power security. Soft power security is affected by institution-dependent and 
independent ideas. These ideas pertain to three main categories of soft power: a) the 
level of national integration; b) the strength of national leadership and; c) the 
perceived relevance of national strategy. Within these categories one finds the key 
elements of soft power security, namely, cultural integration (language, religion, 
ethnicity, and common memory), territorial integration and common memory, 
government policy capability, level of social discipline, common interest and ideology. 
The use of ideas to target these elements of soft power security changes the 
identificational perceptions amongst people. Consequently, these are the elements of 
national security which Hobbesian powers must target to successfully spur 
separatism using the soft power of attraction.  
 Thus, soft power warfare is psychological. It aims at modifying ideas and 
perceptions people hold of themselves, each other and even the state to which they 
belong. When strategically organized, it leads to horizontal and/or vertical 
competition and, eventually, conflict and separatist war. As a result, although soft 
power, the power of attraction, sounds relatively benign, when harnessed by Lockean 
or Hobbesian state policies it is not. 
 
2) Are political-criminal relations used by states as an instrument of foreign 
policy and does their use as such affect the way states perceive each other in 
international relations; if so, what is the profile of the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus?  
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Thus, the objectives of Part Two was to establish the nature of the political-criminal 
nexus, to determine if it is used as a foreign policy instrument, and whether it affects 
the way states perceive one another in international relations. Also, transnational-
organized crime and political-criminal activities were taken out of the traditionally 
accepted national and apolitical realms and extrapolated to the realm of international 
political relations.  
 It is possible to conclude that transnational organized crime is both an 
international security threat and instrument of foreign policy. The 2001 United 
Nations Palermo Treaty against Transnational Organized Crime was used to 
ascertain what transnational organized crime is and whether the international legal 
community has linked it to state behavior. The core crimes codified by the treaty are 
1) Participation in a criminal group. 2) Laundering the proceeds of crime 3) 
Corruption and; 4) The Obstruction of Justice. Tellingly, three of the aforementioned 
four transnational crimes point to the existence of transnational political-criminal 
relations. The states party to the treaty recognized that states use transnational 
organized crime to affect the national security of others. They strongly discouraged 
state actors from effectuating such foreign policies. And, importantly, a legal, albeit 
non-binding provision linking state behavior to transnational organized crime was 
codified. This article specifically pertains to corruption of or by state representatives 
or other state officials in their international dealings. 
 In the second chapter of this part, the finding of historical thinkers including 
Weber, Horkheimer, Tilly and Chambliss made it possible to conclude that states are 
historically rooted in organized violence and protection rackets. Throughout history, 
when it was in the interest of the elite, states have employed informal means to gain 
power. It was through organized crime and violence that protection rackets 
transformed into states. Thus, it is possible to conclude that organized crime not only 
belongs to the state arsenal, it is one of the state‘s organizational forefathers.  
 The stage-evolutionary model of organized crime supports this conclusion. It 
shows that the dynamic nature of political-criminal relations affects the realms of 
power, including territorial power. This model which has, to date, only been applied to 
the internal state-level of analysis was extrapolated here to the international realm. 
And, it is concluded that on the international level, political-criminal relations also 
have the power to affect territorial control.  
 When combined with Roy Godson‘s valuable research, the Criminological 
Social Network Theory shows that political-criminal relations constitute a social 
structure within the state. The Criminological Social Network Theory shows the 
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political-criminal relations constitute a social structure within the state. As a result, 
viewing the formal and informal worlds as completely separate and independent 
entities is fallacious. At the highest level, often cloaked in immunity, the 
representatives of the two worlds meet in a political-criminal nexus. Within this 
symbiotic relationship, elites and criminals cooperate. The elite do this to maintain or 
gain power. The criminals cooperate with politicians to acquire legitimacy and exert 
influence, or control, over the formal world. Thus, to understand this nexus better, it is 
necessary to view the formal and informal worlds as an interdependent dyad.  
 Since the political-criminal nexus is a social structure, it is possible to profile 
the political-criminal nexus of any given state. Like states, transnational organized 
criminal groups are generally ethnically-rooted. To profile the political-criminal nexus 
of any given state, the historical relationship between its upper and underworld must 
be assessed. The structural and cultural causes as well as motives for actor 
cooperation within the political-criminal nexus of any given state must also be 
considered.  
Based on the findings of the aforementioned chapters, it is also possible to 
conclude that there is a post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. It has a number of 
specific, unique features. Foremost is that the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a 
once-contained political-criminal nexus to become an international one. The nexus is 
rooted in Russia‘s imperial past. It is a social network that spans the entire post-
Soviet space and links back to the Kremlin. Importantly, although the post-Soviet 
political-criminal nexus is strong and Kremlin oriented, not all of its activities or actors 
are directed or controlled by the Kremlin. To make such an assertion would be to 
overlook the anarchic nature of the political-criminal nexus which is centered on the 
acquisition and maintenance of power. Also not all of its actors are Russian citizens. 
Rather, many are citizens of the nations they work against. They include politicians 
and businessmen related to the former higher communist party, former 
nomenklatura, security agencies and buccaneer capitalists. The ideological character 
of this nexus is inherently anti-democratic and it is linked to pro-Russian separatism 
in the Black Sea Region. Being aware of the profile of the post-Soviet political 
criminal nexus thereby facilitates the understanding of post-Soviet regional dynamics.  
 These conclusions are of paramount importance to the studies of international 
relations and security. The advantages of including the profiles of the political-
criminal nexuses into the aforementioned disciplines lays in the fact that knowing the 
character of a state‘s political-criminal nexus facilitates the understanding of the 
manner in which, and reasons for the manner in which, states are perceived and 
behave.  
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3) What is Russia’s soft power policy toward the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea via the Russian Black Sea Fleet; and what is the extent to which Russia 
utilizes a political-criminal nexus in this particular case? 
 
Part Three contained the case study.  This part was divided into two chapters and 
relied upon open source materials, Ukrainian archives, information collected in the 
field including interviews with top ranking politicians and military functionaries.  
 The first chapter set the perspective on Ukraine‘s geopolitical position and 
how the post-Soviet political criminal nexus, developed in Part Two, figures inside 
Ukraine. Particular attention was given to the Russian Black Sea Fleet (RBSF) and 
pro-Russian separatism in Sevastopol where the fleet is mainly based. It is possible 
to conclude that of all the post-Soviet states in the Black Sea Region, Ukraine is the 
most important to Russia. Its geopolitical ―borderland‖ position, access to the Black 
Sea, vast mineral wealth, including energy resources, transport systems and fertile 
chornozem, make it a materially interesting land to control. Moreover, Moscow‘s 
interest in Ukraine goes beyond its tangible wealth. Its relationship with Ukraine is 
intimate because its roots trace back to Kyivan Rus, and, Russia (originally Muscovy) 
together with its Russian Orthodoxy were born there.  
 When Ukraine gained its sovereignty in an institutional vacuum in 1991, its 
Kremlin-centered political echelons were filled by members of the Soviet 
nomenklatura, higher communist party members and organized criminals privatizing 
or raiding state property. Formally, Ukraine continued to be ruled by these 
authoritarian regimes until the winter of 2004-2005. That winter, mass electoral 
falsification triggered the Orange Revolution. As a result, Ukraine saw its first 
patriotic, pro-Western, democratic president and government come to power. This 
development was not tolerated very well by pro-Russian forces inside Ukraine nor 
the Russian Federation. As a result, Russia, together with the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus, turned to use energy supplies and separatism to deter Ukraine‘s 
democratic transformations.  
 The Russian Black Sea Fleet has played an important role in this regard. It 
has served as the hard power component in Russia‘s smart power foreign policy of 
promoting pro-Russian separatism in Crimea. The threat of democracy in Ukraine, as 
well as in Russia, linked the Black Sea Fleet to controversial gas deals, gas debts 
and the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. The Black Sea Fleet is a keystone 
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facilitating members of this nexus to accrue power through systematic violations of 
laws including the state‘s constitution, administrative laws and the criminal codex. 
 
 In the second chapter, a presentation and analysis were made of Russian, 
and pro-Russian, institutions linked to soft power operations aimed at trust-building 
between the Russian Federation and Ukraine‘s population in Crimea. At the end of 
this part, the framework for soft power security analysis, developed in Part One, was 
used to determine the extent to which soft power, the post-Soviet political-criminal 
nexus and the promotion of separatism in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in 
Ukraine constituted part of Russia‘s informal foreign policy. 
 It is possible to conclude that Russia‘s soft power policy aimed at the 
promotion of vertical and horizontal competition and separatism in Ukraine‘s 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The soft power security framework of analysis was 
enhanced by factoring in the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. The soft power 
activities were then analyzed for linkages to the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus. 
Importantly, certain activities are directly linked to the Kremlin and soft power 
aggression. For instance, each element of Ukraine‘s soft power security has been 
directly targeted by Russian secret services particularly the FSB and GRU‘s 642nd 
Department for Psychological Warfare. Officers of Russia‘s secret services have also 
indirectly reduced Ukraine‘s soft power by unlawfully gaining Ukrainian citizenship, 
training private security agents in Crimea, and providing its population access to 
cheap, unlawfully-imported products, particularly oil and gas.   
  Russian intelligence services are infiltrated into pro-Russian NGOs in 
Ukraine. These NGOs promote Russian power in Ukraine. Their activities include the 
burning of Ukrainian books, vandalism of state property and the promotion of 
unlawful passportization in Crimea. The activities directly influence institutionally-
dependent and independent identity ideas related to all the components of Ukraine‘s 
soft power security. The sources funding these operations are not transparent. 
Markedly, they have been linked to Russian figureheads including Konstantin Zatulin 
and Moscow‘s former mayor Yuri Luzhkov, money laundering and corrupt 
construction deals linked to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.  
 Importantly, members of Ukraine‘s post-Soviet elite, including former 
Presidents and Prime Ministers, Mayors, diplomats, security officers, lower 
administrative actors and entrepreneurs are also part of the post-Soviet political-
criminal nexus. Their actions include extortion, fraud, corruption, unlawful 
privatization embezzlement of millions (if not billions) of dollars from the state coffers, 
treason and alleged murder. Their political-criminal activities provide pro-Russian 
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forces power. Their fraudulent, self-serving acts also promote transnational 
corruption at the expense of the rule of law, democracy and the territorial integrity of 
their own state.  
 
This all withstanding, it is possible to answer the main research question of this study 
as follows: 
 
 Soft power is linked to national security in such a way that Hobbesian actors 
use it to strategically provoke separatism in third states. The political-criminal 
nexus is linked to the promotion of separatism in this regard insofar as the 
promotion of conflict and insurgency is prohibited by national and 
international laws, and, by their very nature insurgents rely on covert and 
informal structures for logistical and financial support. It is possible to 
conclude that the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus is linked to soft power 
operations that promote separatism in Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea. The post-Soviet political-criminal nexus, particularly through the 
presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, has played a key role in Russia’s soft 
power policy aimed at deterring Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. For almost 
20 years, operations have consistently and systematically, advertently and 
inadvertently targeted the Crimean population’s perceptions to induce a 




The research at hand was not only founded on the disciplines of International 
Relations, Security Studies, Criminology and International Law; its objective was also 
to enhance them. It was expected to find that states can provoke separatism using 
soft power, and, that a soft power security framework could be developed with which 
to analyze state behavior in this regard. It was also expected that states do use 
transnational organized crime and that its use as such occurs through the political-
criminal nexus. It was also anticipated that the political-criminal nexus would be 
linked to state-building and identity, and, that by adding the political-criminal nexus to 
the state arsenal light would be shed onto how it affects state perceptions and 
behaviors.  
 If states were moral and ethical actors, all of their actions would be directed at 
influencing human behavior towards trust, the common good, and the realization of 
peace. But, great states, like most ―great men‖, are almost always bad states 
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because power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Powerful states do 
not restrict themselves to legitimate means or ends while competing for power. They 
steal. They lie. They informally seduce mankind into distrust, fear and ―justified‖ war 
by targeting perceptions and identity ideas people hold of themselves, one another 
and the world around them.   
 Thus, the generally accepted perception of war as something limited to hard 
military operations and the outright use of violence by actors pursing power is wrong. 
The instruments of war are not limited to technologies that destroy buildings, material 
assets and human lives. A softer form of warfare exists. It instumentalises the media, 
non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, intelligence services, and 
political-criminal relations to strategically target man‘s most precious possessions: his 
heart and his mind.  
 The Hobbesian and Lockean use of soft power requires particular attention, 
study and analysis. In a virtually unnoticeable, covert manner, strategic soft power 
security operations provoke conflict as well as territorial and sovereign demise. They 
strategically spur animosity and fear. They jeopardize the freedom of thought and the 
security of future generations. These covert state and non-state actors greatly impact 
international relations. Yet, very little remains known about their existence, 
resources, activities and influence on the upper world. Thus, legitimate state and 
non-state actors must be keenly aware of the power of attraction, where it originates, 
why it is effective, and the purpose for which it is used. 
 Accepting the conclusions drawn here, the political-criminal nexus should also 
be recognized as an unaddressed foreign policy instrument through which legitimacy, 
transparency, justifiability and accountability of the state disappear. The international 
character of the post-Soviet political-criminal nexus may be unique, but the 
phenomenon of international political-criminal relations is not. It is possible to 
enhance the studies of International Relations, Security Studies and Law by profiling 
the political-criminal nexus of any given state and examining how it links to foreign 
affairs. Including it into the study of geopolitics shall also provide civil society 
knowledge with which to counter illegitimate state policies. 
 One way to start is by examining how and why infamous, anti-Communist 
leaders from all over the world, who embezzled hundreds of billions of dollars from 
their populations, have either never stood trial, received abhorrently light sentences 
or were granted political asylum in democratic states. From an institutional 
perspective, a deep analysis of the activities and international relations of the US 
Drug Enforcement Agency is likely to provide good insight into the linkages between 
the international drug trade, state-building and war. And, on an individual level, Viktor 
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Bout serves as a prime example of how a single man allegedly serviced multiple 
states and regimes by trafficking virtually everything from airplanes, arms and 
chickens to delivering international aid for the United States, the Russian Federation, 
South America, countries in the Middle East and Africa as well as regimes in 
Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Sudan and Libya. The list of names and foreign policies attached to them is 
undoubtedly long. 
 The problem is that the political-criminal nexus is a fact. It is more than just a 
problem of public policy or a national security threat. It is an international security 
phenomenon that keeps up the warring status quo. Perhaps, the great philosopher 
Emmanuel Kant did not err to search for a unifying power that would impose the 
product of practical and pure reason upon man. But, but did he really believe that 
states would be capable of imposing it, or that it was ever going to happen?  The 
balance between good men and bad men, as with states, is usually maintained not 
by the state, but rather by individuals with the free will to choose between good and 
evil.  
 Evil people are not only governed by states, often they can be found within 
the very walls of state institutions, running them. They, like powerful states, do not 
often delay in their resort to corruption, coercion and violence to get what they want. 
They commit crimes in their villages, towns, city councils, parliaments, 
administrations, and yes, within the international community. Their criminality 
jeopardizes states and the common good. Perhaps the knowledge that our hearts 
and minds are the most important parts of our personal security, national security, 
and, in turn, international security will highlight the necessity for our own actions to be 
civilized and conscious ones.  
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Russian Community of Crimea – (Russkaya Obshyna Kryma) 1993 –  
Leader: Sergey Tsekov – deputy speaker Crimean parliament 
    Member of Presidium of the International Council of 
Russian Compatriots established in 2002 by Moscow‘s administration. 
    Member of the Coordination Council of Russian 
compatriots established in 2006 by Russian MFA 
Collaborates closely with the Institute for the CIS states 
Funded by Luzhkov, Zatulin, Russian MFA, Russian Presidential Administration  
15,000 Members 
Members are associated with: The Russian Bloc, Party of Regions, Communist Party 
and the Progressive Socialist Party 
 
Established the National Council of Russian Compatriots, an umbrella organization 
for all Russian organizations in Ukraine, uniting 25 organizations including: 
 All-Ukrainian association of Russian culture ―Rus‖ 
 All-Ukrainian national culture association ―Russian Assembly‖ 
The Russian Council of Ukraine 
Russian Movement of Ukraine 
The Party ―Rus‖ 
The Russian Community of Sevastopol 
 
The People’s Front “Sevastopol- Crimea-Russia” 
Est. 2005 
 
The National Front “Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia” 
Est. 2006 
Association of 16 organizations: 
 Congress of Russian Communities of Crimea 
 ―Russian Front of Sergei Shuvaynykov‖ –  
 The Crimean Association of Russian Compatriots 
 A human rights organization ―vira‖(faith) 
 The Union of Orthodox Citizens of Crimea 
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Leader: ―Russian Front of Sergei Shuvaynykov‖  
The Institute of the CIS States 
 Zatulin – Member of Russian Duma 
 
Youth Movements 
Proryv est. 2005(former leader Aleksey Dobychyn – persona non grata, Natalya 
Polyakova she is also head of the Russian Community of Yevpatoria subdivision of 
the Russian Community of Crimea and member of the WG of the All Ukrainian 
Council of Compatriots) 
  
Eurasian Youth Movement est. 2004 
Founded by Alexander Dugin – close ties to Kremlin and Russian Military Intelligence 
Act actively with:  ―Bratsvo‖ 
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Appendix C 
 
SCR Actions and Ukraine’s Soft Power Security 
In this section, a brief chronological overview is provided of certain SCR activities for 
the period 2005 – 2010. Each activity has been ordered according to the element of 
soft power security it affects, however, it is important to keep in mind the fact that the 
elements of soft power over lap and thereby one activity may affect one or all of the 
elements. Let it be noted, that officially, the SCR has not claimed the use of religion 
in its activity. For this reason, some aspects of how religion has been used to 
promote trust between the peoples of Crimea and the Russian Federation are 
considered in a separately below.   
 
1. Level of national integration 
Cultural – ethnic 
November 18, 2005 – a rally organized by the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-
Russia‖ by the ―Breeze‖ the television station of the Ukrainian military forces. The 
participants demanded the removal of Ukraine‘s ―occupational fleet‖ from the hero-
city of Sevastopol and to halt broadcasting of the ―ultra-nationalistic‖ TV station.  
 
January 21, 2006 – a rally in Sevastopol, dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the 
Republic of Crimea that was followed by the Front supporters expelling ―Student 
Brotherhood‖ Bandera followers (Ukrainian patriot movement) from the Black Sea 
headquarters.  
 
July 10, 2006 – a protest in front of the Russian General Consulate in Simferopol 
demanding it to initiate parliamentary hearings in the Russian Duma on violations of 
rights of the Russian compatriots in Crimea and to introduce economic sanctions 
against Ukraine.  
 
August 24, 2006 – a rally on Nakhimov‘s square in Sevastopol on the 15th 
anniversary of Ukraine‘s independence was held with slogans ―Occupants – Get out 
of Crimea!‖ Bandera followers from the Students Brotherhood together with the city 
administration and law enforcement forces seeing the number of participants had to 
give up ―provocations‖ against the Front.  The gathered participants spread out 
symbols of the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖, Russian flags and 
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posters ―15 years of the Russian imprisonment‖, ―Occupants – Get out of Crimea‖ 
and so on.  
 
April 19, 2007 – a rally held by the Ukrainian Sevastopol administration calling to 
expel the Head of the ―occupational Ukrainian administration‖ in Sevastopol, 
Kunitsyn,  from the city of the Russian glory. A plate ―OCCUPATIONAL 
ADMINISTRATION‖ was hung on the Ukrainian administration building. The City 
Council was sent a resolution on confirming the Russian status of the hero-city. The 
activists tried to install the Russian flag on the administration building; however militia 
pulled the flag out and clashed with the protesters. Admiral Usoltsev was injured in 
the fight.  
 
May 30, 2007 – a performance ―Let‘s Save Crimea from Ukraine‖ demanding to 
deport Ukrainian politicians into African countries took place by the office of Ukraine‘s 
President in Crimea. A copy of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine was publicly burned. The 
―Eurasians‖ asserted that as a result of the democratic developments in Kyiv, they 
―are not interested in the fate of poor doctor Frankenstein‘s creature‖ supporting ―the 
process of natural secession of incompatible, extraneous and not integrated parts.‖  
 
July 16, 2007 - during the celebration of the anniversary of Ukraine‘s Declaration of 
Sovereignty, the activists demanded an immediate withdrawal of Ukrainian military 
forces from Crimea. The rally participants also urged to declare Sevastopol and 
Crimea ―a territory without NATO‖. A Nazi swastika was publicly hanged on a gate of 
Ukraine‘s military headquarters.  
 
October 23, 2007 – a press-conference ―Russian Boycott Election of Ukrainian 
Oligarchs‖ of the SCR and the Eurasian Youth Union dedicated against ―a joint 
project of the Presidential Secretariat and the Security Service of Ukraine, who set 
Ukraine‘s foot in NATO‘s door‖. The loud outrage regarding the Tryzub on top of the 
Hoverla Mountain (the Tryzub is Ukraine‘s national symbol which was banned during 
Russia‘s empire and the Soviet regime. It was destroyed by members of the Eurasian 
Youth Group on the highest peak in Ukraine). The SCR and EYU asserted the action 
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Cultural - Linguistic 
May 24, 2006 – a cause on Lenin Square in Simferopol ―To Abolish Useless 
Ukrainian Language!‖ triggered rage on the side of nationalists all over Ukraine. The 
leaders of UNA-UNSO, CUN and other Bandera organizations demanded the 
Ukrainian Security Services and the General Prosecution to dispel the People‘s Front 
―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ otherwise they threaten to deal with the Front by 
physical means.  
 
Territorial Integration 
September 9, 2005 – supporters of the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ 
protested by the Ukrainian military headquarters in Sevastopol chanting ―Occupants 
– Get Out of Crimea.‖ 
 
September 14, 2005 – a rally of the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ 
announced an address to the ARC Supreme Council urging the parliamentarians to 
demand recognition of annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol from the Ukrainian 
leadership and to initiate a process of reunification with Russia.  
 
September 27, 2005 – a rally in front of the Supreme Council of Crimea demanding 
the adoption of an address to the Ukrainian leadership to ―stop annexation of Crimea 
and Sevastopol‖. The Supreme Council ignored urges of the People‘s Front.  
 
October 4, 2005 – a rally-requiem in Simferopol dedicated to tragic events of October 
3-4, 1993 in Moscow. The participants brought a package of documents which were 
adopted by the executed Supreme Council of Russia, and confirmed the Russian 
sovereignty over Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian General Consulate.  
 
November 6, 2005 – Coordination Council of the People‘s Front embarks on an 
initiative to cancel Article 110 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code on encroachment on 
the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which it claims does not meet norms and principles 
of the international law and Helsinki Final Act as well as the General Declaration of 
Human Rights.  
 
January 24, 2006 – simultaneous protests in 6 of the largest cities in Crimea 
(Simferopol, Sevastopol, Kerch, Yevpatoriya, Yalta and Feodosiya) urging members 
of the local councils to request the Russian President and Duma to denounce the 
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Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the RF and 
to claim rights on Crimea and Sevastopol.  
 
January 30, 2006 – an open address to Moscow‘s Mayor Yuri Luzhkov requesting to 
start the second front in Russia to fight for the Russian Crimea and Sevastopol and 
to combine efforts with People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖.  
 
February 20, 2006 – large rallies by the office of the President of Ukraine and the 
Russian General Consulate commemorating the ―tragic event of the concession of 
Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954‖. The relevant petitions were 
conveyed to the Presidents of Ukraine and the RF.  
 
March 21, 2006 – The People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ announced the 
launching of the program ―Ukraine without Crimea‖. The organizers expect Crimeans 
to file numerous administrative lawsuits demanding from the Parliament of Ukraine to 
exempt Part 10 ―Autonomous Republic of Crimea‖ and all provisions that refer to 
ARC and Sevastopol as these territories are not subject to Ukraine‘s jurisdiction.  
 
March 31, 2006 – a presentation by People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ 
before media in Sevastopol by the Eternal Fire memorial urging people of Crimea to 
join the  ―Ukraine without Crimea‖ cause.  
 
November 3, 2006 – a rally by the Russian General Consulate in Simferopol 
demanding to declare the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 
between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, signed in Kiev on May 31, 1997 as 
invalid and to present territorial claims to Ukraine for Crimea and Sevastopol.  
 
May 7, 2007 – a rally held by the Crimean Supreme Council dedicated to the 15th 
anniversary of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea 1992, which declared 
Crimea as a sovereign state. The members of the Crimean parliament were urged to 
resume provisions of the Constitution.  
 
Collective Memory 
February 8, 2006 – a rally held together with the youth organization ―Proryv‖ by the 
office of the President of Ukraine in Crimea dedicated to the Day of anti-Nazi heroes, 
against political repressions and Banderas‘ occupation of Crimea and Sevastopol.  
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January 20, 2007 – a rally in Sevastopol dedicated to the 16th anniversary of 
referendum on resuming Crimean ASSR as a part of the Union.  
 
March 14 & 15, 2010 – pro-Russian parties organized a Ukrainian book burning 
event at the feet of a statue dedicated to Catherine the Great. The teaching of 
Ukrainian history, language and culture were deemed as provocative acts to cause 
hate between Russians and Ukrainians. Thus, Ukrainian books and textbooks were 
destroyed. Importantly, special attention was given to the Kremlin created famine, 
―The Holodomor‖ which was strictly forbidden to talk about in the Soviet era. The 
books included information on the atrocities of collectivization from which millions of 
Ukrainians were killed.1  
 
Strength of National Leadership 
October 13, 2005 – a rally by the office of the President of Ukraine in ARC on the 
occasion of not granting the Nobel Peace Prize to Viktor Yushchenko. The 
participants demanded the launching of a process to return Crimea and Sevastopol 
to Russia.  
 
November 19, 2005 – ―Krymska Pravda‖ newspaper presents an appeal signed by 
leaders of several Crimean and Sevastopol‘s NGOs to Russian President Putin 
urging to demand from the Ukrainian leadership to recognize a fact of annexation of 
Crimea and Sevastopol.  
 
May 5, 2006 – a rally by the office of the Ukrainian President in Crimea, ―The 
Constitution of the AR Crimea adopted by the collaborators of the occupants in 
1998.‖ Addressing the President of Ukraine the Front demanded to reinforce the 
Constitution of Crimea of May 6, 1992, which was illegally denounced by the 
Ukrainian authorities in 1995. 
 
December 1, 2006 – a rally held by the office of the President of Ukraine in Crimea 
stating that results of the referendum held on December 1, 1991 on Ukraine‘s 
independence are not compulsory for Crimea and Sevastopol due to the then acting 
legislation. The Law of USSR ―On the order of solving issues related to exiting of a 
member republic from the USSR‖ of April 3, 1990 preserved the right for the 
autonomous entities to adopt own decisions on their legal and national status.  
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January 31, 2007 – a protest by the Supreme Council of Crimea against the Crimean 
Constitution of 1998 because it contradicts the results of the January 20 1991 
referendum, and urging the removal of the ―occupational‖ blue-yellow symbols on the 
parliament‘s building.  
 
February 5, 2007 – a press-conference held in Simferopol is held to state that the 
Ukrainian authorities are using a clone of the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-
Russia‖ the so-called ―National‖ Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖. Claiming that by 
such means Ukraine pursues a goal to incite a permanent controlled intra-ethnical 
conflict.  
 
March 6, 2007 – a rally:‖Crimea knows and praises its heroes. Get your hands out of 
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov!‖  
 
August 24, 2007 - an event ―Putin – Give us a Gas Attack! Blackout to the Bandera 
State‖ was dedicated to celebration of Ukraine‘s Independence Day in the town of the 
Russian glory Sevastopol. On that day the main square ―dazzled‖ with Russian flags.  
 
November 2, 2007 - on the eve of the National Unity Day the Eurasian Youth Union 
and the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ held simultaneous rallies in front 
of the Crimean office of the President of Ukraine in Simferopol and the Ukrainian 
Embassy in the Russian Federation. The participants demanded the Ukrainian 
authorities to withdraw their armed forces from Crimea and Sevastopol.  
 
Government Policy Capability 
September 20, 2005 – a rally by the Russian General Consulate requesting the 
Russian leadership to pay attention to discrimination of Russians in Crimea. 
Representatives of the People‘s Front Svyatoslav Kompaniyets, Anatoliy Los and 
Valeriy Podyachiy met the Council representatives and presented the Declaration on 
Establishing the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia.  
 
November 24, 2005 – A letter delivered to the regional office of the Ukrainian 
President on the occasion of the anniversary of the so-called ―Orange Revolution‖: 
―A.Matvienko, appointed by you, escaped from Crimea followed by applause and 
curses from a crowd, because he, as nobody else, managed to mobilize Crimeans 
for a struggle with ethnocide of Russians on their own soil. Because of such 
colleagues of yours there is an unreachable precipice between the South-East and 
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the actually rural Ukraine. Based on the abovementioned, the People‘s Front 
―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ looks forward to have fruitful cooperation with You, 
Viktor Andreyevich, in a cause of reunifying the indigenously Russian land with its 
historical motherland.  
 
May 29, 2006 – a press-conference marking the start of events in Feodosiya, where 
the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea of May 6, 1992 was claimed to be the only 
alternative for Crimea in its fear to find itself in NATO together with Ukraine. The 
leader of the Russian Community of Crimea Nelya Protasova took part in the press-
conference. She was also an organizer of an anti-NATO protest by the Feodosiya 
port. The Russian Community of Feodosiya joined the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-
Crime-Russia‖. Information about ―the US intention to deploy a military base in 
Crimea‖ was shared as well as it was assured that the Crimeans will not let it happen 
by any means.  
 
December 21, 2006 – a rally in front of the Russian General Consulate demanding 
the Russian President to abstain from discussing delimitation of maritime borders 
with Ukraine and to raise an issue of territorial jurisdiction of Crimea and Sevastopol.  
 
April 3, 2007 – a press-conference in Simferopol Informpress Center was held to 
present a response to threats of the Executive Head of the Ukrainian Security 
Service Valentyn Nalyvaichenko about closing down pro-Russian organizations. The 
press-center building was surrounded with supporters.  
 
November 13, 2007 - Member of Parliament Leonid Grach requested the General 
Prosecution to provide a legal assessment of the actions of Sevastopol law 
enforcement services that detained leaders of several NGOs from the People‘s Front 
―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ for 3 hours during celebration of the National Unity Day.  
 
January 17, 2008 – a rally held in Simferopol in front of the Russian General 
Consulate demanding the Russian leadership to take measures to prevent removal 
of the Black Sea Fleet from Crimea. Russian Vice Councilor V.Pashedko was 
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Level of Social Discipline 
February 28, 2006 – a press-conference of the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-
Russia‖ urging the Crimeans to vote ―against all‖ at elections to the Supreme Council 
of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.  
 
March 9, 2006 – a press-conference of the People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-
Russia‖ calling Crimeans‘ attention to the ―fact that free and fair elections can‘t take 
place on the occupied territories‖.  
 
June 28, 2006 – a rally by the Supreme Council of Crimea bullied parliamentarians-
collaborationists. The Constitution of Ukraine is placed in a coffin on the eve of its 
anniversary. The coffin is dispatched to the President of Ukraine with a sign on the 
top of the coffin ―To the People‘s President V. Yushchenko from the People‘s Front 
―Sevastopol-Crime-Russia.‖  
 
Perceived relevance of national strategy to common interests 
Common interests 
September 1, 2005 – protest of People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖ against 
the ―ethnocide of Russians on their own soil‖ by the school #43 in the town of 
Komsomolsk with slogans ―Russians have been declared a war. The challenge is 
accepted.‖  
 
January 3, 2006 – leaders of 9 Crimean NGOs signed an agreement to implement 
political project People‘s Front ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia 
 
October 7, 2006 – a rally in Yevpatoriya in support of the referendum results in 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic.  
 
February 19, 2007 - a rally held by the office of the President of Ukraine in Crimea 
dedicated to the ―tragic anniversary of illegitimate concession of Crimea from Russia 
to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954‖. The participants demanded the Ukrainian authorities 
provide historical, legal and moral assessments of the ―arbitrary decisions of the 
totalitarian regime on this illegal concession‖. A relevant appeal to the President of 
Ukraine was adopted. The Ukrainian President‘s office was declared an occupational 
administration and the relevant plaque was installed on the building. The cause ―Let‘s 
help Ukraine to amend its Constitution‖ was launched. A text of part 10  ―On the Law 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea‖ and all other articles that mentioned Crimea and 
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hero-city Sevastopol as territories that are subject to the Ukrainian sovereignty were 
burned. It was claimed that ‖in such a way, the Constitution of Ukraine got adjusted 
to the European standards of democracy‖.  
 
January 16, 2008 - a press-conference ―Attempts to outcast the Black Sea Fleet from 
Crimea as a pro-Russian consolidation factor on the peninsula‖ held in Simferopol 
Informpress Center. Repressions against the pro-Russian activists are claimed to 
occur in pursuit of the goal to clear a way for removing the Black Sea Fleet from 
Crimea and obstruct an organized resistance against Ukraine‘s accession into 
NATO.   
 
Ideology 
December 26, 2005 – a petition to congratulate President Viktor Yushchenko on the 
anniversary of the elections victory, which marked a new stage for the Russian 
liberation movement in Crimea  
 
March 15, 2007 – a rally took place by a gate of the Ukrainian military headquarters 
in the city of Russian glory Sevastopol dedicated to the 11th anniversary since the 
Russian Duma denounced the ―Belovezhskiy Mutiny‖. The rally participants also 
recognized the Belovezhskiy agreement as illegitimate from the day it was signed. 
The rally participants held posters, flags of the Soviet Union, USSR military forces 
and the Russian Federation. They chanted ―Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia‖, ―Occupants 
– get out of Crimea.‖ An ultimatum to the Ukrainian army commander demanding 
immediate capitulation was to have been presented personally by Admiral of the 
USSR Military Forces A.Usoltsev. However, the Ukrainians ―were afraid to admit the 
admiral into their territory, which was illegally occupied by the Ukrainian armed 
forces.‖ The participants installed a white flag on the Ukrainian headquarters by 
themselves.  
 
July 2, 2007 - a demand to rename the Lycee of 10th Anniversary of Ukraine‘s 
independence into the Lycee named after Bogdan Khmelnitsky was conveyed to the 
Council of Ministers of Crimea, because any mentioning of events or dates related to 
demise of the USSR is ―unacceptable and outrageous‖.  
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